Electronic warfare (EW) is a set of coordinated measures and actions for electronic destruction of enemy radio-electronic objects, electronic protection of their radio-electronic objects, as well as electronic information support.
Electronic warfare takes an important place in the system of complex destruction of the enemy, the protection of own troops (forces) and objects, information confrontation, and in the performance of operational (combat) tasks by troops (forces). It is organized and carried out in order to disorganize the systems of command and control of the enemy's troops and forces; reducing the effectiveness of the use of his weapons, military equipment and radio-electronic means; protection of weapons, military equipment and military objects from technical means of reconnaissance of the enemy; ensuring the stability of the operation of systems and means of command and control of its troops (forces) and weapons. Electronic warfare is carried out in close combination with fire damage (capture, incapacitation) of the main objects of systems and means of command and control of troops (forces), weapons, reconnaissance and electronic warfare of the enemy, and other types of operational support.
The goals of electronic warfare are achieved by performing a number of tasks, the main of which are: opening (revealing) the electronic situation; electronic destruction (suppression) of systems and means of command and control of troops, weapons, reconnaissance and electronic warfare of the enemy; destruction, destruction and (or) distortion of software and information in the automated control systems of the enemy; decrease in the effectiveness of the enemy's use of electronic weapons; comprehensive technical control of the state of protection of weapons, military equipment and military objects from technical means of reconnaissance of the enemy and counteraction to them; ensuring electromagnetic compatibility of radio electronic equipment.
In general, electronic warfare can be divided into a number of major areas.
Electronic defeat
Electronic destruction is a set of measures and actions for functional electronic destruction, electronic suppression, and destruction of enemy radio-electronic objects with homing weapons.
Electronic protection
Electronic protection is a set of measures and actions to eliminate or weaken the impact of enemy electronic weapons on their electronic objects, to protect them from enemy technical reconnaissance equipment and to ensure the electromagnetic compatibility of their electronic equipment.
Electronic jamming
Electronic suppression (REP) - electronic defeat, which consists in reducing the effectiveness of the operation of enemy radio-electronic objects by exposing them to deliberate radio-electronic interference.
Electronic warfare (EW) is one of the technological tools of military confrontation, the importance of which is growing as the digitalization of weapons continues.
Electronic warfare is used both in the interests of protection, including in peacetime to protect critical facilities from possible attacks, and during wartime.
For example, in the modern world of high terrorist risks, to one degree or another, solutions from the category of electronic warfare are applied at key global events: the largest summit meetings of the leaders of countries (especially when these are collective rather than bilateral meetings), major sporting events (the Olympic Games, culminating moments of the FIFA World Cup, etc.).
In such cases, the task of electronic warfare is to prevent the use of technological means of attack - drones, remote-controlled explosive devices, missiles, to destroy the communication channels of attackers and thereby prevent the implementation of their plans, etc.
An important block of the civilian sphere of electronic warfare is ensuring the safety of peaceful nuclear facilities - nuclear power plants, transportation of fissionable materials.
In wartime, electronic warfare systems become a full-fledged weapon: from suppressing communications between subunits, disorienting military equipment to temporarily or permanently disabling military equipment and equipment with a large share of electronic components in control systems.
History and modernity
The first historical fact of the use of electronic warfare was the battle for Port Arthur.
On April 15, 1904, two days after the tragic death of Admiral Makarov, the Japanese fleet began shelling Port Arthur. However, this attack, later dubbed "third flip-fire", was unsuccessful. The reason for the failure is revealed in the official report of the interim commander of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral Ukhtomsky. He wrote: “At 9 o'clock. 11 minutes In the morning, the enemy armored cruisers "Nishin" and "Kasuga", maneuvering south-south-west from the Liaoteshan lighthouse, began flip fire at the forts and the inner roadstead. From the very beginning of the firing, two enemy cruisers, having chosen positions against the passage of the Liaoteshan Cape, outside the fortress's shots, began to telegraph why immediately the battleship Pobeda and the station of the Golden Mountain began to interrupt the enemy telegrams with a large spark, believing that these cruisers were informing the shooting battleships of the hit their shells. The enemy fired 208 large-caliber shells. There were no hits in the courts. " This was the first officially recorded fact of the use of electronic warfare in hostilities.
The Armed Forces of the USSR began to pay serious attention to the issues of electronic warfare in 1950-1953, when the war in Korea very convincingly demonstrated the effectiveness of the use of radio-electronic means. Our command faced such problems as the development of the concept of electronic warfare, the creation of electronic suppression technology, the formation of electronic warfare units and bodies. 1954-1959 in all types of the Armed Forces, the first battalions of radio interference of radio communications, radar and radio navigation were formed. 1968-1973 on the basis of the adopted concept for the development of electronic warfare, taking into account the experience of the war in Vietnam, an electronic warfare service was created and strengthened. It was this concept that made it possible to pursue a unified technical policy in the field of creating equipment for electronic suppression (REP), purposefully train specialists, carry out a unified planning and control of the forces and means of electronic warfare.
In the 1970s, with the emergence of new reconnaissance and control systems in the troops of a potential enemy and the improvement of existing ones, it became necessary to find and develop new methods of conducting electronic warfare in operations. In this regard, the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces prepared and conducted a number of special and experimental operational-strategic exercises. For example, during the exercise "Ether-72" the general principles of electronic warfare were studied, and during the exercise "Ether-74" - the methods of its conduct. Subsequently, at the exercises "Electron-75" and "Impulse-76", various ways of increasing the efficiency of EW management, the most expedient methods of combat use of the forces and means of electronic warfare were sought and tested. At the same time, an important conclusion was made about the transfer of EW efforts to the tactical echelon, to the combined arms battle - to the place where victory is directly forged.
At the present stage, Russia is one of the world leaders in these technologies. The key areas of development of electronic warfare technologies in Russia are now:
creation of highly mobile ground-based multifunctional electronic warfare systems for zonal and object protection of weapons and military equipment from electronic reconnaissance systems and destruction of guided weapons;
creation of wide-range systems and electronic warfare equipment for group and individual protection of air, sea and land-based weapons and military equipment;
development of means of electronic suppression of radio-electronic equipment (RES) with complex broadband signals, including those with rapidly tunable (from pulse to pulse) parameters;
development of means of electronic suppression of multi-position systems of radar reconnaissance, target designation and weapons control;
improving the accuracy of executive electronic intelligence to determine the location of emitting objects.
The evolution of electronic warfare systems has accelerated dramatically. At the end of the 20th century, the Ministry of Defense demanded a service life of 15-20 years. Today, the life cycle of electronic warfare devices has been reduced to four to five years. Electronics is developing too fast. Therefore, leading manufacturers are switching to modular device schemes. The basis of the system, the platform, can serve for 20 years, but modules that are standardized in fastening and interface are provided, which allow improving the equipment, changing not the entire complex, but individual blocks. In other words: if I put in a new "advanced" unit in the scientific plan, I got new opportunities.
Only last year, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation received the latest equipment: nine Moscow-1 electronic reconnaissance stations, ten Lever-AV jamming helicopters, eight Krasukha-2 electronic reconnaissance and suppression stations, 15 sets of reconnaissance stations and suppression of "Krasukha-4" and 20 sets of electronic reconnaissance and protection station "Rtut-BM".
Key competencies in the area of electronic warfare are concentrated by Rostec Corporation within the framework of its structures:
JSC "Concern" Radioelectronic Technologies ", KRET (60%),
Concern Sozvezdie JSC (20%),
JSC "Central Scientific Research Radio Engineering Institute named after Academician A.I. Berga ", TsNIRI (10%),
JSC "Scientific and Technical Center for Electronic Warfare", STC REB (5%),
LLC "Special Technological Center" (5%).
The leading enterprise is KRET JSC. In many sectors, the concern has an almost monopoly position on the Russian market in the supply of electronic warfare equipment with electronic reconnaissance and weapons control systems. Electronic warfare equipment and systems developed by KRET are used to equip aircraft of the Su-25, Su-27SM, Su-30, Su-34, Su-35, Il-76, Il-78, Il-96, Tu-214 types, and Mi helicopters -8, Mi-26, Mi-28, Mi-35 and Ka-52, as well as surface ships of projects 1144, 1164, 1155, 956, 11540, 22350, 20380, 21631. The situation is most favorable for the concern in the market of aviation complexes and electronic warfare means. The reasons for this, in addition to the global growth in demand for electronic warfare systems in the world, are: 1) the expected growth in the supply of Russian aircraft; 2) projected growth in the share of aircraft supplied with electronic warfare equipment for individual and group protection; 3) the purchase of electronic warfare equipment by foreign states within the framework of the program for the modernization of their own aircraft fleet of Russian / Soviet production.
World market
The world market for electronic warfare is currently estimated at about $ 13.6 billion a year, it is one of the most progressive and expanding parts of the overall market for weapons and military equipment, along with the production of military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and command and control systems. It is expected that in the coming years the world market for electronic warfare funds will continue to grow with an average annual growth rate of 4% and will reach $ 15.6 billion by 2020 and $ 19 billion by 2025.
conclusions
Russia is actively developing the electronic warfare segment within the defense industry complex.
The solutions of the Russian defense industry in terms of electronic warfare are advanced in many segments and create a confident export backlog.
Offers
Focus public attention on the non-lethal nature of electronic warfare and its potential to prevent conflicts.
To position Russian solutions in the international information field through electronic warfare as a tool for achieving a balance of power.
Electronic warfare: more than a century for the good of the Motherland
With proper planning and use of electronic warfare means, the course of hostilities will largely be determined by the potential of the electronic warfare troops
Mikhail LYUBIN
Compared to the first edition of 2004, the new book differs in a fairly complete analysis of the concept of development of electronic warfare, a detailed presentation of operational-tactical views concerning the name and content of both individual components and electronic warfare as a whole. Much attention is paid to new directions in the development of electronic warfare, the results of research and development work, the personal contribution of scientists, designers, heads of the Ministry of Defense and the defense industry complex in the creation and implementation of electronic warfare equipment in the interests of all branches of the armed forces and branches of the Armed Forces.
In the history of the development of electronic warfare in the Armed Forces of the USSR and the Russian Federation since the 1940s. to the present, three main stages can be distinguished: the period of radio countermeasures (RPD) - 1940-1950s; the period of the fight against enemy radio-electronic means (BRESP) - 1960s; the period of electronic warfare (EW) - from the 1970s. Until now.
During the RPD period, directorates, departments or groups of radio interference, radio interference or electronic countermeasures were created as part of the headquarters of the large units and formations of the Armed Forces, which, despite the various names, united the content of the main component of the RPD - electronic suppression (REP), i.e. suppression of enemy troops and weapons control systems using radio-electronic interference. Other components of the RPD did not contradict this: radio and radio-technical reconnaissance in the interests of the RPD, counteraction to radio and radio-technical reconnaissance of the enemy, as well as complex electronic control.
It is important to note the following. If during the years of the Russo-Japanese and World War I, the objects of electronic warfare were only radio communications used to control troops and fleets, and interference was created sporadically, more attention was paid to radio intelligence and radio disinformation, then during World War II, interference was used on a wider scale by both belligerents parties, especially their Air Force. In order to increase the combat survivability of aircraft, the problem of equipping them with onboard active and passive jamming devices to suppress radar detecting air targets, guiding fighters and targeting anti-aircraft artillery has become the most acute problem. By the summer of 1943, about 10% of US and British bombers had been converted into special jammers, each of which was equipped with equipment for dropping metallized reflectors and 10-18 active jamming stations. Such special aircraft, suppressing the enemy's air defense radar systems by jamming, performed the functions of group protection of bombers. For the purpose of individual protection, each aircraft was equipped with passive and active jamming equipment to suppress the enemy air defense weapon control radar. According to foreign experts, the losses of bombers have decreased by about half compared with the losses of aircraft not covered by interference.
In our Air Force, jamming in order to suppress enemy air defense radars began to be used since 1943. In each bomber aviation regiment of the Long-Range Aviation (ADA), the crews manually dropped packs of 200 metallized paper strips 25-30 cm long from the allocated two or three aircraft with an interval of 10 seconds. for suppressing target detection radars, antiaircraft artillery guidance (ZA) stations and airborne radars of enemy fighters. To determine the moment the aircraft entered the detection zone, the aircraft detectors of the SOL-3 and SOL-3A radars were used, which began to arrive in the ADD units since 1942. The initiators and direct organizers of the combat use of passive interference, i.e. pioneers of electronic warfare in our air force were the officers of the headquarters of the ADD A.P. Chernyshov and A.V. Delnov. Thanks to the actions at night by single crews with access to the target from different directions and at different altitudes, as well as the timely use of passive jamming in combination with anti-aircraft and anti-fighter maneuvers, aircraft losses were significantly reduced and the effectiveness of ADP strikes was increased.
From January 1943 and until the end of the Great Patriotic War, four separate special-purpose radio battalions (ordn SN) armed with jamming stations such as "Storm", "Storm-2" and "Thunder "To suppress radio communications in the VHF, SV and HF bands, respectively. Thus, the actions of the 131st SN Order (commander - Major V.A.Petrov) as part of the Stalingrad Front and the 132nd SN Order (commander - Major A.K.Bushuev) as part of the Don Front in January 1943 blocked radio communications the German high command with the grouping surrounded at Stalingrad. In the East Prussian operation in January-April 1945, the 130th Order of the Special Forces (commander - Major V.G. Lukacher) and the 226th Order of the Special Forces (commander - Major I.Ya. Konstantinov) blocked the radio communication of the German command with the district grouping of troops in the Keniksberg area. For successful hostilities, the 130th Order of the CH was awarded the Order of the Red Star, the 131st Order of the CH was awarded the honorary name "Konigsberg", the 132nd Order of the CH was awarded the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky.
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Mikhail Dmitrievich LYUBIN- retired colonel. Born on January 19, 1924. Participated in the Great Patriotic War as navigator of the ADD aircraft in 1944-1945. Graduated from the VVIA named after N.E. Zhukovsky in 1954 and Higher academic courses in electronic warfare at the Academy named after M.V. Frunze in 1968. For ten years he served in leading positions in electronic warfare in the headquarters of the formations (in the headquarters of the VA in the Far East, the General Staff of the Air Force, the headquarters of the Group of Soviet Forces in Egypt). For nine years he worked as a senior researcher in the aviation department 5th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, nine years - senior lecturer of the Department of Electronic Warfare of the Military Academy of the General Staff. After retirement for ten years he worked as a researcher in the Air Force and Air Defense Department Unfortunately, Mikhail Dmitrievich passed away on December 24, 2014. We offer our sincere condolences to the family and friends of Mikhail Dmitrievich Lyubin. |
However, shortly after the end of the Great Patriotic War, at the end of 1945, without any justification, all the mentioned radio divisions were disbanded. Only in September 1953, on the basis of studying and generalizing the experience of the Second World War and post-war local conflicts (especially in Korea in 1951-1953), which testified to the high efficiency of the use of radio-electronic means, on the initiative of the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces, the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU was adopted and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in which the preparation of the Armed Forces for radio countermeasures is recognized as a task of special state importance. In the course of the implementation of the decree, separate radio battalions were re-formed in the Armed Forces, and then special purpose radio regiments, a little later, radio interference units (companies, squadrons, detachments) were created as part of the formations and units of the combat arms. The radio mixing apparatus created at the General Staff, consisting of 28 specialists, was essentially a prototype of the future electronic warfare service in the Armed Forces of the USSR.
After the end of World War II, aircraft were developed for group protection in the early 1950s. The Air Force adopted more advanced passive jamming devices: fiberglass dipole reflectors of the DOS-50, DOS-113 types and automatic devices for dropping them, such as ASO-4, ASO-16, ASO-28, APP-22, as well as active jamming stations of the project PR-1. On the basis of long-range and front-line aviation bombers, as well as aircraft of the Military Transport Aviation (VTA), special electronic warfare aircraft were created, equipped with the aforementioned means of group defense jamming. In the first half of the 1950s. on the basis of jamming aircraft, the following were formed: as part of Long-Range Aviation (DA), a separate electronic warfare regiment on Tu-4 aircraft (since 1956 - on Tu-16P), in each of the three air corps - a separate squadron (UAE) electronic warfare on aircraft Tu-16P, in each bomber regiment of ADD - a squadron of jammers on Tu-16P and Tu-22PP aircraft; as part of the front-line aviation in each of the seven air formations - the electronic warfare unit on the Il-28P aircraft, in each bomber aviation regiment - a unit of 4-8 Il-28P jammers. Several years later, a separate electronic warfare regiment was formed as part of the VTA on the An-12PP jamming aircraft.
In the first post-war decade and subsequent years, the enterprises of the domestic defense industry, first of all, NII-108 (now the Central Research Institute of Radio Engineering and Technology named after Academician AI Berg), NIIAP (Novosibirsk), NII Ekran (Samara) under the leadership of chief designers G.V. Abramov. , Boldyreva A.N., Zinicheva A.A. and Kopylova B.A. SPS-1 and SPS-2 sighting jamming stations, Zavesa barrage jamming stations and Buket-type aiming jamming stations for group protection of aircraft were developed, and under the leadership of chief designers L.V. Volkov, Yu.N. Mazhorov ., Spiridonova E.K. and Fursova Yu.S. - automatic active jamming stations such as "Rose", "Reseda" and "Lilac" for individual protection of aircraft.
In 1962, instead of RPD, the term BRESP was introduced, as well as a service with the same name. At the same time, the goal was to achieve disorganization of the enemy's troops and weapons control systems by any means up to nuclear, fire destruction and capture of control points, communication centers, radar posts and other radio-electronic objects. The term BRESP was not successful primarily because nuclear destruction and the capture of the mentioned objects go beyond the limits of the modern understanding of electronic warfare, and therefore it was inappropriate to assign these tasks to the BRESP service, which essentially supervised parts of the RPD, whose capabilities are limited only by radio and radio-technical reconnaissance and jamming of enemy radio-electronic means.
As for the destruction of radio-electronic objects of the enemy with conventional fire weapons, homing missiles of the air-radar class were not considered as a weapon of the BRESP, although already in those years they were developed and entered service with foreign and domestic air forces. So, in 1965, the KSR-5P anti-radar missile system entered service with our Long-Range Aviation (DA), which should be regarded as the beginning of a fundamentally new direction and stage in the development of electronic warfare in our Armed Forces. Unfortunately, this fact was not reflected either in the work of 2004 or in the work of 2014, in which it would be appropriate to note that the first passive radar homing head (PRGS) for the KSR-5P was developed under the leadership of the chief designer, laureate State Prize of the USSR V.A. (Research Institute-108, now the Central Research Institute of Radiation and Technology named after academician A.I.Berg).
In 1969, instead of BRESP, a more adequate term EW was introduced, reflecting the two-sided nature of electronic warfare. In the early 1970s. BRESP bodies were transformed into an electronic warfare service at all levels from the General Staff to the headquarters of the formations of the combat arms (forces). Before that, parts of the radio interference that were previously part of the signal and air defense forces were transferred to the subordination of the electronic warfare of the headquarters of military districts and groups of forces.
In the 1970s. the successful work on improving the air-radar missile systems was also continued. At the Central Design Bureau of Automation (Omsk) under the leadership of chief designers A.S. Kirichuk, V.V. Slavin, B.A. Guselnikov, V.P. Fedorov. and Pototskiy N.E., as well as a well-known specialist in the field of missile control Sedunova E.I. complexes of anti-radar missiles Kh-28, Kh-58U, Kh-31P for front-line aviation and complexes Kh-22MP for long-range aviation developed at TsNIRTI were developed and adopted by the Air Force. Thanks to the introduction of digital methods and information processing devices by the employees of the Central Design Bureau under the leadership of the chief designers A.S. Kirichuk, V.V. Slavin. and Abramova S.P. in the 1990s. For the first time in our Armed Forces, the L-150 system has been developed, combining the onboard means of direct electronic reconnaissance of the aircraft and the missile's PRGS into a single on-board electronic warfare system, which provides target designation to missiles with PRGS and the issuance of control commands for active and passive jamming means. For the front-line bomber Su-34 in the 1990s. the integrated complex of electronic warfare (IC electronic warfare) "Khibiny" was developed. The Su-34 aircraft equipped with this complex showed high efficiency during the operation to force Georgia to peace in August 2008.
In parallel with the creation of modern air-radar missile systems for the Air Force in the 1970s-1980s. more advanced means of electronic warfare of group, individual and individual-mutual protection were developed. So, instead of jamming stations of the Buket type for the group protection of aircraft, more advanced jamming stations of the Lily of the Valley and Azalea type, developed at the Scientific Research Institute of the AP (Novosibirsk) under the leadership of chief designers N.Ya. Feldman, were received. and Boldyreva A.N. To combat high-potential target detection radars in the 1980s. jamming stations of the "Ikebana" and "Lever" type were created, which are equipped with the Mi-8MTI and Mi-8MTR jamming helicopters. To suppress radar control systems for anti-aircraft guided missiles for the purpose of group protection of aircraft in the 1970s. for the first time developed in ground and helicopter versions of the jamming station of the "Smalta" type.
Instead of outdated jamming stations of the "Lilac" type used to suppress air defense weapons control radio systems, employees of TsNIRTI im. Academician A.I. Berg in the 1980s. more advanced, including container, individual protection jamming stations of the "Gardenia" type (chief designer - Mikhailov L.V.) and individual-mutual protection stations of the "Geran" type (chief designer - Altman I.Ya.) were developed, which in terms of their characteristics, they were close, and in some parameters they were superior to foreign stations of active interference similar in purpose.
An important place is occupied by aircraft and helicopter jamming stations of a new generation, developed in those years at the Research Institute "Ekran" (chief designer - director of the institute AI Golovin) and NII TsS (chief designer - director of the institute Yu.T. Karmanov). In these stations (of the Miass type) digital methods and devices are used at a high technical level, which provide analysis of the signal situation, frequency tuning, the formation of the optimal number of types and combinations of interference, the required level of their power and the moment of emission.
For the main types of Air Force aircraft in 1970-1980. On-board defense systems (BKO) were developed, which included stations for active interference of individual and individual-mutual protection, heat direction finders of the "Mak" type for detecting the moment of launching enemy attack missiles, as well as devices for ejection of consumable REP assets (dipole reflectors, anti-radar cartridges, etc. anti-infrared projectiles).
Noteworthy is the work of the Azov Optical and Mechanical Plant on the creation of Mak-type heat direction finders for detecting the moment of launching surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles (chief designer - ES Sukhanov), as well as the work of NPO Zenit ( Zelenograd) on the creation of an optical-electronic jamming helicopter station SOEP-V1A (chief designer - Samodergin V.A.).
Works on the automation of labor-intensive planning processes for electronic warfare are valuable for the EW bodies of aviation associations and formations. In the 1970s. scientific team of the 5 Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense under the leadership of A.D. Ilyin and Zhikhareva S.N. information and settlement systems (IRS) have been developed, which are used in the preparation by the electronic warfare service of proposals for organizing electronic warfare for inclusion in the commander's decision and in the subsequent development of an electronic warfare plan in operations (combat actions).
In the interests of the Ground Forces in 1950-1970. the most ambitious work was carried out to create means of suppressing radio communications in the control systems of enemy troops, and in the interests of the country's Air Defense Forces - to create means of suppressing on-board radar systems for reconnaissance and aimed bombing of enemy aircraft.
In the early 1950s. R-325 HF radio jamming stations and R-330A VHF radio communication jammers developed at 16 TsNIIS MO under the scientific supervision of A.N. and Usik V.A. In the 1970s. with the participation of employees of the 5 TsNII MO, the Tambov Scientific Research Institute of Radio Engineering "Ether" and the Kharkov plant "Proton", new generation jamming stations R-325U, R-378B and R-330B were developed, and the Vladimirsky Radio Communication Design Bureau developed a jamming station for aviation VHF radio communications R-934 ( chief designer - V.V. Morozov), which provide digital methods and devices for information processing and the formation of adaptive interference.
In the 1990s. in connection with the introduction of highly immune HF and VHF radio communication channels operating in the adaptation mode and telecode messages into the tactical control link systems (TZU) of the potential enemy, the Tambov plant "Revolutionary Labor" under the leadership of General Director Grebenyuk L.V. automated jamming stations for HF and VHF radio communications have been developed and put into mass production, in which automatic (using specialized PCs) determination of the operating frequency, the main parameters of the received signals, the coordinates of radio emission sources and, most importantly, the automatic generation of adaptive interference providing channel suppression is provided ground and aeronautical radio communications with pseudo-random frequency tuning (PFC), as well as short telecode messages. In order to increase the efficiency of deployment and combat use in these jamming stations, for the first time, automated telescopic antenna-mast devices with an electric drive were used for lifting and installing masts.
In the 1970s-1980s. Helicopter jamming stations for radio relay communications "Shakhta-1" (chief designer - Danishchenko I.Ya.), satellite jamming stations R-949 (chief designer - Ryzhov E.I.), radio navigation jamming stations systems R-338 ("Kedr"), as well as jamming stations for radio fuses SPR-1 and SPR-2 (chief designers - V.Kh. Kharlampiev and V.G. Lopatin).
In order to protect military and special equipment, important objects from their detection and fire damage by enemy aircraft in the 1950s. As part of the Land Forces and the Air Defense Forces of the country, the formation of electronic warfare units and subunits began, which were armed with jamming stations for SPB-1 and SPB-5 radar bomb sights, developed by employees of NII-108. In the 1960s. At the Research Institute of APP (Rostov-on-Don), the Bryansk Electromechanical Plant developed serially SPB-7 jamming stations, for the control of which the ATsU-7P mobile automated target allocation and control system was first developed (chief designer - Aryupin V.D.).
In connection with the emergence of new types of aircraft radars, including side-looking stations, support for flights at low altitudes, control of airborne weapons and multifunctional radars, in the 1980s. Research Institute APP and VNII Gradient have developed: SPO-10 single-shot retaliatory jamming stations, which ensure the withdrawal of missiles from PRGS from ground targets (chief designer - Vorobei G.K.); powerful jamming stations SPN-30 to suppress all types of aircraft radars, powerful noise jamming stations SPN-2, -3, -4 (chief designer - Yu.M. Perunov). In the same years, to suppress early warning radars (such as E-3 Sentry and E-2 Hawkeye), a Pelena-1 jamming station was developed.
ROC in the interests of the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy were no less significant. All ICBMs in the 1970s and 1980s equipped with complexes of means of overcoming (KSP) missile defense. For their development, the USSR State Prize was awarded to the chief designers of TsNIRTI V.M. Gerasimenko, N.G. Ponomarev. and Spiridonov Y.A. As part of the Navy, all combat surface ships and submarines were equipped with REP systems for group, individual and individual-mutual protection.
The apogee of the development of electronic warfare technology in the USSR Armed Forces was in the mid-1980s, when the Ground Forces consisted of more than 100 different electronic warfare units. As part of the front-line set, the following were provided: OP REB-NK, OP REB-S, ove REB based on radio relay jamming stations "Shakhta-1", a separate squadron of remotely piloted aircraft (RPV) electronic warfare, a complex technical control unit. The army kit provides for electronic warfare-N (in an independent direction - op electronic warfare-NS), in motorized rifle, tank and airborne divisions - for electronic warfare and electronic warfare. Each motorized rifle, tank and airborne brigade has a separate electronic warfare company.
As part of the Air Force in 1983-1984. formed: two separate electronic warfare aviation regiments of the VA VGK, including one regiment on Su-24M aircraft and one regiment on MiG-25BM aircraft with X-58U air-radar missiles, eight separate electronic warfare helicopter squadrons on Mi-8PPA helicopters and Mi-8SMV. In those years, the Navy included six electronic warfare regiments, including one regiment as part of each of the four fleets, one regiment as part of the Kamchatka flotilla and a separate electronic warfare regiment as part of the Fleet Aviation.
Unfortunately, in the difficult 1990s. In the midst of a systemic crisis, one of the consequences of which was the reduction of the Armed Forces, electronic warfare regiments in all branches of the RF Armed Forces, regular electronic warfare squadrons in frontline and long-range aviation bombing regiments were disbanded, the number of separate electronic warfare helicopter squadrons in frontline aviation was halved. The electronic warfare bodies were curtailed at the headquarters of large formations and formations. As a result, the EW potential of the Armed Forces has sharply decreased.
It took 20-25 years of persistent work to fix the grave state of electronic warfare in the RF Armed Forces. At the same time, it was necessary to overcome the outdated views of some scientific opponents, who, without giving convincing arguments, in the open periodicals declare the very concept of electronic warfare as a "deep error".
However, the results of the combat use of electronic warfare systems in local wars and armed conflicts over the past four decades testify to the groundlessness of such statements. In particular, during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the high efficiency of domestic electronic warfare equipment was demonstrated, especially the Smalta jamming stations, with the help of which the radar guidance systems of Israeli Hawk anti-aircraft missiles were suppressed. As a result, a group of 120 Soviet-made Syrian aircraft lost only one aircraft from air defense fire (0.8%). In the 1980s. during the war in Afghanistan, thanks to the use of optical-electronic jamming (in combination with other electronic warfare means), the losses of the 40th Army aviation from MANPADS used by the dushmans were reduced by seven to eight times.
Useful lessons were also learned from the experience of electronic warfare during the operation to force Georgia to peace in August 2008. These lessons include: weak organization of reconnaissance, the lack of reconnaissance aircraft capable of conducting detailed electronic reconnaissance in real time with high accuracy in determining the coordinates of the radar ; belated (for a whole day and only after the intervention of the Air Force command) the use of electronic warfare aviation units; lack of means of electronic warfare for group protection of aviation from combat formations; the actions of strike aircraft only under the cover of group means of protection from the patrol zones by the Mi-8PPA and Mi-8SMV-PG jamming helicopters, as well as by the An-12PP jamming aircraft; mismatch of the frequency ranges of the PRGS of the "air-radar" missiles and those affected by the radar air defense missile systems (Soviet-made) of the Georgian air defense system.
It is hoped that some of the shortcomings noted above will lead to the solution of important organizational tasks in the field of electronic warfare. In our opinion, such tasks include: the restoration of the electronic warfare department as part of the Military Academy of the General Staff in order to prepare highly qualified command and staff personnel for the associations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; restoration of units ordering electronic warfare equipment in the main command offices of the Armed Forces; expanding the number of electronic warfare specialists at the headquarters of the armed forces; strengthening the leading role of the Federal Research and Development Center for Electronic Warfare, this requires the withdrawal of it and the composition of the Air Force Military Educational and Scientific Center.
According to existing views, the following are considered as offensive components of electronic warfare: electronic suppression of enemy troops (forces) and weapons control systems using active and passive interference, decoys, traps, computer viruses and antiviruses, i.e. hacker shares; the defeat of enemy radio-electronic targets with aviation and artillery ammunition with passive radio-electronic homing heads (PRGS). As evidenced by foreign experience, as well as the work of domestic scientists and designers, a qualitatively new means of electronic destruction, which sharply enhances the offensive components of electronic warfare, can be electromagnetic and laser weapons designed to destroy both radio-electronic and non-radio-electronic objects. An important part of the weapon system is also unmanned electronic warfare vehicles, thanks to the use of which the scale of non-contact combat operations is significantly expanded, the losses of manned electronic warfare systems and the required number of certain ground-based electronic warfare systems are reduced.
The defensive component of electronic warfare is electronic protection of weapons and military equipment facilities, including reducing their visibility, protection from electronic warfare equipment, from ammunition with PRGS and enemy electromagnetic weapons, as well as from mutual interference of radio electronic equipment. The electronic warfare service is entrusted with such important tasks of electronic protection as ensuring electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) of radio electronic equipment and distributing radio frequencies. The main functions of electronic protection of command and control systems for own troops and AME facilities are naturally performed by command and control bodies (headquarters) of combat arms, special forces and services, which are armed with the appropriate radio electronic means.
An important component of electronic warfare is electronic reconnaissance, including detection, identification, determination of the location of radio emission sources, parameters of electromagnetic signals and the degree of their threat. This intelligence is used not only by the electronic warfare service, together with other information about the enemy and about its troops, but also by the command of military formations in the preparation and during combat operations of any scale.
In connection with the growing potential of modern electronic warfare systems and especially aviation and sea carriers of electronic destruction weapons operating directly in the combat formations of the main strike forces, electronic warfare is increasingly being transformed from the form of operational and combat support into the form of combat operations. Taking into account these considerations and the urgent need to restore the number of electronic warfare units, on the initiative of the leadership of the General Staff in our Armed Forces, on the basis of the preserved and newly created electronic warfare units, electronic warfare troops were formed in 2009. Since these troops are armed with their own unique means of electronic destruction (electronic warfare devices, air-to-radar missiles, and, in the future, electromagnetic weapons), then, in accordance with the well-known provisions of our operational art, there are reasons to consider electronic warfare troops not as special troops. but as a new kind of troops. Unlike the existing special ones, for example, the railway and signal troops, the electronic warfare troops are not intended to support combat operations of the combat arms, but to interact with them in order to conduct hostilities, for example, in the form of electronic strikes.
The authors of the work convincingly state that after the massive electronicization and computerization of troops in the armies of developed countries, unified global integrated information and control systems of associations (armies, navies, fronts) appeared, the basis of which is formed by a single information and communication space, intensively implemented training and acceptance systems. solutions (DSS) based on "artificial intelligence", as well as expert systems. Their main task is to make it possible to provide full-scale information support for the combat operations of each of the formations (army, navy, front) as a whole.
An example of a global combat control system (SBU) is the American S-41 system, developed in accordance with the concept of "network-centric warfare" and providing, according to foreign experts, high stability of combat control on a time scale close to real, and at all levels of command ... The fight against global control systems only by means of their electronic suppression becomes ineffective and even meaningless. To ensure successful counteraction to such SBU, promising high-precision means of electronic destruction (including EMO and other types of new weapons) are required, as well as modern information and control (essentially network-centric) systems of associations (armies, fleets, fronts), in which, thanks to the integration of weapons, control points (including EW command and control bodies) and a unified information and communication network, it is possible to control the course of hostilities in real time or close to it, and the head of any level within his competence at any time is given the opportunity to make a decision on the means and methods of combat actions, including the use of adaptive means and methods of electronic warfare.
The electronic warfare troops were created for wartime. In peacetime, their main task is combat training. Real electronic warfare in peacetime is carried out in the form of countering foreign technical intelligence services. Recently, the problem of information confrontation (IPB) has become aggravated. Many military specialists of highly developed states regard the information sphere as a sphere of hostilities not only in wartime, but also in peacetime; new operational and tactical categories are proposed, such as cyberwar, cyber troops, offensive, defensive and special information operations. Scientists from the Academy of Military Sciences, the Military Academy of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces and some leaders of the RF Ministry of Defense propose the creation of cyber troops and even a new type of the Armed Forces (cyber commands of a strategic scale and cyber commands within the branches of the Armed Forces). That is, radical, but not yet sufficiently substantiated transformations are proposed.
At the same time, in connection with the need to neutralize information threats and strengthen the country's information sovereignty, the proposals published in 2013 by our scientists and heads of the military department on gaining information superiority over possible opponents, rivals and competitors, both in military and peaceful time. For this purpose, it is assumed that the Armed Forces have special formations that, in comparison with the electronic warfare troops, will solve a wider range of tasks using various technical means and methods of information impact on the opposing enemy systems (by substituting and distorting information, i.e. disinformation and sabotage actions), as well as on their own systems of military and state administration, social and political organizations, business communities and the media. As part of the General Staff, along with the Directorate of the Chief of the EW Troops, there can be additionally created leading structural subdivisions that perform the functions of the IPB both in peacetime and in wartime.
In order to solve the ISS tasks in peacetime, it seems expedient to form additionally cyber units based on means of computer electronic suppression (KREP) and special units based on non-lethal electromagnetic weapons as part of the existing electronic warfare troops.
Along with the regular supply of new EW assets, complexes and systems to the troops, the role and responsibility of the EW service in the activities of commanders (commanders) and headquarters of large formations and formations of the Armed Forces during the preparation period and during operations (combat actions) significantly increases. When preparing any operation, in the decision of the commander of the formation, on the basis of the proposals of the electronic warfare service, the concept of disorganizing the control systems of troops (forces) and enemy weapons by means of their electronic destruction is essentially formulated, the corresponding tasks are assigned to subordinate formations and units. An important part of the work of the headquarters of the formation when planning electronic warfare in an operation is occupied by operational-tactical calculations to determine the required order of forces and means of electronic warfare, their placement in the operational-tactical formation of the formation, organization of control and interaction with the main forces.
Considering these circumstances, including the capabilities of existing and prospective EW and AME systems, created on the basis of the achievements of modern electromagnetic energy, there is reason to expect that with competent planning and use of EW means, the course and outcome of operations (combat actions) will largely be determined by the potential of the EW troops. on which the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces essentially depends. Therefore, the priority (based on the latest technologies) development of EW means, complexes and systems, appropriate funding of research, development and development projects and target programs related to production, testing, equipping troops with modern EW means, the formation of the necessary number of EW units and the organization of combat training is of paramount importance. personnel.
Electronic warfare: radiation instead of missiles
In modern warfare, not everything is decided by guns. To disarm the enemy, it is enough to disable his electronics. For this, powerful electronic weapons are used.
Start
The history of electronic warfare begins with the Russo-Japanese War. Mario de Archangelis, author of the book "Electronic War", said that the Russian sailors-radio operators of Port Arthur predicted possible attacks by radio exchange between Japanese ships. “... Several Russian ships left the port of Vladivostok, - wrote Mario de Archangelis about the events of 1904. “However, the Japanese found them. As the Russian ships nearer and nearer to Gensan, they began to intercept (Japanese) radio communications, increasing in intensity. Therefore, the Russians abandoned their plans, which, undoubtedly, would have ended in tears. "
But in May 1905, the campaign of the Russian fleet under the command of Admiral Zinovy Rozhdestvensky ended tragically. The Japanese cruiser Shinano Maru discovered our ships, but due to weather conditions, it took a long time to establish radio contact with the battleship of Admiral Togo. When the connection was finally established, the radio operators of our ship "Ural" suggested Zinovy Rozhestvensky to transmit a powerful signal on the same frequency at which the Japanese worked. However, the admiral refused. Soon the Russian squadron led by the battleship Suvorov was defeated by the superior forces of the Japanese fleet.
Battle for the skies with radar
As a result of the Second World War, Sir Winston S. Churchill wrote: "If British science had not been better than German science, we could almost certainly have been defeated, crushed and destroyed." Meanwhile, the British electronic warfare systems were not always better than the German ones. At the start of the war, Britain was indeed ahead of Germany, which allowed the Royal Air Force pilots to choose more convenient positions for air battles with Luftwaffe vehicles. So in August 1940, the Germans lost 600 aircraft, and the British only 260.
However, in the second half of the war, the Germans developed devices capable of receiving radar signals at a distance twice as long as the Allies could. The situation in the sky changed immediately. It happened at the beginning of 1944. For example, during a raid on the night of March 30-31, 1944, Luftwaffe aircraft, using technical superiority, shot down 115 British bombers.
Soon the raids on German cities practically disappeared. However, on July 13, 1944, several German Junkers Ju 88G-1 fighters ended up mistakenly at an airfield in Britain. As the British engineers found out, onboard German electronics (radar SN2 and Flensburg) saw the coalition planes precisely on the radar. The British simply removed all radar equipment from their night bombers, sharply reducing their losses.
"Blind" and destroy
At the very end of World War II, the development of systems that could "blind" enemy radars with powerful signals began. So, on British Short Stirling aircraft, Mandrel jammers were installed, which disrupted the operation of the German Freya radars.
After 1945, this direction developed intensively. And already in Operation Desert Storm, it was clearly shown that more powerful electronic weapons can quickly change the course of a war. After the American EF-111 electronic warfare aircraft deprived the Iraqi radar of radar vision, the F-4G coalition aircraft with HARM anti-radar missiles destroyed almost all of Saddam Hussein's air defense systems. Then the US RC-135, TR-1 and E-8 radio reconnaissance aircraft took control of all Iraqi airspace. And only after that there was a stunning defeat of the aviation and ground forces of Baghdad. As a result, there were 120 Iraqi soldiers for every American soldier killed.
Modern electronic warfare systems
Among modern electronic weapons, integrated radio warfare systems are of great importance, the task of which is to create such interference that could withstand enemy missiles and radars in conditions of high electromagnetic density. Such systems are installed on ships, aircraft and even tanks.
Also, with the help of interference, the radar is still being "blinded", but there are already developments that create electromagnetic "ghosts" of aircraft. This allows not only to detect enemy air defense systems, but also to mislead them. There are also miniature flying models, weighing only 120 kilograms, which look like powerful airplanes or rockets on the radar screen. As in the Second World War, the developers are paying a lot of attention to aircraft warning radars and anti-radar weapons. However, experts say that the most important weapon of electronic warfare is the means capable of destroying the enemy's electronics. The most powerful weapon in this direction is considered to be the Russian generator of electromagnetic impulses "Nika".
V.S. PIRUMOV - Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor, Honored Scientist of the Russian Federation, Rear Admiral
The date of the first classic example of electronic warfare can be considered April 2, 1904, when, during the shelling of Port Arthur by Japanese ships, the radio transmission of artillery spotting ships to the main forces was opened and suppressed by deliberate interference. In the classical understanding of the essence of electronic warfare as a two-way process of suppressing radio electronic means on the one hand and protection against interference, on the other hand, is the dialectic of the development of all radio electronics. The desire to achieve a positive result in this confrontation has driven and always will, on the one hand, move the technical process, and on the other, improve the methods of combat use.
From the first steps to the present time, electronic warfare in the world theory and practice of armed warfare in its development has gone through the path of both evolutionary and revolutionary changes. The stages of development of electronic warfare are characteristic of the armed forces of all states and they can be traced on the basis of such a qualitative criterion as the role of electronic warfare in the system of armed warfare, and considering this criterion in two aspects - military and technical. On the basis of this approach, three main types can be distinguished in the development of electronic warfare.
Thus, at the second stage, there is a qualitative change in both the military aspect - the transformation of electronic warfare into an independent type of operational (combat) support with the expansion of its scale to the scale of the use of forces (strategic, operational, tactical), and technical - the creation of electronic warfare complexes and systems.
The outlined general patterns of development of electronic warfare are fully manifested in the history of electronic warfare of the Russian Navy. A significant contribution to the formation and development of means and methods of electronic warfare was made by the Russian naval navigators and scientists S.O. Makarov, A.S. Popov, G.O. Essen, A.N. Nepenin. I.I. Rengarten, A.A. Petrovsky. In the period 1907-1914. In the Russian Navy, a system of documents on the organization of electronic warfare was created, EW issues were introduced into operational plans and worked out in combat training, the first theoretical studies and field experiments were carried out to increase the effectiveness of interference. However, the civil war and the resulting sharp decline in the composition and power of the fleet, the actual cessation of its development for many years slowed down the development of both radio electronics in general and means of electronic warfare.
During the Second World War, Germany, the USA, and Great Britain had not only radar and hydroacoustics, but also special means of suppressing them. The classic use of electronic warfare equipment was their massive use during the Normandy landing operation. The USSR Navy entered the war and ended it without any special means of jamming. The experience of the Second World War forced attention to this area of radio electronics in the first post-war years. As a result of studying the experience of war, captured equipment, field experiments, forecasting the development of radio electronics in 1948 at the 6th Institute of the Navy, a report was prepared "Means of protection against enemy radar and the sequence of their development" (authors V.N. Lupall, A.D. Trofimovich), which became the first step in the development of the means of electronic warfare of the USSR Navy. In the late 40s - early 50s, the first scientific units were created at the Naval Research University, research was launched to create the first ship models of electronic warfare equipment. However, this work was not coordinated organizationally and ideologically, since there were no units in the command and control bodies of the Navy that could solve these problems.
The experience of the Korean War has shown the ever-increasing importance of electronic warfare, on the one hand, and our serious lag behind the fleets of the leading foreign states, on the other. So, in the first 10 post-war years, only one ship jamming station "Coral" (1954) was adopted by the Navy.
In order to accelerate the development of electronic warfare, coordinate the activities of command and control bodies and NRUs, plan electronic warfare and process its activities in 1956, a radio countermeasures and camouflage department was created as part of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Navy (head of the department - Captain 1st Rank G.V. Slashchinsky). Similar structures were created in the fleets. During this period, the formation of special coastal units of electronic warfare began, designed to support the actions of the forces of the fleets at sea.
In 1958, the ships adopted the Crab ship jamming station, which was used to equip cruisers, destroyers and large anti-submarine ships. In 1961-1962. the first samples of self-propelled and drifting hydroacoustic jamming devices were adopted for submarine armament. The Navy introduced the "Guidelines for Combating Enemy Electronic Means". Practical training of electronic warfare tasks began at operational training events. Enthusiasts actively worked at the headquarters and the Naval Research University, among them P.I. Moshkina, D.I. Shchukin, K.P. Sergeeva, B.I. Bondareva, A.N. Prikhodko. V.A. Bykova, S.P. Pamfilova, V.S. Fedorishchev and others.
Despite certain positive results, it was not possible to achieve a radical change in the development of electronic warfare in the 50s and 60s. The main unresolved issues were the following:
At the Naval Academy, first a separate discipline was formed, and then the Department of Electronic Warfare of the Navy (headed by VS Pirumov). Since 1969, the training of specialists began at the VVMURE named after V.I. A.S. Popova - the head of the discipline V.Ya. Radovilsky).
In the late 60s - early 70s, a new generation of electronic warfare equipment was adopted by the Navy, including electronic reconnaissance stations, active jamming stations, passive jamming devices, and self-propelled submarine simulators. However, the level of the tactical and technical characteristics of these means, and most importantly their number, did not meet the rapidly growing needs of the created ocean-going fleet.
In 1975 the author of the article became the head of the Naval Electronic Warfare Directorate. In a short time, the issue of the state of electronic warfare of the Navy was given a relevance corresponding to the real situation and needs. Suffice it to say that 7 special resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the government were adopted, defining the main tasks, programs for creating and equipping the naval forces with electronic warfare equipment and measures to ensure these resolutions.
The main content of this work was the introduction of a system-integrated approach to the development of electronic warfare in all its aspects. The main burden of this problem fell on the specialists of the Electronic Warfare Directorate, where V.A. Nikitin, I. V. Kavetsky, F.A. Smirnov. This activity relied on the substantial assistance of naval science, primarily of such scientists as A.N. Partala and R.A. Chervinsky.
By the end of the 70s, the Navy had developed and practically mastered the theory of organizing and conducting electronic warfare in operations and combat operations, formed a set of electronic warfare units and subunits, and created an electronic warfare training system for all branches of the naval forces.
In the Navy, the cadres of EW specialists have grown and strengthened, including L.V. Aminin, V.A. Kalinin, A.V. Dubinin, V.K. Kashintsev. THEM. Tregubov, P.I. Smirnov, N.N. Gelunov and others. Scientific schools, which were headed by Doctor of Sciences V.S. Pirumov, A.N. Partala, G.V. Slavyansky, R.A. Chervinsky.
The high efficiency of the measures was facilitated by constant attention to the problems of electronic warfare, specific guidance and assistance from the command of the Navy S.G. Gorshkova, N. D. Sergeeva, V.A. Kasatonova, G.M. Egorova, P.G. Kotov, who were deeply imbued with the importance and complexity of the problems and participated in its solution personally and directly.
The work carried out in the late 70s - early 80s made it possible to move to a new stage in the development of electronic warfare, the main content of which was the creation in the 80s of multifunctional complexes and electronic warfare systems based on modern technologies, the widespread introduction of automation.
Electronic warfare systems developed in the 1980s are highly effective systems that allow, in the shortest possible time, to reveal the electronic situation in the combat area, to suppress the detection systems, control of forces and weapons of the enemy with active and passive interference.
The Russian Navy is equipped with weapons that, in some cases, not only are not inferior, but even surpass their foreign counterparts.
As mentioned above, at present, electronic warfare systems and systems, along with high-precision weapons, are the basis for the forces' actions to disorganize the enemy's control system. They have a number of indisputable advantages in comparison with other means. Some of them include the absence of the need for direct fire contact with the enemy, which means a decrease in the likelihood of losses in forces and equipment when achieving the set goals, the “inexhaustible resource” of active suppression means, the initial advantage in mutual detection and the range of effective impact on systems, using active methods of detection and guidance, etc. In potential, electronic warfare means can significantly expand their capabilities by giving them the ability to functionally destroy radio-electronic objects, system-program impact on ACS, etc.
All this speaks about the prospects of this type of weapon, which in the next century may become part of the main types of weapons of the navies.
The emergence of electronic warfare is inherently associated with the invention and implementation of radio communications in military affairs. Radio, which became one of the greatest inventions of the late 19th century and led to a revolution in the field of communications and media, began to be mastered at an extremely fast pace by the armed forces of various countries. First of all, we are talking about the navies, for which radio meant solving the age-old problem of communication between ships at sea. In fact, the naval forces acted as pioneers of radio communications (it is no coincidence that in Russia the invention of radio by Alexander Stepanovich Popov took place under the auspices of the naval department), and from about 1900, ships of the main classes of all leading naval powers were rapidly equipped with radio stations.
However, at the same time, the side effects of radio communications, such as its dependence on weather conditions and various kinds of interference, were also clarified. The lack of any technical capabilities to protect early radio communications from external interference quickly enough suggested the possibility of obstructing enemy radio transmissions by specially created interference. Back in January 1902, in the report of the Russian Marine the technical committee pointed out: "Telegraphing without wires has the disadvantage that a telegram can be caught at any foreign station and, therefore, read, interrupted and confused by extraneous sources of electricity." In March 1903 A.S. Popov, in a memo to the War Ministry, formulated the main ideas of radio intelligence and electronic warfare.
For the first time jamming of radio transmissions in practice was applied in September 1901 in the United States in the yacht races for the America's Cup, when engineer John Rickard, who worked for American Wireless Telephone & Telegraph, used its ground radio station to “jam” the news broadcasts of competing radio stations. companies about the course of the races.
Thus, the idea of electronic warfare has been in the air practically since the spread of radio communications. The subsequent increasing expansion of the use of electromagnetic waves in military affairs and the development of new ranges of radio communication gave rise to new methods of radio countermeasures.
A qualitative leap in the development of electronic warfare was caused by the emergence and implementation of radar based on the principle of receiving reflected electromagnetic waves. The widest spread of radar equipment, which made it possible to increase the detection ranges of targets far beyond the visual visibility, and the critical importance of radar equipment for many areas of armed struggle, respectively, sharply increased the importance of electronic warfare. From now on, electronic warfare was transformed from a tool for solving a rather specific problem of disrupting enemy radio communications into one of the main means of reducing the effectiveness, or even completely neutralizing enemy means of fire destruction. Thus, in its history, electronic warfare has come a long way from creating simple radio interference to the most important type of support for combat operations of any scale.
In modern conditions, EW includes both the purposeful impact of electromagnetic radiation on radio-electronic objects in the control systems of the enemy's troops and weapons, and the protection of their radio-electronic systems from the effects of the forces and means of the enemy's electronic warfare.
As already mentioned, the idea of using interference by outside radio stations was formulated in Russia even before the start of the Russo-Japanese War, therefore, with the outbreak of hostilities in 1904, the Russian side began to actively introduce the practice of radio countermeasures. Already March 7 (old style) 1904the new commander of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov from gave order number 27, prescribing radio discipline for his forces and at the same time using radio to detect enemy transmissions.
The detection of enemy forces by pinpointing the work of its ship radio stations was widely practiced by the fleets of both sides. On the Russian side, measures were taken both for the direction finding of enemy ship radio stations in order to determine the distance and even bearing of their carriers, and for intercepting the content of enemy radiograms (although with regard to the latter, the successes were apparently insignificant, including due to ignorance of conventional signals and the presence of language barrier).
2 April (old style, April 15 new style) 1904 - for the first time in world history was a practical step has been taken from organizing radio intelligence to conducting electronic warfare in combat operations at sea. On this day, the Japanese undertook another shelling of Port Arthur with naval artillery, which was included in the historical chronicle of the defense of the fortress under the name of the "third flip-fire".
The Japanese armored cruisers Nissin and Kasuga began firing 203-mm and 254-mm guns at the forts and inland roadstead of Port Arthur from a long distance over Cape Liaoteshan. To adjust their fire by radio, the Japanese used two armored cruisers, which were kept at sea opposite the exit from Port Arthur, out of range of coastal batteries. Immediately, the Russian squadron battleship Pobeda and the naval radio station on Golden Mountain began to interrupt the working range of Japanese radio stations with a “big spark” (with a more powerful signal from its transmitter).
Squadron battleship Pobeda in Port Arthur. 1904 g.
The jamming of Japanese spotter ships had some success, which is also confirmed by the Japanese side. As a result, none of the 208 shells fired by the Japanese armored cruisers caused serious damage. To commemorate this episode, in 1999, 15 April was declared by the Russian Minister of Defense as the Day of the Electronic Warfare Specialist and has been celebrated since that time.
The effectiveness of jamming Japanese ship radio stations in the Russo-Japanese War was facilitated by the relative primitiveness of Japanese radio stations of their own production, installed on most Japanese ships and operating on the same frequency, which did not allow changing it (the Japanese also used British Marconi stations). In contrast to this, Russian ships used more advanced radio stations - both Russian (the Kronstadt workshop for the manufacture of wireless telegraph devices) and joint (the Parisian enterprise "Popov-Dukret-Tissot"), as well as imported (Telefunken and British Marconi). All of them were powerful enough (more than 2 kW), allowed a change in the operating wavelength, as well as a change in the radiation power (in order to reduce the possibility of detecting their work by the enemy).
During the campaign of the 2nd Pacific squadron of the vice admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky to the Far East, it included the auxiliary cruiser Ural, specially equipped with an additional purchased radio station Telefunkenextra high power(4.5 kW, the range of reception and transmission at a wavelength of 800-820 m reached 750-1100 km). The second such radio station was in the Vladivostok fortress to establish communication with the 2nd squadron when the latter approached the theater of operations. From the very beginning, it was planned to use the Ural radio station to jam the radio transmissions of enemy ships.
Auxiliary cruiser Ural ". Tsushima Strait, May 14, 1905
When approaching the Tsushima Strait on May 14 (old style), 1905, the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron was discovered by Japanese auxiliary cruisers, who actively used their radiotelegraphs to notify the Japanese commander, Admiral H. Togo, about the Russian forces. Even the day before the commander of the cruiser "Ural" appealed to the commander squadron with a request to use the cruiser's radio station to jam Japanese transmissions, but Z.P. Rozhdestvensky did not give such permission - presumably out of fears that with the help of the direction finding of such a powerful transmitter, the Japanese could easily target the Russian squadron.
During the Tsushima battle itself, a number of Russian ships used radio stations to "jam" enemy radio broadcasts. After the battle, the direction finding of enemy radio transmissions (with the determination of the distance to the source of transmission) allowed several ships of the broken Russian squadron to evade encounters with Japanese ships and break through to neutral ports or to Vladivostok.
On the whole, during the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian fleet demonstrated the rudimentary use of the basic methods of radio suppression and radio and radio-technical intelligence. It is also worth noting the introduction of radio discipline measures on the Russian side in order to prevent the use of similar methods by the enemy. Based on fragmentary data, it can be judged that the direction finding of radio communications of the Russian side was also practiced by the Japanese fleet.
In turn, it is known that since 1902 the British fleet, and since 1903 the American fleet, during the exercises, tried to intercept enemy radio communications. In 1904, British ships systematically interceptedradio broadcasts of Russian warships in the Mediterraneanre(including those carrying out the transition to the Far East), and in a number of cases they read the content of Russian radiograms without hindrance.
The rapid progress in radio technology on the eve of the First World War contributed to the development of research and the introduction of radio suppression methods into practice.
In Russia in 1911-1912. Professor of radio engineering of the Naval Academy and the head of the laboratory of the Radiotelegraph depot of the Maritime Department A.A. Petrovsky was the first to theoretically substantiate the methods of creating radio interference and protecting radio communications from them, which were practically tested in the Black Sea Fleet. Before the war in 1912-1913. in the Baltic Fleet, measures were being worked out that would allow "to get away from enemy interference during radio communications," and the corresponding training of ship radiotelegraph operators began.
Similar methods have become widespread in other countries. First of all, radio intelligence developed rapidly. In particular, it is known that in 1908 during the Bosnian crisis (caused by the annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina occupied by it since 1878, formally part of the Ottoman Empire), and then during the Italo-Turkish war of 1911, the Austrian The military radio service intercepted Italian military and government radio broadcasts, using the information received to develop political and military measures to counter possible Italian interference. Since that time, the intelligence services of Austria-Hungary and France have formed special units to intercept enemy radio transmissions.
Signal intelligence gained a large scale in Great Britain, where German ciphers were broken by government and naval services, which throughout almost the entire First World War allowed the British to remain highly aware of the movements of the same German fleet, anticipating the success of Operation Ultra during World War II ... Especially for the analysis of intercepted German radio communications and their decryption in August 1914, the famous "Room 40" was created in the British Admiralty, and special radio equipment developed by Marconi was used for radio interceptions at long distances, using innovative tube amplifiers for that time, and from the beginning In 1915, a network of radio interception stations ("Y stations") was created. In particular, the use of intercepting radio transmissions from German ships allowed the British command to be timely notified of the departure of the main forces of the German fleet in a raid operation at the end of May 1916 and to send the Grand Fleet to meet the Germans, which led to the Naval Battle of Jutland.
On the German side, the greatest success of radio intelligence was the use of intercepts of radio communications by Russian army headquarters and corps radio stations from the Russian 1st and 2nd armies, which were advancing on East Prussia in August 1914. Neglecting the elementary rules of secrecy, the Russians quite often transmitted radio messages in clear text (this was partly due to the lack of common ciphers for the connections), up to operational orders of the army commanders, which allowed the command of the German 8th Army, headed by General P. Hindenburg, to be well aware of the movements and intentions of the Russians. This largely contributed to the catastrophic defeat of both Russian armies in the East Prussian operation, allowing the Germans, leaving only barriers against the 1st Russian army of General P.K. Rennenkampf, to encircle and defeat the 2nd Army of General A.V. Samsonov, after forcing the 1st Army to retreat.
The German general Hoffmann wrote later: “The Russian radio station transmitted the order in unencrypted form, and we intercepted it. This was the first of a series of countless other orders that the Russians initially received with incredible frivolity. Such frivolity greatly facilitated the conduct of the war in the East, sometimes only thanks to him and in general it was possible to conduct operations. "
It should be noted that the Germans themselves at the beginning of the war repeated the same mistakes in organizing radio communications, which made it easier for the French, who intercepted the radio messages of German troops, to conduct the battle on the Marne in September 1914.
Radio interception of enemy messages was most widespread in the First World War in all the belligerent powers, causing the formation of special radio intelligence units in the intelligence agencies. The rather primitive encryption methods used made it easier to read the enemy's messages. At the same time, this also limited the use of interference - it was more practical to read messages from enemy radio stations than to interfere with their transmission.
In 1917-1918. the British, and then the Americans, were widely usedto order the direction finding of radio transmissions of German submarines in order todetecting their areas of action... This led to the introduction of shipborne radio direction finders - the first radio and radio reconnaissance devices. French and British troops on the Western Front since 1915 used special radio goniometric interception systems based on radio direction finders in order to determine the location of the radio stations of the headquarters of German military formations. This practice then became common to both warring coalitions. Thus, by the middle of 1916, the Russian army had 24 radio direction-finding stations subordinate to the army headquarters.
During the war, the Russian Baltic Fleet created its own effective radio intelligence service, headed by the head of the Baltic Sea communications service, Admiral A.I. Nepenin. To a large extent, the successes of Russian (and partly British) naval radio intelligence were based on the ability to break German ciphers, relying on German signal books and other encryption documents captured on the wrecked in the Baltic on August 26 (old style) 1914 light cruiser Magdeburg , as well as those obtained by secret agents. During 1914-1915. In the Russian fleet, coastal and shipborne radio direction-finding stations of new types were developed and introduced into a series. In 1916 onlyin the Baltic there were eight Russian coastal radio direction-findingposts.
Episodes of the use of radio interference in the First World War were generally isolated. The most famous was the "clogging" of the radio transmissions of British ships with targeted radio signals from the radio stations of the German battle cruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau during the breakthrough of the latter through the Mediterranean Sea to Turkey in August 1914. This was facilitated by the high power of the advanced Telefunken radio stations by the standards of that time, installed on these German ships - as opposed to the less powerful and outdated radio stations pursuing the German detachment of older British ships.
The practice of "jamming" radio transmissions of other ships and vessels with signals from one's own station was widely used during the operations of German raiders (both light cruisers and auxiliary cruisers).
There is information about the use by Western allies of jamming and false radio guidance signals against the radio stations of the German zeppelin airships that raided the British Isles. In particular, during a major raid of 11 "Zeppelin" on England on October 19-20, 1917, the transmission of false radio signals by a powerful radio transmitter from the Eiffel Tower in Paris, relayed by another radio station, led to disorientation of the "Zeppelin" radio operators, who used signals from German radio stations for night navigation ... As a result, on the way back, the loss of orientation by the navigators of the German airships due to this interference, combined with bad weather, led to the wreck of two air ships L 50 and L 55 (and three more were shot down by British and French fighters during this raid).
Edited by N.A. Kolesova, I. G. Nosenkov. Electronic warfare. From Experiments of the Past to the Decisive Front of the Future - Moscow: Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2015
