Business card
Before the departure to Afghanistan, the head of the 3rd Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR Nikolai Alekseevich Dushin and the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Viktor Mikhailovich Chebrikov took me. Dushin, in particular, said that if before this time we led the 40th army in Afghanistan directly from Moscow, now all the reign of the board are in their hands you, the head of the special Turkvo department. Therefore, your main workplace is not in Tashkent, but in Kabul.
- Why exactly?
- When successful was expected at the beginning of the campaign, it was good to manage from Moscow. And by this time it became clear that it was necessary to somehow get out of Afghanistan ... Therefore, former interest, so let's say it was no longer.
- What impression was made on you conversations with the leadership, what was the main focus on them?
- I saw that Nikolai Alekseevich tracks the situation in Afghanistan, he was aware of all cases. He very carefully told me: "I need to see how much we will fight there ... I have been rooted there for six years - and the end is not visible and there is no positive, only the worsening of the situation goes. In general, see what is there, but only quite carefully! "
The leaders of the 3rd of the Main Department, Dushin, and then Sergeev, tracked the situation in the 40th Army in daily mode, owned the situation, knew that where was what was going on, what events were held ...
Chebricov completed the conversation such a phrase: "As a specialist, you probably know me all the technical sides, so I give you" political installations ". I will not say that he specifically managed counterintelligence work in this direction, but in general, of course, he owned the situation - in Afghanistan there was a great representation of the KGB.
- What role did this representation played?
- I will say this: in the hands of the KGB representative office was real power, through it the influence of the Soviet Union on the Afghan administration. In second place in importance, so I will say, there was a representative of the raft of the Supreme Command - all five years that I was in Afghanistan, in this position was the general of the army of Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov, First Deputy Head of the General Staff. At one time, the commander of the Carpathian Military District, since then we have been familiar. Well, and a very significant figure was the commander of the 40th Army - when I arrived in Kabul, it was Lieutenant-General Igor Nikolayevich Rodionov, subsequently the Minister of Defense. However, not very long, for five years they changed four commander of the army.
- How did your relationship with the Military Guide?
- Valentina Ivanovich I introduced myself on the first day; He treated for special departments to employees very carefully. "Where did you come from, Grigory Maksimovich?" - "From Transbaikalia." - "Yes? I have a son there! " "I know," I say, "in Dosatoy, the commander of a motorized rifle shelf on BMP ..."
I will clarify that in about a year later, the son of General Varennikov arrived in Afghanistan as Deputy Commander of the 201st Motorized Relocked Division. Soon the real hunt began behind him: the opponent knew that this was the son of a high chief. I reported on this situation Valentina Ivanovich and, although he was categorically opposed, set the question of the need to depart his son from Afghanistan before leadership. This was done, he was sent to study at the Academy of General Staff.
Relations with Varennikov I had not just business, but I would say warm. If necessary, I called him at any time and always found an understanding. I can say that Varennikov always took over the full responsibility, "closed the command of the army. If some miscalculations happened, he said: "I'm the main thing here, and I will answer in front of the General Staff, Politburo ..."
- Commander of the army, as you said was Rodion ...
"Yes, and I knew him as a commander of the 24th Iron Division, where I was the head of a special department, it was in the early 1970s, and we were friends at the beginning of the 1970s. I also met Igor Nikolayevich on the first day. In the evening they went to him, and immediately the question surfaced: how much and how we will fight? He says: "I can give you my estimates, but only if I light up as an opponent to continue the war - I will be assigned affected sentiment, and ..." Rodionov gave a deep analysis of the prospects for the development of events. The conclusion was unequivocal: the military decision the Afghan problem has no. Even if, as suggested, to increase the army.
- Who suggested it?
- In particular, the team composition of the 40th army. There were not enough people: everyone absorbed the garrison service. Our 120 thousand group was scattered throughout Afghanistan, on dozens of garrisons, large and small, which they were protected and provided. And the combat operations begin - division at best is typing three combat battalions. Maximum - consolidated regiment. But if there is more troops, it will be more garrisons. In general, a vicious circle! Rodionov is a very competent general, very well prepared in militarily. He gave me all the calculations ... I will add that Igor Nikolayevich for people was very worried about - she calculates ten times, it is necessary to spend this operation or it is not necessary that we will have it ... He has not been spread from it.
- Did the mood matches the mood of his army? Or was it a certain tragic understanding of the commander?
- No, we have been very well studied the mood of all categories of servicemen, from soldiers and sergeants to generals - everything was unambiguously believed that the war is unprospective, it is not clear for what, and it is unclear who it is all necessary ... However, I can not say that in The 40th army had some affected mood, the desire to quit everything and leave - no, the army was absolutely combed, with a good martial spirit ... But in the depths of the soul, everyone believed that they were trying to be fighting for what.
- Grigory Maksimovich, like all employees of military counterintelligence, communicated a lot with the personnel of the 40th army. But how did the troops relate to individuals?
- Military counterintelligers enjoyed great authority, the good location of officers and soldiers, because they were in combat orders with them.
Here is the hero of the Soviet Union Boris Innokentyevich Sokolov - he promptly provided an intelligence battalion of the Bagram Division, visited more than eighty combat operations. He even had a machine to white in the mountains in the mountains! Calls me the Outhin: "How many are the heroes of the Soviet Union?" "Four," I say, "for the Great Patriotic War posthumously and one alive ..." - "Let's withdraw him so that there is no fifth." I call: "Boris Innokentievich, are going!" - "No, I have three more months! I got a hero - how can I go now? "
Although in general, I consider military counterintelligence awards was deprived. After all, our officers did no less than any platoon commander or company, but, unfortunately, many were not marked by anything ...
Military counterpeople in Afghanistan behaved very adequately - there was no case that anyone under some kind of pretext refused to participate in a combat operation. Moreover, in the last year and a half, I categorically forbade the operational composition to go into combat operations without agreeing with me, and myself determined expediency. It hurts me very much, but seven of the eighteen dead employees of military counterintelligence fall on my period ...
- From your words, we can conclude that the troops were performed completely in vain in Afghanistan ...
- Did I say so? On why the USSR introduced troops to Afghanistan, there are different points of view - and that they wanted to help revolutionary movement, although the revolution occurred there without our "blessing" and to assist the people ...
- International help, as they often say ...
- No, everything is easier: we had big geopolitical interests there. In particular, we built the five largest aircraft bases: Kandahar, Bagram, Kabul ... the runway of each airfield - 3,200, they could land strategic bombers, refuel and fly further to bring blows on communications of the likely opponent in the Pacific Ocean . I really didn't want to lose this crucial position - however, I think it was not necessary to enter the troops here, but to solve everything in other ways.
- For example?
- Continue to arm the Afghan army - they, if necessary, are efficient and can fight well, especially if you pay well. But someone inhabited: there was a point of view that in six months there are ordering order. However, it was possible to reason only not knowing either Afghanistan, nor his history, nor his people ... So it is not necessary to reduce everything to the notorious international care! When I instructed our employees, I said: "You are going to defend the strategic, political interests of your own country! In order not to start the war from our Zawaling, as in 1941. "
- And what is it - the special department of the 40th army, where did they go?
- Very serious, influential organ! By the way, even in the Great Patriotic War, there were no coordination of operational documents with military counterintelligence. And here on an approved commander of the corresponding rank mall of a combat operation at the bottom always stood: "Agreed. Special department, such something. " It was not envisaged by any regulatory documents, but this practice was developed.
- And the meaning is what, what is it for?
- On the one hand, military counterintelligence, feeling responsible, tried to get a maximum of information about the possible danger for troops. On the other hand, it disciplined the command, contributed to the success of operations, reduce personal losses. This practice has developed in 1983, when we carried the biggest losses here.
- Nevertheless, what was the special department of the army?
- It was an unusual structure: although a full-scale war was going, but the special department of the 40th army was not deployed in military time. He consisted of the army apparatus, special departments of divisions and brigades. The military counterintelligence of the army was equipped with literally by all units that existed then to the KGB, up to the operational service, the external surveillance service ...
- The question of the amateur: What is the point of all this?
- I will explain on a concrete example. When analyzing and studying the situation, I noticed that the information was led about operations, especially aviation. Let's say our planes to the area to the Pakistani border fly out, and the Pakistani F-15 is immediately raised to meet them with American pilots. It was clear that Americans are aware of the flights of our aviation. Since there was no solid radar field in Pakistan, it became clear that there was a leak from some kind of headquarters - we had a great contact with the headquarters of the Afghan army.
- You definitely talk about Afghan headquarters - how did you ever find an enemy agent somewhere in our headquarters?
- I officially report to you: for the whole war, military counterintelligence did not reveal from generals, officers, ensigns, sergeants, soldiers or employees of the Soviet army not a single agent of foreign special services or gangs! Even serious developments in suspicion of our people in involvement in the enemy agent, we really were not. Therefore, I realized that the leak comes from our "friends" - as we called the Afghans. Together with Rodionov, we conducted several experiments: we think about a small operation, which "friends" do not speak, "leaks" does not occur. As soon as they shared - there is!
- That is, it was necessary to find, who exactly transfers the information to the enemy?
- It was very difficult! By that time, the Americans began to use satellite tools to communicate with agents. Translations were carried out in superfast mode. Speed \u200b\u200bis if the text printed sheet is transmitted to the air within a minute, and ultra-fast half-seconds. If you take a bearing on an oscilloscope - it is only so, the flash begins - and that's it! It was expensive pleasure, but the costs apparently justified: the information was reset to the satellite, then Langley and went in the opposite direction ...
With the assistance of the First Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Georgy Karpovich Zinyev in the Special Department of the 40th Army was created by a radio conveying service. It was very difficult to deliver the appropriate mobile technique there, the direction finders were 1950 years of release, but the teams were staffed by very good experts. They refined this technique so that they carried out radio equipment of satellite systems! It is necessary to drain from three points to make a triangle; Then even closer - another triangle; Even closer - more ... At first, it was possible to determine the area - this is the fourth district of Kabul, the so-called Shvashi - Soviet, who was tuned by our specialists since the 1930s, then found a quarter, then the house, after which the equipment led to the doors and one And another agent - let's call them "Said" and "Ahmed".
- Your assumptions were confirmed? Headquarters?
- Lieutenant Colonel "Said" for a long time headed the air traffic police officer of the Afghan army. The dispatching point in Kabul was united: in the same room there were air traffickers who managed and small Afghan aviation, and a huge aviation of the 40th army, and therefore everyone knew about the departures of Soviet aircraft, and about where helicopters rise, where helicopters are rising . Then "Said" became the depths of the aviation and the personal pilot of Najibulla. It is difficult to present more favorable positions!
- How did he become an agent?
"At one time he passed flight training in the United States, there was recruited and actively worked on his" hosts ".
The second agent, Ahmed, is their largest physician, which, as the Starina, was rumored, was used by the family of President Najibulla, the Prime Minister, the leaders of the army and the police. It is known that Afghans have no secrets both from his wife and children and from the doctor. The agent received huge political information!
- In general, these agents were revealed ...
- I consider this operation with the greatest success of the military counterintelligence of the 40th Army: both were arrested when conducting communication sessions. We hoped to organize an operational game, but they immediately pressed on the buttons of the device showing that they were detained ... each was seized by nine sets of equipment for radio communications, combined under household radio receivers, bags. The withdrawn was sent to the center - our reconnaissance did not possess similar means of communication.
We interrogated them: both worked for a very high cash reward. The money was going on their bills, the printouts of which in the banks in America they were given quarterly, and here, in place, they paid very small amounts in Afghani or in dollars. The Americans were correctly done, because Afghans could spend gorgeous to spend this money and light up. The Afghan servicemen were poor: their salary was about six times lower than ours.
- What then did with these agents?
- I do not know. All the offensive and arrested agents and suspicious persons were transmitted by the special services of Afghanistan. If you are told that our specialists had some prisons or concentration camps there are not true! The only thing when the operation was going, a temporary camp was created, where filter operation was performed, detecting suspicious persons who, after a certain development, were transferred to "friends." No repressive measures against the citizens of Afghanistan or foreigners who were fighting there, the Soviet special services did not undertake. I'll tell you one hundred percent!
- Grigory Maksimovich, but do you personally do in Afghanistan? 
- How did your employees manage to create such miracles?
- The amazing qualifications of investigators were, besides extremely honest people! Therefore, none of the case was protested, no one was justified on the complaint. It was a law: any doubt in evidence was interpreted by us in favor of the suspect accused. The slightest doubt that this is not an "iron" proof that it thrown somewhere in court - and this fact was displayed from the accusation, and only what could not be refuted to the court. When doubted even suspects released - God forbid, if at least one person is illegally arrested and imprisoned! Let it be better to blame for freedom - after all, it is not a killer, not traitors ... And in just ten years, 204 criminal cases were investigated for more than 2.000 people.
- By the way, you talked about common crimes, but there were military crimes ...
- Yes, there were cases on betraying the Motherland - in the form of a transition to the side of the enemy and promoting the enemy. For example, they put a fighter to the secret - he kills a partner, takes the weapon and goes to the gang. There were such cases. Mujahideen such traitors used as instructors, militants and so on.
- Is that often happening?
- If I said that it was a single case, it would be a wrong. Approximately a dozen such cases was.
- not so few of our soldiers got into captivity of the militants ...
- For the period of hostilities in the hands of the gangsters turned out to be about three hundred of our servicemen. We had a card file for everyone: what data, under what circumstances ... somewhere eighty percent were captured in a helpless state, wounded or ammunition were over ... they were kept in the gangs in the random conditions. We have created a search department, which dealt with the conclusion in captivity. The desperate guys were there - for each of them I would not regret the highest state awards! We brought 70 people - from three hundred ...
- How did you manage to find them?
- Through agents from the number of Afghans, through the Advitage apparatus and through the GRU who had a agent in Bangruppers ... If an honest person, patriot, if an officer - did not regret anything! For our one, as a rule, they asked for five or six of their prisoners - they sat in the camps, the Afghans kept them firmly, especially if someone with some kind of relationships ... We gave.
I tell how the operation was passed. They chose a place to have five to six kilometers. They came there armed to teeth, about the platoon or reinforced branch, conducted prisoners ... From ours they demanded that no accompaniment so that no more than two people, in fitting sports costumes and no weapons - did not even take the knives. Of course, the helicopters have stood somewhere, but until the helicopter rises ... Usually, if it is a soldier, there was a platoon commander, or company, or colleague - to identify. If he is beaten or emaciated, then asked - he called some names for which they were convinced that it was he. Then they took it and left, and they stood with a weapon from teaching, watched ...
- Did you say that I had to buy out?
- Yes, they redeemed - sometimes for considerable money. Including also bought those whom we later attracted responsibility.
- It can be understood that they wanted to return not all?
- Yes, many refused. Some, as I said, went there with progressive intentions; Another women were given, they accepted Islam ... it was different. So, by the conclusion of troops, the American human rights group bought out a lot of money and took out 13 of our prisoners of war in America. And there were also the heroic deeds in captivity - as a rebellion in the camp in Pakistan, which, unfortunately, is known quite a bit.
And in general, not everything was so simple. In the overwhelming majority, people who were in combat orders were in captivity. Although there is one "but" - if at least one of their dreams died, they did not take prisoners, they shot all the remaining. If a combat clash has passed so that their all "dry" remained, and our fell - then there was a chance that they would bring them to this pit ...
In the pictures: G.M. Casimir with the hero of the Soviet Union B.I. Sokolov, Bagram, 1986; Military counterintelligence officers at the headquarters of the 40th Army, Kabul, 1988
- Grigory Maksimovich, let's go back to the fact that you have begun: you have been tasked with the prospects for finding our limited contingent in Afghanistan.
- Yes, and therefore at the beginning of 1987 I wrote my own, since it was impossible to connect a typist, a big letter addressed to the chairman of the KGB of the USSR. For all three positions: military component, mood and prospects and what to do. The conclusion was one: from Afghanistan need to leave.
- Why didn't you send a team on the team?
"So we agreed with Nikolai Alekseevich sulin." As a result, it was very soon for Gorbachev. The one, as far as I know, imposed a resolution: "Proposals deserve attention. To the secretariat, for study. " Since that time, the preparation of the withdrawal began.
- Not quite clear. I wrote, we will say, just the head of the special department of the district - and immediately it all started ...
- So all this was waiting! Only no one wanted to take responsibility, reasoned: and that "there" will think how to understand it? And I was in Turkvo - further the coupling, as mentioned, will not send. A bug is our Turkestan Military District, I've been there constantly. General received. What do I lose?! And then, people die - without perspective, and most importantly, the situation has deteriorated every day ...
- Why did the worse?
- The reason is an absolutely incorrect internal policy of the authorities of Afghanistan. For example, they took the land from the rich and allegedly transferred to dehkanam. But if before, the tenant gave the landowner one third of the crop, now the taxes on the ground made up two thirds! Why dehkanina such land?! In addition, the best lands, the best water sources remained in the bog. For example, the Prime Minister of the "People's Government" was the largest latifundist of Afghanistan and did not give its lands. And this is only one point ...
It seems my letter played the role of the catalyst - the need for withdrawal, as I said, has long been aware of everything.
- How has your activity changed for that period?
- In 1987, an order was issued on the KGB of the USSR, where I personally assigned duties to create an intelligence service of military counterintelligence of the 40th Army. So in the last year I was literally sitting on this, but I was doing.
- According to the example of the "zafront" work "Smered"?
- Of course - the invaluable experience of the Great Patriotic War. If the reconnaissance of the GRA entered into contacts with band formations, with the local population, collected information about the opponent, planned attacks, raised ambushes penetrated the gang, then our task was to identify the aspirations of the opponent's intersections to our special services and penetration to us. That is, intelligence in order to counterintelligence.
- In CVR, this unit is an external counterintelligence.
- Yes, you can call that. Although naturally, the bulk of the information received was in favor of the army, but something we drew for themselves: here, for example, a "substab" is preparing - this will come, say that he wants to cooperate with the KGB ... knowing it, We worked with him accordingly - any "twin" is useful if it is reasonable to use. And as an enemy agent, we neutralized it. Received information about the admission of disinformation; penetrated the intelligence officers not only in Afghanistan; Purchased large local "authorities".
It is known about this side of military counterintelligence, but we will not speak a lot ... But I will say that I participated in the most eve of the conclusion in a very responsible operation.
- Did you managed it?
"No, I said," participated. Head of the 3rd Head of Sergeev, Head of the Main Directorate of the Border Guard, General Army Matrosov, Chiefs of Special Departments of the Two Border Districts and I flew around the helicopters all 16 border projects that were on the border with Afghanistan. On the other side, in a depth of 25 to 50 kilometers, mangroups were constantly - combat maneuverable groups, from a strengthened company to a reinforced battalion. It was so ensured that there was no breakthrough of militants to our territory, although there was one case in the Moscow area ... We visited large man, in the Afghan territory. Therefore, even Sergeyev had an automatic and peason - if anything else is. We flew around everything for a month, everywhere heard reports - after all, all these mangroups remained there after it was officially announced that the last soldier came out. We had two helicopters and support. So, from the maintenance of two helicopters we lost!
- That is, the war went to the last ... And where were you during the solemn yield of troops, February 15?
- From this side, I met. It was possible to negotiate with the customs service so that the inspection was done in the territory of Afghanistan - before crossing the border, and here came here without a delay, solemn march. In addition, smuggling is when the border crossed, and if something found something, it is just an administrative violation. Why do people pull?
- Indeed, it was not worth someone's holiday to spoil ...
"Finishing our conversation, I will say that my special admiration causes the fact that most of the" Afghans "showed themselves very well and subsequently. Many advanced in the service, achieved high posts, distinguished themselves ... For example, he became the hero of Russia Grigory Konstantinovich Khoperskov, whom I know from Major, - a combat man! Or Lieutenant General Victor Petrovich Vasilyev, "Kandaagaret", head of the special department of the brigade, whose account was the real interceptions of a very serious agent of bandforms and many other glorious things ... This is Anatoly Ivanovich Mikhalkin, hero of Russia Alexander Ivanovich Shulyakov, and others Comrades ... We will not call their names, titles and positions - it is impossible, because all of them are on advanced borders, protecting the safety and state interests of our Motherland.
In the picture: Head of the 3rd Main Department of the KGB of the USSR Lieutenant General N.A. Dushin (second right) in the Special Department in the 40th Army.
Sokolov Boris Innokentyevich -, Opera Compact Special Department of the KGB of the USSR in the 108th Motorized Relocial Division of the 40th Army of the Turkestan Military District (limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan), captain.
Born on October 19, 1953 in the capital of Buryatia - the city of Ulan-Ude in the family of the employee. Russian. Member of the CPSU since 1977. He graduated from 10 classes, Irkutsk Aviation Technical School. Worked on a machine-building plant. In the Soviet Army since May 1973, it is called for an urgent service to the Trans-Baikal Military District. From the troops entered the military school. In 1979 he graduated from the Kazan Higher Military Engineering School. He served in the engineering units of the Leningrad Military District.
From August 1981 - in the organs of the KGB of the USSR. He graduated from the highest courses of military counterintelligence of the KGB of the USSR in Novosibirsk in 1982. He served in the special departments of the KGB in parts of the Leningrad Military District.
From December 1983, within two and a half years, Boris Sokolov was served as part of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as a second-channel special department of the KGB on the 108th motorized rifle division. Take part in 64 military operations with a total duration of 269 days. In the battles was twice short and got a fragmentary wound. He remained in Afghanistan to the end of the timing of the trip, even after the assignment of the title of the hero, refusing the right to go to the union ahead of time.
By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of December 10, 1985, "For courage and heroism, the captain of the Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with a sentence of the Order of Lenin and the" Golden Star "medal (No. 11536)."
Sokolov Boris Innokentyevich is a security officer of the Special Department of the USSR KGB according to the 108th motorized rifle division of the 40th Army of the Turkestan Military District. Major General. He was awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Star, medals.
B. I. Sokolov was born on October 19, 1953 in the capital of Buryatia - Ulan-Ude. In the Soviet Army since May 1973 - is called for an urgent service to the Trans-Baikal Military District. From August 1981 - in the organs of the KGB of the USSR. He served in the special departments of the KGB in parts of the Leningrad Military District. From December 1983, within two and a half years, Boris Sokolov was served as part of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as a second-channel special department of the KGB on the 108th motorized rifle division. Take part in 64 military operations with a total duration of 269 days.
Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of December 10, 1985 for the courage and heroism, shown in the provision of international assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Captain Sokolov Boris Innokentievich was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union with the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the "Golden Star" medal (No. 11536).
In 1986-1991 He served in the Special Department of the State Security Committee of the USSR in the Moscow Military District. Since 1992, served in the military counterintelligence bodies of the Ministry of Security and FGC Russia.
http://salambacha.com: "... Sokolov B. I. Since 1986, he serves in one of the divisions of the USSR State Security Committee. Afghanistan left a tragic mark in the hearts of hundreds
thousand Soviet people. It's time to tell me about the fact that in this difficult war next to the soldiers and officers, army security officers participated in all matters. Survoying school of Afghanistan shoulder to the shoulder with warriors passed military counterintelligers who committed their duty to ensure the security of a limited contingent of Soviet troops. One of them is Boris Sokolov. His Afghan weekdays was small about what was different from the weekly hundreds of other military counterintelligers who earned the good memory of everyone, with whom they had a fate on the dangerous roads of Afghanistan. They exposed and stopped by many spy-sabotage and terrorist shares of rebels and their Western patrons against the Soviet troops, are exempt from and captivity of dozens of military personnel of the Soviet army. From the presentation of Captain Sokolova Boris Innokentievich to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: "took part in 64 operations with a total duration of 269 days. During operations showed courage, courage and courage. In a complex combat situation, I was confidently, I took competent decisions, more than once provided a successful implementation by the unit of combat missions. "In combat conditions, the business qualities of the officer as a palm, and his Chekist, especially. So it was both in that March day 1984, when During the landing of Soviet warriors for helicopters, they fell under the slim fire of the gang. Sokolov and Head of the headquarters Major Yakushev managed to organize an effective defense, providing landing of warriors into combat cars. And the latter came out of battle. In war it is difficult to separate the life of the army counterintellor from the military everyday life Soviet officers. Only, maybe a counterintelligence of a little more difficult, because he also has its own, cheeky tasks. However, the enemy does not make a discount on it. In January 1984, Sokolov and Senior Lieutenant A. Golovin seized important documents containing Information about the involvement of Western special services to major hostile promotions against Afghanistan, lists of rebel agents. The price of this is terrible Boris in which Boris participated. Not once, the Communist Sokolov had to take command commands in critical combat situations. It happened in February 1984, when Boris, contused, still managed to head the unit and withdraw him from the battle with minimal losses. And one more, maybe the most significant barcode in Boris Sokolov's combat biography. The Chekist division in which he served was actively engaged in the liberation of Soviet soldiers who captured. This work, always associated with a fatal risk, demanded from military counterintelligers of great personal courage and readiness for self-sacrifice: it was necessary to have a huge composure and courage to walk unarmed in the camp of dusts and under the dowl of automata to negotiate with them. Many Soviet servicemen helped them back to their mothers. More recently, Boris Sokolov was one of those heroes that could not write about. Now about it, as you can see, write and even in posters. "
Sergeev
Evgeny Georgievich
At the time of the presentation by the title of the Hero of the Soviet Union - the Deputy on Commercial Training of the Commander of the Special Destination, Major. Born in 1956 in the city of Polotsk (now Vitebsk region, Republic of Belarus), in the family of the military. In 1973, in 1973 he received a certificate of secondary school education.
In the Soviet Army - from August 1973. In 1977 he graduated from the Ryazan Airborne Command School. Military service passed in parts of the special purpose of the Trans-Baikal Military District, including allocated on the territory of Mongolia; Commanded platoon and rota special forces.
Since 1984, Major E.G. Sergeyev was located as part of a limited contingent grouping of Soviet troops in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. It distinguished itself in numerous combat operations, successfully solving military tasks with minimal human losses among their subordinates.
Showed courage and heroism when implementing the Directive Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal Soviet Union S.L. Sokolova about the urgent seizure of the portable anti-aircraft missile complex (CRK) "Stinger" produced by the United States.
In 1986, the Americans were transferred to Afghan anti-government formations a huge batch of "Stinger" - over 500 units. The consequences were not forced to wait long: In the same year, 23 Soviet aircraft and helicopter were shot down in Afghanistan. There is a need to urgently capture a good sample of weapons and develop protective measures. All parts of the special purpose in Afghanistan were focused on performing this task. But she was not easy: dusts observed strictest security measures. The first capturing CRCK warrior was promised the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
They became Major Evgeny Georgievich Sergeev. On January 5, 1987, the inspection team under his command flew over two helicopters in the depth of controlled dusts of the territory - in the Meldanai Gorge - with the aim of reconnecting the area of \u200b\u200bthe upcoming ambush actions. Working on a maximum altitude, the scouts found three motorcycles with several dusts, and near, as it turned out, there were positions on which there were several other opponents. The enemy managed to release a rocket on helicopters, but in a hurry missed. A response shot from the air, part of the dusts was destroyed in place, another special forces were neutralized later. When examining the dead, our fighters found a good "Stinger" used by the container from the rocket just released, as well as the portfolio with the instruction on combat use of the CRK. The most valuable trophies were urgently delivered to the headquarters of the 40th Army to Kabul, and from there to Moscow.
Performing a promise, the commander of the 40th Army gave an indication to submit Major E.G. Sergeeva to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. But the political workers categorically constantly opposed to this, because by that time, Major had a reprimand on the party line for a disciplinary violation. Requests in awards and all the other special forces participating in the operation, although among high officials in the headquarters encouraged for the seizure of "Stinger" turned out to be a lot of ...
Lieutenant Colonel EG Sergeev died on April 25, 2008 after many years of severe illness (due to combat injuries and contusions). Buried on a new cemetery in Ryazan.
The last years of the life of the officer, his combat comrades tried to restore justice and to assign him a deserved award; Found a document on the presentation of him by the title of the Hero of the Soviet Union. The exhausting struggle with the bureaucratic system continued after the death of the officer, and in the end, truth truth. By the decree of the President of the Russian Federation of March 6, 2012 for courage and heroism, manifested in the execution of military debt in the Republic of Afghanistan, Lieutenant Colonel Sergeyev Evgenia Georgievich was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation (posthumously).
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| Sergeev E.G. | Sokolov B.I. |
Sokolov
Boris Innokentievich
Opera Compact KGB of the USSR, captain. Born in 1953 in the capital of Buryatia - the city of Ulan-Ude, in the family of the employee. He graduated from the Irkutsk Aviation Technical Academy, worked on a machine-building plant.
In 1973, he was called up to the urgent service in the Soviet Army, after demobilization, he entered the Kazan Higher Military Engineering School, after which he served in engineering units. Since 1981 - in the organs of the KGB of the USSR. He studied at the highest courses of military counterintelligence of the KGB of the USSR, he served in the special departments of the KGB of the Leningrad Military District.
Within two and a half years, Boris Sokolov served in the Republic of Afghanistan as a secondary special department of the KGB. He took part in 64-troop operations with a total duration of 269 days. In the battles was twice short and got a fragmentary wound. He remained in Afghanistan to the end of the timing of the trip, even after the name of the title of the hero, abandoning the right to go home ahead of time.
Afghanistan left a tragic footprint in the hearts of hundreds of thousands of Russian people. It's time to tell me about the fact that in this difficult war next to the soldiers and officers, army security officers participated in all matters. Survoying school of Afghanistan shoulder to the shoulder with warriors passed military counterintelligence officers who committed their duty to disfiguring the security of a limited contingent of Soviet troops.
One of these heroes is Boris Sokolov. His Afghan everyday life differed from the everyday life of other military counterintelligers who left good memories of everyone with whom they had a fate on dangerous Afghan roads. The many spy-sabotage terrorist stakes of the rebels and their Western patrons against the Soviet troops were exposed and stopped their efforts and stopped, the tens of military personnel of the Soviet army were released from captivity.
In combat conditions, professional qualities of the officer, and even more so Chekista - like on the palm. So it was both at that March day of 1984, when during the landing of Soviet soldiers to the gang helicopters opened a squall fire on them. B.I. Sokolov and Chief of Staff, Major Yakushev managed to organize an effective defense, disappearing soldiers in combat vehicles, and the latter came out of battle.
The Chekist division in which Boris Sokolov served, was actively engaged in the liberation of the Soviet fighters in captivity. This work, always associated with fatal risk, demanded from military counterintelligers of great personal courage and readiness for self-sacrifice: not everyone was able to go to the camp of Dushmanov unarmed to negotiate with the gangsters under the dawn of enemy machines ...
Prepared
Evgeny Polyeva
| Boris Innokentievich Sokolov | |
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Sokolov Boris Innokentyevich (born 1953) - Soviet soldier, participant in hostilities in the Republic of Afghanistan, Hero of the Soviet Union, Opera Compact Special Department of the USSR KGB on the 108th Motorized Railway Division of the 40th Army of the Turkestan Military District (limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan), captain .
Born on October 19, 1953 in the capital of Buryatia - the city of Ulan-Ude in the family of the employee. Russian. Member of the CPSU since 1977. He graduated from 10 classes, Irkutsk Aviation Technical School. Worked on a machine-building plant. In the Soviet Army since May 1973, it is called for an urgent service to the Trans-Baikal Military District. From the troops entered the military school. In 1979 he graduated from the Kazan Higher Military Engineering School. He served in the engineering units of the Leningrad Military District.
From August 1981 - in the organs of the KGB of the USSR. He graduated from the highest courses of military counterintelligence of the KGB of the USSR in Novosibirsk in 1982. He served in the special departments of the KGB in parts of the Leningrad Military District.
From December 1983, within two and a half years, Boris Sokolov was served as part of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as a second-channel special department of the KGB on the 108th motorized rifle division. Take part in 64 military operations with a total duration of 269 days. In the battles was twice short and got a fragmentary wound. He remained in Afghanistan to the end of the timing of the trip, even after the assignment of the title of the hero, refusing the right to go to the union ahead of time.
By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of December 10, 1985, "For courage and heroism, the captain of the Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with a sentence of the Order of Lenin and the" Golden Star "medal (No. 11536)."
In 1986-1991, he served in the Special Department of the State Security Committee of the USSR in the Moscow Military District. Since 1992, he served in the military counterintelligence bodies of the Ministry of Security and FGC Russia, then in the Office of Economic Counterintelligence - Department of Economic Security of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. He headed the representative office of the FSB of Russia in one of the foreign countries. He was the Deputy Head of the Gokhran of Russia. Then he was a senior adviser to the Russian Embassy in the United States.
