Creation of GKO
Stalin's actions in the early days of the war can be called feverish, disorderly and reactive. Unable to control the situation, not knowing how to lead the troops, Stalin simply tried to do something, because it was impossible to do nothing. Basically, these were desperate and inadequate attempts to launch a counterstrike, which often, if not in most cases, worsened the situation and caused new casualties.
Stalin, apparently, was fully aware of how great the threat looming over the country was. There is convincing evidence that already in the first days of the war, Stalin tried to come to an agreement with Hitler, yielding to him a number of Soviet territories in the west of the USSR in exchange for a cessation of hostilities. On Stalin's instructions, Beria organized a meeting of his representative with the envoy of the allied Germany, Bulgaria. The diplomat, with the hope of transferring it to Hitler, was asked about the conditions of peace: what territories does Germany claim? The fate of this initiative is unknown. Most likely, the Bulgarian envoy simply did not get involved in mediation. However, this feeling of the soil speaks volumes. Even if it was a maneuver aimed at dampening the German offensive impulse, it is obvious that Stalin was aware of the threat of defeat.
Other facts testified to this as well. Along with the extensive mobilization of the Red Army and the preparation of new lines of defense, a mass evacuation began in the first days of the war. Moreover, not only the population and material resources from the front-line areas were subject to export. A secret, but very indicative, evacuation of the capital, which was still at a considerable distance from the hostilities, was carried out. On June 27, 1941, the Politburo approved a decree on the urgent (within three days) export from Moscow of state reserves of precious metals, precious stones, the Diamond Fund of the USSR and the values of the Kremlin Armory. On June 28, it was just as urgently decided to evacuate banknotes from the Moscow vaults of the State Bank and the State Sign. On June 29, a decision was made to transfer the apparatuses of the people's commissariats and other leading institutions to the rear. On July 2, the Politburo decided to take the sarcophagus with Lenin's body to Siberia, on July 5 - the archives, primarily the archives of the government and the Central Committee of the party.
One of the functionaries, summoned to Stalin on the afternoon of June 26, recalled: “Stalin looked unusual. The view is not just tired. The view of a person who has suffered a strong internal shock. Before meeting him, I felt for all sorts of indirect facts that it was very difficult for us there, in the border battles. Perhaps a rout is brewing. Seeing Stalin, I realized that the worst had already happened. " The next few days brought no relief. Stalin was increasingly aware of the futility of his orders and the extent of the army's uncontrollability.
Just a week after the start of the war, disturbing news began to arrive in Moscow about the dire situation of the Western Front and the surrender of the capital of Belarus, Minsk. Communication with the troops was largely lost. There was a heavy pause in the Kremlin. On June 29, for the first time since the beginning of the war, no meetings were recorded in Stalin's Kremlin cabinet. According to Mikoyan's testimony, Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan and Beria gathered at Stalin's evening. Most likely, the meeting took place either in Stalin's Kremlin apartment or at his dacha. Stalin phoned Timoshenko. Again to no avail. The military did not control the situation. Alarmed, Stalin broke his usual routine and invited the members of the Politburo to go to the People's Commissariat of Defense. Here he was once again convinced that the catastrophe had acquired enormous proportions. Stalin attacked the generals with reproaches and accusations. Unable to withstand the tension, Chief of the General Staff Zhukov burst into tears and ran into the next room. Molotov went to calm him down. This scene apparently sobered Stalin. He realized that it was useless to put pressure on the military. Leaving the building of the People's Commissariat of Defense, Stalin, according to the testimony of Mikoyan and Molotov, said: "Lenin left us a great legacy, we - his heirs - pissed away all this."
Strong expressions and rudeness were not uncommon for Stalin. In this case, however, they reflected a really high degree of confusion. From the People's Commissariat of Defense, Stalin, apparently, left for his dacha.
The next day, June 30, Stalin did not appear not only in his Kremlin office, but in Moscow in general. In a situation of growing disaster, such self-isolation could have critical consequences. The huge administrative machine, built under Stalin, in his absence inevitably failed. I had to do something. The initiative was taken by Molotov, the senior in the informal hierarchy of members of the Politburo. According to Mikoyan, Molotov said: “Stalin has such a prostration that he is not interested in anything, has lost the initiative, is in poor condition". This was indirectly confirmed many years later by Molotov himself in conversations with Chuev: “For two or three days he did not appear, he was at his dacha. He was worried, of course, was a little depressed. " It is obvious that memory betrayed Molotov in details: Stalin remained at the dacha for a shorter period than two or three days. However, in the conditions of the catastrophic start of the war, even a short absence of the leader, naturally, was perceived as critical.
Alarmed, Molotov decided to act. He summoned Beria, Malenkov and Voroshilov to a meeting. This, of course, was not about the formal or actual displacement of Stalin from power. Companions racked their brains over how to "lure" Stalin out of his dacha, to force him to return to business. The task was not easy. The established order did not involve visits to Stalin's dacha without an invitation. In an emergency, such an unauthorized visit could have been particularly painful for Stalin. It was no less difficult to formulate the reason for such a trip. To tell Stalin openly that his depression threatens the security of the state, no one would have dared. However, the Politburo members, skilled in political intrigue, came up with a brilliant move. They all decided together (necessarily together!) To go to Stalin and propose to him a project to create a supreme authority for the war period - the State Defense Committee, headed by Stalin himself. In addition to Stalin, it was proposed to include four project developers in the GKO. Molotov was appointed first deputy chairman of the State Defense Committee.
Now everything worked out smoothly and convincingly. There was a good reason for the visit to Stalin, which had nothing to do with the fact that he did not appear at the workplace. The proposal to create a GKO headed by Stalin demonstrated not only the determination to continue the struggle, but also the loyalty of his comrades-in-arms to the leader. The collective trip made it possible to smooth over Stalin's possible indignation.
When the plan was agreed upon by Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov and Beria, Mikoyan and Voznesensky were summoned to Molotov's office. They were two members of the steering group that the Quartet decided not to include in the GKO. However, Mikoyan and Voznesensky, demonstrating the unity of the ranks, had to go to Stalin's dacha.
Mikoyan left the story of what happened at Stalin's dacha. Stalin, according to him, the delegation found in a small dining room, sitting in an armchair. He looked inquiringly at his comrades-in-arms and asked why they had come. “He looked calm, but somehow strange,” Mikoyan recalled. After hearing the proposal to create a GKO, Stalin agreed. A small altercation was caused by the draft of the "quartet" on the personnel of the GKO, voiced by Beria. Stalin proposed to include Mikoyan and Voznesensky in the GKO. However, Beria, empowered by the "Quartet", set out the arguments "against" - someone should remain in the leadership of the SNK. Stalin did not object.
The publication of Mikoyan's memoirs in 1999, prepared by his son S. A. Mikoyan, in this fragment contains numerous changes and insertions into the original text preserved in the archive. SA Mikoyan clearly tried to create the impression of Stalin's fear. For this purpose, the following phrases were inscribed into the original dictations of A. I. Mikoyan: “Seeing us, he (Stalin. OH.) as if squeezed into a chair "; “I (Mikoyan. - OH.) there was no doubt: he decided that we had come to arrest him. " However, it is important to remember that these accents were added later and do not belong to Mikoyan.
Could Stalin Be Scared? How to interpret the meeting at the dacha on June 30? Undoubtedly, this was a crisis moment in the development of Stalinist autocracy. No matter how carefully Stalin's associates behaved, they violated important rules of the political protocol of the dictatorship. The members of the Politburo came to Stalin, having previously agreed among themselves and on their own initiative. They offered to make the most important decision and insisted on its adoption in the form in which they agreed among themselves. Of fundamental importance was the formal confirmation of Molotov's role as the second person in the state and the non-inclusion of Voznesensky in the GKO, whom Stalin appointed in May 1941 to replace Molotov as his first deputy in the Council of People's Commissars. In fact, Stalin's comrades-in-arms made it clear to him that, in the face of a mortal threat, it was necessary to consolidate the leadership that had developed after the Great Terror, that the new shake-ups at the top, which Stalin started on the eve of the war, must stop. It was a unique episode. It marked a temporary change in the nature of the dictatorship, the emergence of a military political compromise that was somewhere between pre-war tyranny and Stalinist loyalty in the early 1930s. Forced for Stalin, the principle of compromise relations in the Politburo operated throughout almost the entire war.
The decision to create a GKO, agreed upon at Stalin's dacha, was published the next day in the newspapers. The inclusion of only Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov and Malenkov in the GKO did not mean that the rest of the top leaders of the Politburo had lost their administrative influence... Mikoyan and Voznesensky performed essential functions of an economic nature. Zhdanov completely concentrated on the defense of Leningrad. Kaganovich, as the people's commissar of communications, was engaged in railways, the importance of which in the conditions of war and evacuation was difficult to overestimate. In February 1942 Mikoyan, Voznesensky and Kaganovich were included in the GKO.
The formation of the GKO gave impetus to the further concentration in the hands of Stalin of the formal attributes of the highest power. On July 10, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command, which was headed by the People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko, was transformed into the Headquarters High command under the leadership of Stalin. On July 19, by the decision of the Politburo, Stalin was appointed People's Commissar of Defense, on August 8 - the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Everything fell into place. Stalin returned to the people and the army in his usual image of an autocratic leader, decisive and confident of victory. The most important role in this "return of Stalin" was played by his famous speech on the radio on July 3.
Unlike Molotov, who spoke on June 22 at the Central Telegraph Office next to the Kremlin, Stalin demanded that his speech be broadcast directly from the Kremlin. Overworked communications workers were forced to fulfill this senseless whim. Cables were urgently pulled into the building of the Council of People's Commissars. Stalin, sitting at a table with microphones and a bottle of Borjomi, read out his speech. This appeal by Stalin to the people was unique in many ways. “Comrades! Citizens! Brothers and sisters! Soldiers of our army and navy! I appeal to you, my friends! " - already this beginning of the speech was unusual and not at all in the Stalinist style. It was specially noted and remembered by many contemporaries of the events. Clinging to the receivers or reading the lines of a newspaper report, people looked for the answer to the main question in Stalin's words: what will happen next, how soon will the war end? However, Stalin did not report anything encouraging. Having significantly exaggerated the losses of the German army ("the best divisions of the enemy and the best units of his aviation have already been defeated"), Stalin was forced to admit that "it is [...] about the life and death of the Soviet state, about the life and death of the peoples of the USSR." Stalin's calls to the people to realize "the full depth of the danger that threaten our country" sounded alarming, to organize partisan warfare behind German lines, to create detachments of the people's militia, to take out or destroy all material resources from territories threatened by seizure by the enemy. Stalin declared the outbreak of war national and domestic. From all this followed the obvious conclusion - the war will be hard and long.
In the meantime, the people and especially the army needed to somehow explain the causes of the disaster, point to the next "scapegoats". It didn't take long to search. Soon it was announced about the complete collapse of the Western Front and the mistakes of its leadership, headed by General DG Pavlov, which clearly spoke of the direction of demonstrative repressions. Pavlov and a number of his subordinates were put on trial and shot. By orders signed by Stalin, the army was widely notified of this.
This text is an introductory fragment.The Creation of a Scientist I have a friend, an artist, and sometimes he takes a point of view with which I disagree. He takes a flower and says: "Look how beautiful it is." And then he adds: “As an artist, I am able to see the beauty of a flower. But you, being a scientist, disassemble
Creation of ADD Our flight to Warsaw was well known to Stalin and often recalled about him. In conclusion of his brief overview I expressed my firm conviction that the elimination of GAs was wrong, because, being in the hands of the High Command, GAs would certainly be in a big
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Creation of GKO Stalin's actions in the early days of the war can be called feverish, disorderly and reactive. Unable to control the situation, not knowing how to lead the troops, Stalin simply tried to do something, because it was impossible to do nothing. They were mainly
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THE CREATION OF A SOCIETY In the last days of May 1924, posters were posted on the streets of Moscow, which attracted the attention of almost every passer-by. And no wonder: the first thing that caught the eye on this poster was the words: "Interplanetary travel". It was a report announcement
Initially (on the basis of the joint Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 30, see below) the composition of the GKO was as follows:
The first GKO decree ("On the organization of production of medium T-34 tanks at the Krasnoe Sormovo plant") was issued on July 1, the last one (No. 9971 "On payment for the remnants of incomplete ammunition items received from the industry and located at the bases of the NKO of the USSR and the NKVMF" ) - 4 September . The numbering of the decrees remained end-to-end.
Of these almost ten thousand decisions, currently remain classified in full - 98 documents and three more partially.
Most of the decisions of the GKO were signed by its chairman, Stalin, some also by deputy Molotov and members of the GKO Mikoyan and Beria.
The State Defense Committee did not have its own apparatus, its decisions were prepared in the corresponding people's commissariats and departments, and the office work was carried out by the Special Sector of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).
The overwhelming majority of the GKO resolutions were labeled “Secret”, “Top secret” or “Top secret / special importance” (designation “s”, “ss” and “ss / s" after the number), but some resolutions were open and published in print (An example of such a resolution is the GKO Resolution No. 813 of 19.10.41 on the introduction of a state of siege in Moscow).
The vast majority of GKO resolutions dealt with topics related to the war:
The GKO included several structural divisions. Over the period of its existence, the structure of the Committee has changed several times, with the aim of maximum management efficiency and adaptation to current conditions.
The most important unit was the Operations Bureau, created on December 8 by GKO decree No. 2615s. The bureau included L.P. Beria, G.M. Malenkov, A.I. Mikoyan and V.M. Molotov. The actual head of the Operations Bureau was Beria. The tasks of this unit initially included coordination and unification of the actions of all other units. On May 19, Resolution No. 5931 was adopted, by which the functions of the bureau were significantly expanded - now its tasks also included supervision and control over the work of the people's commissariats of the defense industry, transport, metallurgy, the people's commissariats of the most important areas of industry and power plants; also the Operations Bureau from that moment was responsible for supplying the army, finally, it was entrusted with the duties of the abolished decision of the Transport Committee.
Other important divisions of the GKO were:
The State Defense Committee was in charge of all military and economic issues during the war. The leadership of the hostilities was carried out through the Headquarters.
The State Defense Committee was disbanded by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on September 4.
Gorkov Yu.A. "The State Defense Committee decides (1941-1945)", Moscow: Olma-Press, 2002. - 575 p. ISBN 5-224-03313-6
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GKO is an extraordinary supreme state body, which concentrated during the Great Patriotic War full power. Formed on June 30, 1941. Composition: L. P. Beria, K. E. Voroshilov (until 1944), G. M. Malenkov, V. M. Molotov (deputy chairman), I. ... ... Political science. Dictionary.
This term has other meanings, see State Defense Committee (disambiguation). Not to be confused with the Headquarters of the Supreme Command State Defense Committee of the USSR GKO, GKO USSR Emblem of the Armed Forces Years of existence ... Wikipedia
THE STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE in the USSR (GKO) is an extraordinary supreme state body that concentrated all power during the Great Patriotic War. Established on June 30, 1941. Composition: L. P. Beria, K. E. Voroshilov (until 1944), G. M. Malenkov, ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary
State Defense Committee, State Defense Committee of the USSR,- from 06/30/1941 to 09/04/1945, an extraordinary supreme state body, which concentrated in its hands the entirety of legislative and executive power, in fact, replacing the constitutional bodies of power and administration. Abolished due to ... ... Brief Dictionary of Historical and Legal Terms
This term has other meanings, see State Defense Committee (disambiguation). Not to be confused with government committees central authorities government controlled THE USSR. Not to be confused with committees at ... ... Wikipedia
State Defense Committee: The State Defense Committee was an emergency governing body created during the Great Patriotic War, which possessed full power in the USSR. State Defense Committee of the People's Republic of China supreme ... ... Wikipedia
It should not be confused with the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, the State Defense Committee (abbreviated as GKO), an emergency governing body created during the Great Patriotic War, which possessed full power in the USSR. Necessity ... ... Wikipedia
- (GKO), the extraordinary supreme state body during the Great Patriotic War. He possessed all the power in the country. Formed on June 30, 1941. Composition: I. V. Stalin (chairman), V. M. Molotov (deputy chairman), ... ... encyclopedic Dictionary
STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE (GOCO)- - a committee created by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on June 30, 1941 in view of the current state of emergency in the country in order to quickly mobilize all the forces of the peoples of the USSR for ... Soviet legal dictionary
Introduction
State Defense Committee (abbreviated GKO) - an emergency governing body created during the Great Patriotic War, which possessed full power in the USSR. The need for creation was obvious, since v war time it was required to concentrate all power in the country, both the executive and the legislative, in one governing body. Stalin and the Politburo actually headed the state and made all decisions. but decisions taken formally came from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, etc. To eliminate such a method of leadership, permissible in peacetime, but not meeting the requirements of the country's martial law, it was decided to create a GKO, which included some members of the Politburo, secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Stalin himself, as the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
1. Formation of GKO
The GKO was formed on June 30, 1941 by a joint resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). The need to create the GKO as the supreme governing body was motivated by the difficult situation at the front, which demanded that the leadership of the country be centralized to the maximum extent. The aforementioned resolution states that all GKO orders must be unquestioningly carried out by citizens and any authorities.
The idea of creating a GKO was put forward by L.P. Beria at a meeting in Molotov's office in the Kremlin, which was also attended by Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky. attribution of opinion is needed It was decided to put Stalin at the head of the GKO, in view of his undeniable authority in the country. attribution of opinion is needed Having made this decision, the six in the afternoon (after 4 o'clock) went to Blizhnyaya Dacha, where they persuaded Stalin to again take over the functions of the head of state and assigned responsibilities in the newly created committee attribution of opinion is needed... ... (for details see: Stalin June 29-30, 1941).
2. Composition of T-bills
Initially (on the basis of a joint Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated June 30, 1941, see below) the composition of the GKO was as follows:
Chairman of the State Defense Committee - I. V. Stalin.
Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee - VM Molotov.
GKO members:
K. E. Voroshilov.
On February 3, 1942, N. A. Voznesensky (at that time Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR) and A. I. Mikoyan became members of the State Defense Committee;
On November 22, 1944, N. A. Bulganin became a new member of the GKO, and K. E. Voroshilov was removed from the GKO.
3. Resolutions of the State Defense Committee
The first decree of the State Defense Committee (“On the organization of production of T-34 medium tanks at the Krasnoe Sormovo plant”) was issued on July 1, 1941, the last one (No. 9971 “On payment for the remnants of uncompleted ammunition items received from the industry and located at the bases of the NKO of the USSR and the NKVMF ») - September 4, 1945. The numbering of the decrees remained end-to-end.
Of the 9,971 resolutions and orders adopted by the State Defense Committee during its work, 98 documents remain classified in full and three more partially (they mainly relate to the production of chemical weapons and the atomic problem).
Most of the decisions of the GKO were signed by its chairman, Stalin, some also by deputy Molotov and members of the GKO Mikoyan and Beria.
The State Defense Committee did not have its own apparatus, its decisions were prepared in the corresponding people's commissariats and departments, and the office work was carried out by the Special Sector of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).
The overwhelming majority of the GKO resolutions were labeled “Secret”, “Top secret” or “Top secret / special importance” (designation “s”, “ss” and “ss / s" after the number), but some resolutions were open and published in print (An example of such a resolution is the GKO Resolution No. 813 of 19.10.41 on the introduction of a state of siege in Moscow).
The vast majority of GKO resolutions dealt with topics related to the war:
evacuation of the population and industry (in the first period of the Great Patriotic War);
mobilization of industry, production of weapons and ammunition;
handling captured weapons and ammunition;
study and export to the USSR of captured samples of technology, industrial equipment, reparations (at the final stage of the war);
the organization of hostilities, the distribution of weapons, and so on;
appointing authorized T-bills;
the beginning of "work on uranium" (the creation of nuclear weapons);
structural changes in the GKO itself.
4. Structure of T-bills
The GKO included several structural divisions. Over the period of its existence, the structure of the Committee has changed several times, with the aim of maximum management efficiency and adaptation to current conditions.
The most important unit was the Operations Bureau, created on December 8, 1942 by GKO decree # 2615s. The bureau included L.P. Beria, G.M. Malenkov, A.I. Mikoyan and V.M. Molotov. The actual head of the Operations Bureau was Beria. The tasks of this unit initially included control and monitoring of the current work of all people's commissariats of the defense industry, people's commissariats of communications, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, power plants, oil, coal and chemical industries, as well as the business of drawing up and implementing production and supply plans for these industries and transport with everything you need. On May 19, 1944, Resolution No. 5931 was adopted, by which the functions of the bureau were significantly expanded - now its tasks included monitoring and controlling the work of the people's commissariats of the defense industry, transport, metallurgy, the people's commissariats of the most important areas of industry and power plants; also the Operations Bureau from that moment was responsible for supplying the army, finally, it was entrusted with the duties of the abolished decision of the Transport Committee.
Other important divisions of the GKO were:
Trophy Commission (created in December 1941, and on April 5, 1943 by Resolution No. 3123ss it was transformed into the Trophy Committee);
Special Committee - created on August 20, 1945 (GKO Resolution No. 9887ss / op). He was engaged in the development of nuclear weapons.
A special committee (dealt with issues of reparations).
The Evacuation Committee (created on June 25, 1941 by GKO Resolution No. 834, disbanded on December 25, 1941 by GKO Resolution No. 1066ss). On September 26, 1941, by GKO Decree No. 715c, the Department for the Evacuation of the Population was organized under this committee.
The Committee for the Unloading of Railways was formed on December 25, 1941 by GKO Decree No. 1066ss, September 14, 1942 By GKO Resolution No. 1279, it was transformed into the Transport Committee under the GKO, which existed until May 19, 1944, after which, by the GKO Resolution No. 5931, the Transport Committee was abolished, and its functions were transferred to the GKO Operations Bureau;
Radar Council - created on July 4, 1943 by GKO Decree No. 3686ss, consisting of: Malenkov (chairman), Arkhipov, Berg, Golovanov, Gorokhov, Danilov, Kabanov, Kobzarev, Stogov, Terentyev, Ucher, Shakhurin, Shchukin.
A group of permanent commissioners of GKO and standing commissions of GKO at the fronts.
5. Functions of GKO
The State Defense Committee was in charge of all military and economic issues during the war. The leadership of the hostilities was carried out through the Headquarters.
6. Dissolution of T-bills
The State Defense Committee was disbanded by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated September 4, 1945.
7. Additional Information in wikisource
Bibliography:
R. A. Medvedev. JV Stalin in the early days of the Great Patriotic War. New and Contemporary History, No. 2, 2002
Konstantin Pleshakov. Stalin's mistake. The first 10 days of the war. Per. from English A.K. Efremova. M., "Eksmo", 2006 ISBN 5-699-11788-1 p. 293-304
E. Guslyarov (ed.) Stalin in life. M., Olma-Press, 2003 ISBN 5-94850-034-9
1941 year. The documents. in 2 vols. M., Democracy, 1998 p.498 ISBN 5-89511-003-7
Kumanev G. Next to Stalin. Smolensk, Rusich, 2001, pp. 31-34. ISBN 5-8138-0191-X
Khrushchev N. S. Memories. Time, people, power. In 3 vols. M., Moscow News, 1999.T.1., P. 301
Zhover V. Secrets of Stalin's life and death. - "Le Nouvel Observateur": 2006-06-28. (Interview with English historian Simon Sibeg Montefiore)
Scientific conference "N.A. Voznesensky: his era and modernity". Archives of Russia
State Defense Committee
GKO is an emergency governing body of the country created during the Great Patriotic War. The need for creation was obvious, since in wartime it was required to concentrate all power in the country, both executive and legislative, in one governing body. Stalin and the Politburo actually headed the state and made all decisions. However, the decisions made formally came from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. To eliminate such a method of leadership, permissible in peacetime, but not meeting the requirements of the country's martial law, it was decided to create a GKO, which included some members of the Politburo, secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Stalin himself, as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
The idea of creating a GKO was put forward by L.P. Beria at a meeting in the office of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Molotov in the Kremlin, which was also attended by Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky. Thus, the GKO was formed on June 30, 1941 by a joint resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). The need to create the GKO as the supreme governing body was motivated by the difficult situation at the front, which demanded that the leadership of the country be centralized to the maximum extent. The aforementioned resolution states that all GKO orders must be unquestioningly carried out by citizens and any authorities.
It was decided to put Stalin at the head of the GKO, in view of his undeniable authority in the country. Having made this decision, Beria, Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky in the afternoon of June 30 went to the "Blizhnyaya Dacha".
In the early days of the war, Stalin did not make a speech on the radio, as he understood that his speech could further cause anxiety and panic among people. The fact is that he very rarely spoke in public, on the radio. In the pre-war years, this was only a few times: in 1936 - 1 time, in 1937 - 2 times, in 1938 - 1, in 1939 - 1, in 1940 - not a single one, until July 3, 1941 - not a single one. ...
Until June 28 inclusive, Stalin worked intensively in his Kremlin office and received a large number of visitors every day; on the night of June 28-29, he had Beria and Mikoyan, who left the office at about 1 am. After that, the entries in the visit log cease and for June 29-30 they are completely absent, which shows that Stalin did not receive anyone in his office in the Kremlin these days.
Having received on June 29 the first and still vague information about the fall of Minsk that had taken place on the eve, he visited the People's Commissariat of Defense, where he had a difficult scene with G.K. Zhukov. After that, Stalin went to the "Blizhnyaya Dacha" and locked himself there, not receiving anyone and not answering phone calls... He remained in this state until the evening of June 30, when (at about 5 pm) a delegation (Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky) came to him.
These leaders informed Stalin about the created state governing body and invited him to become the chairman of the State Defense Committee, to which Stalin gave his consent. In the same place, powers were distributed among the members of the GKO.
The composition of the GKO was as follows: Chairman of the GKO - I. V. Stalin; Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee - VM Molotov. Members of the State Defense Committee: L. P. Beria (since May 16, 1944 - Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee); K. E. Voroshilov; G.M. Malenkov.
The composition of the GKO was changed three times (the changes were legislatively formalized by resolutions of the Presidium of the Supreme Council):
- On February 3, 1942, N. A. Voznesensky (at that time Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR) and A. I. Mikoyan became members of the State Defense Committee;
- On November 22, 1944, N. A. Bulganin became a new member of the GKO, and K. E. Voroshilov was removed from the GKO.
The vast majority of GKO resolutions dealt with topics related to the war:
- evacuation of the population and industry (in the first period of the Great Patriotic War);
- mobilization of industry, production of weapons and ammunition;
- handling captured weapons and ammunition;
- study and export to the USSR of captured samples of technology, industrial equipment, reparations (at the final stage of the war);
- the organization of hostilities, the distribution of weapons, and so on;
- appointment of authorized GKOs;
- the beginning of "work on uranium" (the creation of nuclear weapons);
- structural changes in the GKO itself.
The overwhelming majority of the decisions of the State Defense Committee were classified as “Secret”, “Top secret” or “Top secret / of special importance”.
Some decisions were open and published in the press - GKO Decree No. 813 of 19.10.41 on the introduction of a state of siege in Moscow.
The State Defense Committee was in charge of all military and economic issues during the war. The leadership of the hostilities was carried out through the Headquarters.
On September 4, 1945, the State Defense Committee was abolished by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
The State Defense Committee is an emergency governing body created during the Great Patriotic War, which possessed full power in the USSR. The need for creation was obvious, since in wartime it was required to concentrate all the executive and legislative power in the country in one governing body. Stalin and the Politburo actually headed the state and made all decisions. However, the decisions taken formally came from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, etc. , which included some members of the Politburo, secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and Stalin himself, as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
The GKO was formed on June 30, 1941 by a joint resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). The need to create the GKO as the supreme governing body was motivated by the difficult situation at the front, which demanded that the leadership of the country be centralized to the maximum extent. The aforementioned resolution states that all GKO orders must be unquestioningly carried out by citizens and any authorities.
The idea of creating a GKO was put forward at a meeting in Molotov's office in the Kremlin, which was also attended by Beria, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky. In the afternoon (after 4 o'clock) they all went to Blizhnyaya Dacha, where powers were distributed among the members of the State Defense Committee.
By a joint Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on June 30, 1941, the State Defense Committee was formed consisting of:
Chairman of the State Defense Committee - I. V. Stalin
Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee - VM Molotov.
Members of the State Defense Committee - K. E. Voroshilov, G. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beria.
Subsequently, the composition of the State Defense Committee has changed several times.
The first decree of the State Defense Committee (“On the organization of production of T-34 medium tanks at the Krasnoe Sormovo plant”) was issued on July 1, 1941, the last one (No. 9971 “On payment for the remnants of uncompleted ammunition items received from the industry and located at the bases of the NKO of the USSR and the NKVMF ") - September 4, 1945. The numbering of the decrees remained end-to-end.
Of the 9971 resolutions and orders adopted by the State Defense Committee during its work, 98 documents remain classified in full and three more partially (they mainly relate to the production of chemical weapons and the atomic problem).
Most of the decisions of the GKO were signed by its chairman, Stalin, some also by deputy Molotov and members of the GKO Mikoyan and Beria.
The State Defense Committee did not have its own apparatus, its decisions were prepared in the corresponding people's commissariats and departments, and the office work was carried out by the Special Sector of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).
The overwhelming majority of the GKO resolutions were labeled “Secret”, “Top secret” or “Top secret / special importance” (designation “s”, “ss” and “ss / s" after the number), but some resolutions were open and published in print (An example of such a resolution is the GKO Resolution No. 813 of 19.10.41 on the introduction of a state of siege in Moscow).
The vast majority of GKO resolutions dealt with topics related to the war:
evacuation of the population and industry (in the first period of the Great Patriotic War);
mobilization of industry, production of weapons and ammunition;
handling captured weapons and ammunition;
study and export to the USSR of captured samples of technology, industrial equipment, reparations (at the final stage of the war);
the organization of hostilities, the distribution of weapons, and so on;
appointing authorized T-bills;
the beginning of "work on uranium" (the creation of nuclear weapons);
structural changes in the GKO itself.
The GKO included several structural divisions. Over the period of its existence, the structure of the Committee has changed several times, with the aim of maximum management efficiency and adaptation to current conditions.
The most important unit was the Operations Bureau, created on December 8, 1942 by GKO decree # 2615s. The bureau included V. M. Molotov, L. P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov and A. I. Mikoyan. The tasks of this unit initially included control and monitoring of the current work of all people's commissariats of the defense industry, people's commissariats of communications, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, power plants, oil, coal and chemical industries, as well as the business of drawing up and implementing production and supply plans for these industries and transport with everything you need. On May 19, 1944, Resolution No. 5931 was adopted, by which the functions of the bureau were significantly expanded - now its tasks included monitoring and control over the work of the people's commissariats of the defense industry, transport, metallurgy, the people's commissariats of the most important areas of industry and power plants; also the Operations Bureau from that moment was responsible for supplying the army, finally, it was entrusted with the duties of the abolished decision of the Transport Committee.
On August 20, 1945, a Special Committee was created to deal with the development of nuclear weapons. Within the framework of the Special Committee, on the same day, August 20, 1945, the first department of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was created, which was engaged in the creation of a new industry in a short time.
The system of three main directorates under the GKO was created with the expectation of the post-war development of fundamentally new industries and lasted much longer than the committee itself. This system directed a significant part of the resources of the Soviet economy to the development of the nuclear sector, the radar industry and the space sector. At the same time, the main departments were solving not only the goals of improving the country's defense capability, but were also a sign of the importance of their leaders. So, for reasons of secrecy, several years after its creation, the PSU did not give any information about the composition and results of work to any bodies, except for the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
The main function of the GKO was to manage all military and economic issues during the war. The leadership of the hostilities was carried out through the Headquarters.
