The ship is known for its mysterious death in the Bay of Havana, where it arrived on January 25, 1898 in connection with the popular uprisings taking place in Cuba against the colonial rule of Spain. On the evening of February 15, 1898, the ship exploded and sank. The explosion killed 266 people: 260 during the explosion or shortly after, and 6 died in hospital from their injuries. Captain Sigsby and most of the officers survived because their seats were aft.
The death of the ship and most of the crew received wide publicity in the American press, which directly or indirectly accused Spain of blowing up the cruiser, and thus played a catalytic role in shaping public opinion in favor of the start of the Spanish-American war.
The entry into service of the Brazilian battleships Richauello and Akidaban in 1883-1885 seriously changed the balance of the naval forces of the Western Hemisphere. Although by European standards, both Brazilian ships were very small and belonged to the 2nd or even 3rd class, no other power in the Americas - not even the United States - had modern battleships at the time. generally... Two battleships for some time brought Brazil to the strongest maritime powers of the New World.
The American navy in the 1880s was in a completely neglected state. As Chairman of the Maritime Affairs Committee Hillary A. Herbert grimly remarked, "If our entire fleet had met the Richauello on the high seas, I doubt that even one of our ships would have returned to port." Isolationists in Congress pushing for a cruising war against potential European adversaries against commercial shipping have been severely shaken by the emergence of modern battleships from a potentially hostile power near American shores. The proponents of building a modern navy finally got the upper hand and the design of a response began immediately.
In 1884, the design and repair bureau submitted for consideration two projects of a 7500-ton battleship and a 5000-ton cruiser. Secretary of the Navy William Collins Wheatley instead requested Congress to build two 6,000-ton armored ships (displacement requirements were limited due to the small size of the existing American docks, which were only supposed to be modernized). In 1886, the permission was obtained, and the Navy began to draw up a detailed project of its first armored ships for a long twenty years.
The Armored Ship Maine was designed by Theodore D. Wilson, chief engineer of the Bureau of Design and Repair. The purpose of this ship was determined as predominantly cruising (unlike Texas, which, having an almost identical layout, was designed from the very beginning as a battleship), which predetermined the speed requirement of 17 knots.
"Maine" and "Texas" in fact repeated the Brazilian ships: both had an echelon arrangement of gun mounts of the main caliber and were primarily designed to conduct battle in the front line. The Americans did not yet know that this concept was already considered outdated, and, for example, the design of the Richauello itself was not optimal.
The length of the ship was 98.9 meters, width - 17.4 meters and draft - 6.9 meters. Its total displacement was 6682 tons. It was narrower and slightly longer than the "Texas", its hull was divided into 214 watertight compartments and had one long longitudinal bulkhead. The ship received a double bottom, but only within the citadel.
Maine's main armament consisted of four 254-mm 35-caliber 10 "/ 35 Mark 2 guns. The guns were located in pairs in two diagonally located rotating turrets: the bow turret was strongly displaced to the starboard side (and partially protruded beyond it), and the stern tower - to the left. Due to the location of the towers close to the extremities, the ship was subject to strong longitudinal roll. In addition, the guns standing low above the water were heavily flooded. [ ] The towers were hydraulically powered.
These heavy guns fired a 231-kilogram projectile with an initial velocity of 610 meters per second. At a distance of up to 5000 meters, the projectile pierced 180 millimeters of hardened harveted armor. But the rate of fire of the guns, due to the unsuccessful design of the breeches and the outdated reloading procedure, was very low - about 1 shot per minute and a half. By 1905, at the expense of better workout gunners and simplifying reloading, the rate of fire was raised to 2-3 rounds per minute. Nevertheless, the Americans considered the Maine's main armament to be more successful than that of the Texas, since the reloading mechanisms of the Maine's guns rotated with the turrets and could reload the guns in any position.
The auxiliary armament of the ship consisted of six 152-mm 30-caliber guns, located in the casemates. Formally rapid-fire, the guns had separate loading and in practice they initially fired no more than 1 round per minute (the situation was corrected by the 1890s). Their maximum range was about 8000 meters.
As an anti-mine weapon, the Maine was equipped with seven 57mm rapid-fire Driggs-Schroeder guns mounted on the superstructure roof. The guns fired up to 20 rounds per minute. In addition, the ship carried four 37mm Hotchkiss guns and four 1-pounder Driggs-Schroeder machine guns. Also, the ship was equipped with four 450-mm torpedo tubes (two per side) and, according to the initial project, was supposed to carry on board two small destroyers with a displacement of 15 tons. Later, this idea was abandoned due to the completely unsatisfactory qualities of the experimental destroyer.
The main belt of the ship was made of steel-nickel armor. It had a thickness at the top edge of 305 millimeters, and thinned to the bottom edge to 178 millimeters. The belt covered the ship's citadel between the towers of the main caliber. Its height was 2.1 meters, of which 0.9 protruded above the water. Along the edges of the citadel, the belt obliquely went deep into the hull, thinning to 203 millimeters, and passing into the armored bulkhead.
The convex armored deck was 51 millimeters thick in the central part and had bevels 76 mm thick behind the armored belt. In the stern, the armored deck went under the water, covering the rudders and propellers from the shells falling from above. The artillery of the main caliber was protected by 203 mm armor with a barbet armor thickness of up to 305 mm in the upper part (in the lower - up to 250 mm). Casemates of rapid-fire guns were protected by 114-mm armor.
The ship was powered by two triple expansion machines with a total power of 9239 hp. It was not possible to develop the design speed of 17 knots: during the test, the ship gave out only 16.45 knots, which was even worse than that of the "Texas". The economical range was only 6670 km.
On February 15th, 1898, Maine was in Cuba to protect American citizens in the wake of an uprising against Spanish rule on the island. At 21.40, when the cruiser was in the port of Havana, a powerful explosion took place on board. Subsequent analysis showed that more than 5 tons of powder charges in the bow magazines detonated simultaneously, destroying the bow of the ship. The mutilated skeleton quickly settled to the bottom of the harbor. Since it was night, most of the Maine's crew rested in the bow rooms, and the disaster claimed the lives of 266 (more than 2/3 of the crew). The senior officers survived only because their cabins were aft, farthest from the explosion.
The death of the Maine sparked a wave of fury in American society, skillfully directed against the Spaniards. Radical circles of society believed that the cruiser was destroyed by a Spanish mine, brought under its side at night. This version was widely played in American propaganda for the Spanish-American War.
In addition to the investigation carried out shortly after the explosion, ordered by the Spanish government by two officers of the Spanish navy, two official investigations were authorized by the American side, in 1898 and in 1910. An 1898 investigation concluded that an external torpedo or mine explosion was the cause of the ship's death, thus allowing the blame to be placed on Spain (although the commission stated that it could not identify a specific party responsible). This politicized decision was sharply criticized by the Spaniards, who, based on interviews with witnesses, believed that the explosion occurred inside the enclosure.
In 1910, the ship began to be raised to the surface, as it interfered with navigation. The technology was as follows: since the Maine sank at a shallow depth (14 meters), many 30-meter piles were driven into the bottom with the help of floating steam hammers. They surrounded the ship with a kind of palisade, forming a waterproof cofferdam. Then the gaps between the piles were sealed and the pumping of water began. At the same time, a re-investigation of the incident was launched.
Inspection of the ship's hull by divers could not finally resolve the issue of the cause of the explosion, but questioned a number of conclusions of the 1898 commission. In particular, the divers found that the damage to the keel, which in 1898 was one of the main arguments in favor of an external explosion, was in fact caused by the detonation of the cellars (which, however, as recognized by the 1910 investigation, could have been caused by an external explosion). One of the reasons for the commission's uncertain conclusions was that the ship's hull had undergone severe corrosion and the bow was completely destroyed.
After draining the cofferdam, American engineers cut off the superstructures and upper decks of the ship and cut off the bow, which was completely destroyed by the explosion. The rest of the ship was sealed with cement, cleared of silt and, after filling the rubber dam, surfaced. On March 16, 1912, the remains of the ship were towed out to sea and sunk.
In 1976, American Admiral Rickover organized a private investigation into the incident. He suggested that the cause of the death of the ship was spontaneous combustion of bitumen coal, which had just begun to be used in the American Navy. The National Geographi Society conducted its investigation in 1998, timed to coincide with the centenary of the sinking of the ship. The conclusions based on the study of archives and computer modeling were ambiguous: on the one hand, a fire in a coal pit could provoke an explosion, but on the other hand, the same thing could actually be done even with a small mine attached to the outside of the hull. [ ]
In 2002, the History Channel aired a program about its investigation into the explosion. Currently, the most likely cause of the ship's death is considered a fire in a coal cellar, which led to the detonation of a nearby 6-inch artillery cellar. A similar version was first put forward during the investigation in 1898, but for political reasons it was declared "unlikely".
Although this version (the explosion of a cruiser with a mine brought under its board by the Spaniards) was widely circulated in the American press, it was never put forward as an official accusation. The destruction of Maine, as such, did not bring any direct benefit to Spain (other than weakening the American fleet) and only increased the likelihood of a conflict with the United States, which the Spanish government was trying to avoid. However, there is a certain possibility that the cruiser could have been blown up by a Spanish barrage, torn from the anchors by the current and drifting across the bay.
Almost from the very moment the cruiser was destroyed, a conspiracy theory of the disaster appeared, according to which the cruiser was blown up by agents of the American government in order to provoke a wave of popular indignation against Spain. This version is not supported by any material sources, but it is very popular. The main objection to it is that the destruction of "Maine" - one of the few modern American armored ships at that time - for the sake of organizing a provocation, is an unjustifiably expensive action that undermines the combat capability of the fleet.
One of only two pioneers of modern American armored shipbuilding in the 1880s, the Maine was not a particularly successful ship. Lack of experience of American designers and a glance at the outdated European experience (diagonal arrangement of towers) embodied in the "Richauello" that served as an example led to the fact that the ship, formally powerful, turned out to be ineffective.
Lagging behind the battleships of that time in armament power and armor, the Maine was too slow and had clearly insufficient cruising range to be an effective cruiser. Although her armament was more effective than the heavy guns of the "Texas", the unsatisfactory qualities of all American heavy guns of that time led to the fact that the cruiser was inferior in firepower to all European counterparts.
Nevertheless, the construction of Maine and Texas gave American shipbuilders valuable experience and made them think not to try to follow the often outdated foreign standards, but to look for their own way in shipbuilding.
On this day in 1898 in the port of Havana exploded "Maine" - a battleship of the 2nd class of the American fleet.
The ship before the explosion
After him...
The Americans, of course, accused the Spaniards of sabotage - they accused them, then attacked and took away Cuba, the Philippines and Puerto Rico.
Now they adhere to the version that the ship exploded ITSELF - well, it also happens ...
It was only when the WTC skyscrapers fell in 2001, the Americans occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, began to "kill" and grab people all over the world, staged bullying at airports - maybe they also exploded themselves?
The explosion that caused the war. Battleship Maine
On the morning of February 15, 1898, the booming rumble of an explosion swept over the Cuban capital Havana. Those who were on the embankment at that time saw a bright flash flash over the bow of the two-pipe warship, and immediately it was enveloped in thick clouds of black smoke. A few minutes later, the ship disappeared under water. This is how the American armored cruiser Maine, which came to Havana on a friendship visit ten days ago, perished.
The boats of the Spanish cruiser Alfonso XII immediately rushed to the crash site. The sailors tried their best to help the few survivors from the Maine.
Some details of the disaster soon became known. According to Captain Sigby, the commander of the cruiser, the disaster happened out of the blue. At 9 hours 40 minutes, when part of the crew was still asleep, the cruiser shuddered from an unusually strong explosion in the bow, rose, then sank heavily into the water and sank. Sigby himself was wounded in the head during the explosion, but until the last minutes of his ship he tried to save, if not him, then at least the team. However, the captain's efforts were in vain: "Maine", turned into a heap of mutilated ruins, dragged 266 sailors to the bottom of the bay - three quarters of the crew.
What were the causes of the disaster?
According to the Spaniards, "Maine" was killed by an internal explosion in the bow magazine of ammunition. The cause of the explosion could be established by examining the wreckage of the deceased ship. The Maine lay at a shallow depth, and it was relatively easy to do this.
They thought differently in the United States of America.
Without asking permission from Spain, whose colony at the time was Cuba, a special commission of inquiry, consisting of four American naval officers, was sent to Havana. On February 19, the commission began work.
Madrid did not like the unceremonious behavior of its northern neighbor, and on February 25, Cuban Governor Blanco made an official protest. At the same time, the Spaniards offered America, in their opinion, a reasonable compromise: to create a mixed Spanish-American commission to investigate the disaster. However, Blanco's offer was rejected, moreover in a rather impolite form.
While four Americans were examining the wreckage of Maine, a fierce anti-Spanish campaign broke out in the United States with a suspiciously quick, if not organized, campaign, unequivocally calling on the Americans to war with Spain.
"The warship Maine is split by the enemy's secret infernal machine!", "Maine" is treacherously destroyed! " - the newspaper "The Journal" snapped, and the "World" openly demanded new steps from the government: "The destruction of the Maine should be the basis for ordering our fleet to sail to Havana!"
The newspapers were echoed by US Deputy Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, an ardent supporter of the war with Spain and the future US president, creator of the "big stick" doctrine.
The press, statesmen and politicians of the United States tirelessly urged the "average American" to war, persistently drumming into his head an ominous call: "Remember" Maine! "
The US government, rushing things, allocated 50 million dollars for the needs of "national defense", orders from the military industry increased sharply - the United States was openly preparing for war.
In the meantime, the American Commission of Inquiry finished its work and published its report on March 21. Judging by the materials of the investigation, "Maine" died from the explosion of an underwater mine or torpedo. Although the commission did not name the perpetrators of the disaster, the propaganda machine had already managed to do its own thing: it was clear to every American that the Spaniards were to blame for everything. The US version was repeated by the press of many countries. Some publications cautiously expressed doubts that "Maine" died from sabotage. Here is what the Russian magazine Vokrug Sveta wrote: “Three weeks ago, the North American battleship Maine, which arrived there, took off on the roadstead of Havana. The cause of the explosion is one of the torpedoes lowered by the Spaniards into the water to protect the harbor. " The ending of the message clearly denies the intentional nature of the disaster ...
Naturally, the Spanish side categorically disagreed with the conclusions of American experts and created its own commission, but the Americans did not even allow her to inspect the wreckage of the Maine. The Spaniards had to confine themselves to interviewing witnesses to the explosion. Having thus restored the course of the disaster, they concluded that, contrary to the US version, the explosion on February 15 was internal. The Spanish commission published the results of its work on March 28.
Meanwhile, President McKinley addressed Congress with another message in which he declared: “The loss of the Maine was in no way the result of negligence on the part of the officers or members of the crew of this ship. The ship was destroyed by an underwater mine explosion, which caused the explosion of two ... front ammunition depots. "
McKinley did not call the Spaniards the culprits of the disaster, but he blamed Madrid on all the responsibility for it, citing the fact that the Maine died in the territorial waters of Spain.
Many disagreed with such hasty conclusions. In particular, the authoritative Russian "Marine Collection" reminded readers of some facts that partially confirm the Spanish version - two years ago, briquetted coal spontaneously flared up in the coal pits of the American cruisers "Cincinnati" and "New York". The fire threatened the ammunition storage. The catastrophe was averted literally by a miracle, flooding the cellars with sea water at the last moment. According to Morskoy Sbornik, a similar fire on the Maine could have caused an explosion in the bow cellar, which was fatal for it.
Ultimatum
But the United States stubbornly refused to hear anything that would interfere with the impending aggression. The government responded to its president with an open call for war, albeit slightly covered with hypocritical reasoning of a moral and religious nature: “It is impossible to endure any longer the appalling state of affairs that has dominated Cuba for three and a half years. It outrages the moral feeling of the American people, is a disgrace for Christian civilization and ended with the death of the federal warship Maine with 266 persons of its crew during a friendly visit to the Havana Bay. "
Convinced of the full support of the government, McKinley declared on April 11: "Intervention is our special duty, since all this is taking place at our borders." The President justified the war on the security interests of the United States, which, of course, no one threatened ...
On April 20, the American Ambassador Wood Ford issued an ultimatum to Madrid: the United States demanded that Spain abandon Cuba and withdraw its army and navy from its region. The ultimatum expired on April 23, but the day before that the American squadron of Admiral Simpson left Key West to block the Cuban waters, and the next day the squadron of Admiral Dewey went to the Philippines. Without hesitation, the US President took another decisive step - he announced the conscription of 25 thousand volunteers into the army.
The Spanish-American War, the first war of the era of imperialism, the war for the redivision of the world, ended with an impressive victory for the United States. Backward, semi-feudal Spain was forced to abandon the Philippines and its possessions in the West Indies. Cuba became a semi-colony of the United States for many years until it became free after the national liberation uprising led by Fidel Castro.
Spain lost in this war almost everything it owned - both the colonies and the navy. America's losses were immeasurably less. The victorious war somehow quickly erased from the memory of the Americans the memories of its victims, the first of which were the 266 sailors of the Maine. The mystery of the death of the ship remained unsolved.
Who benefits from?
This traditional question from lawyers will help us to somewhat lift the veil of mystery over the explosion on February 15, 1898. Indeed: who benefits?
Not the Maine sailors, of course. By the way, it was later established that there was no fire at all in the boiler room and coal pits of the deceased cruiser, and that nevertheless the explosion took place inside the ship.
Perhaps Spain was eager to enter into a military conflict with the United States of America? Most likely no. By the end of the 19th century, it had lost the remnants of its former power. To top it all off, her army has for several years tried to pacify the Cuban rebels, who have fought bravely for their independence. The methods of fighting the punishers with the rebels led Spain to political isolation. On the overseas possessions of Spain, scattered on the islands of the West Indies, there was a 90,000-strong army exhausted by constant battles with Cubans, against which America put up 170 thousand soldiers armed to the teeth ...
The almost anecdotal episode of the "capture" of Guam by the Americans speaks best of the combat effectiveness of the Spanish army and navy. As soon as the cruiser "Charleston" fired the first seven shells at the forts of Guam, the governor sent his officer aboard her with an apology for not being able to return a salute to the "Charleston" due to the lack of gunpowder on the coastal batteries! The Americans, of course, accepted his apology, adding that such honors were not necessary, since the governor and his subordinates could henceforth consider themselves prisoners of war.
Naturally, in such conditions, Spain not only did not think about a war with the United States, but, moreover, tried with all its might to settle the conflict peacefully. But this was the last thing the USA wanted.
The short Spanish-American War had a long history, with the United States preparing for it several years before the Maine bombing.
Back in February 1895, simultaneously with the outbreak of the uprising in Cuba, the United States launched a powerful anti-Spanish propaganda campaign. The formal reason for it was the brutality of the punitive forces in the fight against the Cuban rebels. In fact, American capitalists did not even think about a free and independent Cuba. They needed another Cuba - a supplier of cheap sugar and tobacco, a convenient naval base that controlled the Caribbean Sea and the entrance to the Panama Canal.
Even President Cleveland "probed" the Spanish government for the sale and purchase of Cuba, but received a categorical refusal. And then America began to prepare for war.
On December 6, 1897, two months before the Maine explosion, McKinley, in his message to Congress, declared: “If later it turns out that our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity will require us to use force, then this will not be given to us reproach, since the need for such actions will be so obvious that it will cause support and approval of the civilized world. "
References to "obligations" to the "civilized" (and nowadays - to the "free") world were used by American propaganda 110 years ago, just as they are used now, and they appear, as a rule, when the United States cannot find a better excuse to explain his aggressive policy ...
The anti-Spanish campaign in the United States took a variety of forms, from calling for war to raising funds for Cuba's poverty-stricken population.
Meanwhile, an event took place in Cuba, which was immediately taken advantage of by the United States. On January 12, 1898, five thousand supporters of Spanish colonialism staged a demonstration on the island. It did not have any noticeable impact on the events on the island, but the United States reacted to it with lightning speed - it declared the demonstration a "threat" to itself and sent a detachment of warships to the shores of Cuba: New York, Indiana, Massachusetts "And" Iowa ".
America was ready for war, it only remained to find a pretext.
On January 24, the US Secretary of the Navy announced the upcoming visit to Cuba of the armored cruiser Maine.
The Americans were in such a rush to things that they did not wait for the official consent of the Spanish government to this "friendly visit." On January 25, Fort Morro saluted the Maine as it slowly entered the harbor of Havana. The only thing left for the Spanish government was to take care, at least outwardly, of prestige. Two days later, Madrid reluctantly announced a return visit, and the Spanish cruiser Vizcaya set off for New York.
Less than two weeks later, "Maine" was killed on the roadstead of Havana from a mysterious explosion.
Igor Boechin. Source of information: Journal "Technology for Youth"
The article by I. Boechin is commented on by a specialist in the history of the fleet, captain of the second rank, retired Sergei Romanov.
There is another explanation for the Maine tragedy: perhaps the American ultras were involved in the explosion. This idea has already been expressed at one time by some US historians. They believed that the perpetrators of the explosion were those who feared a peaceful resolution of the conflict, who were interested in the profit that the seizure of the island promised.
This version is supported not so much by the circumstances of the explosion as by the events that occurred shortly after the catastrophe, in February - March 1898, and another 13 years later.
First of all, the stubborn unwillingness of the American authorities to allow Spanish experts to investigate the disaster is alarming. Even more suspicious is the strange request made by Captain Sigby on March 25 (by this time the Americans had already examined the Maine). Sigby asked the Havana authorities for permission to blow up the remnants of his cruiser with dynamite!
Logically speaking, it should obviously be assumed that, by dumping all the blame for the disaster on the Spaniards, the US Naval Command should have published the detailed results of the study. Alas, the command acted in a completely different way.
In 1910, the Maine began to rise to the surface, and moreover in an original way... First, steam hammers installed on floating platforms drove many 30-meter iron piles into the ground near the ship, surrounding the cruiser lying at a depth of 14 meters with a solid wall. Then, carefully filling up the gaps between the piles, they pumped out water from the "ring". For the first time since the disaster, American sailors descended on the deck of the Maine.
Already a cursory examination showed that the Spaniards at one time completely correctly rejected the version of the explosion of boilers - the boiler room was intact, but the explosion, as established by experts, nevertheless occurred inside the ship. This finally refuted the American version of an underwater mine or torpedo. Suddenly, by order from above, the experts stopped work, and all the materials disappeared in the state archives, permanently sealed with a stamp of perfect secrecy.
The rise of Maine, which cost American taxpayers $ 750,000, ended in 1911. The bow of the cruiser, destroyed by the explosion, was cut and sent for melting, thereby destroying the possibility of establishing the true cause of the explosion, and the stern was towed into the open sea and flooded at a depth of 1200 meters.
The reasons for the death of "Maine" are still unknown. The perpetrators of the disaster are also unknown, although it is quite possible that the answer to all questions can be given by the US archives, where all investigation materials are stored. But these materials have not yet been published, and they are unlikely to be made public in the near future - in America, the memory of the scandal associated with the publication of documents on the preparation of the war in Indochina is still fresh.
It is well known that the only person interested in preventing by all means and means an objective investigation of an event, especially a catastrophe, is its culprit.
"We refused to anyone but ourselves to study the evidence," wrote the American historian Adams about the tragedy of Maine, "and then destroyed it." His words clearly enough indicate the true culprit of the mysterious explosion of February 15, 1898, the explosion that sparked the Spanish-American War.
The ship is known for its mysterious death in the Bay of Havana, where it arrived on January 25, 1898 in connection with the popular uprisings taking place in Cuba against the colonial rule of Spain. On the evening of February 15, 1898, the ship exploded and sank. The explosion killed 266 people: 260 during the explosion or shortly after, and 6 died in hospital from their injuries. Captain Sigsby and most of the officers survived because their seats were aft.
The death of the ship and most of the crew received wide publicity in the American press, which directly or indirectly accused Spain of blowing up the cruiser, and thus played a catalytic role in shaping public opinion in favor of the start of the Spanish-American war.
The American navy in the 1880s was in a completely neglected state. As Chairman of the Maritime Affairs Committee Hillary A. Herbert grimly remarked, "If our entire fleet had met the Richauello on the high seas, I doubt that even one of our ships would have returned to port." The isolationist positions in Congress, who insisted on a cruising war against the commercial shipping of potential European adversaries, were severely shaken by the emergence of modern battleships from a potentially hostile power near American shores. The proponents of building a modern navy finally got the upper hand and the design of a response began immediately. In 1884, the design and repair bureau presented for consideration two projects of a 7500-ton battleship and a 5000-ton cruiser. Secretary of the Navy William Collins Wheatley instead requested Congress to build two 6,000-ton armored ships (displacement requirements were limited due to the small size of the existing American docks, which were only supposed to be modernized). In 1886, permission was obtained, and the navy began to draw up a detailed project of its first armored ships for a long twenty years. Design
|
Maine-class battleships(English Maine-class battleships) - three large, seaworthy battleships of the 1st rank, built for the US Navy in late XIX- the beginning of the XX century. Intended for ocean service. They were the first American battleships to use main battery guns powered by smokeless powder. They remained in service until 1919-1922, after which they were written off and dismantled for metal.
1 / 5
Why our IQ levels are higher than our grandparents "| James Flynn
Psychological Research - Crash Course Psychology # 2
Basic geometry: language and labels | Introduction to Euclidean geometry | Geometry | Khan academy
Week 10, continued
07 - Just So Stories by Rudyard Kipling - The Beginning of the Armadillos
Three large Maine-class battleships were authorized for construction by Congress on May 4, 1898, just eight days after the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. According to the terms of reference, these were to be large, seaworthy ships, with high-mounted guns, capable of making long transitions and fighting on the high seas.
The project was based on the design of the first American-built ocean-going battleship, BB-4 "Iowa". By this time, the advantages of the ocean-going Iowa over low-side coastal defense battleships like the Indiana or the Kirsages under construction had already been proven by practical experience in the operation of ships. With undoubted evidence of the superiority of seafaring battleships, the US Navy was finally able to reject the previously prevailing coastal defense doctrine and move on to building a truly ocean-going fleet.
Initially, the project envisioned an enlarged Iowa, replacing the 305mm guns with 330mm guns and the 100mm guns with 127mm ones. But by the time the ships were laid down, the completely unsatisfactory qualities of the American 330-mm guns had already become apparent. The chief engineer of the US Navy, George W. Melville, took advantage of the negative experience of using 330 mm guns in the Spanish-American war to completely redesign the project, taking into account all the new technologies. Now the battleship was to receive new 305mm 40-caliber smokeless guns, much more reliable and powerful than the anachronistic 330mm cannons. It was also supposed to use the Krupp cemented armor armor, which by this time had already successfully replaced the old harveted plates all over the world.
A revised design was submitted to the Department of the Navy in October 1898. The Navy considered that with all the improvements (especially expensive and little-developed cemented slabs), the program would not fit into the allocated funding. At the same time, the American fleet began to express concerns about the rapidly developing naval programs of Russia and Japan: the rapid growth of the Russian and Japanese fleets posed a potential threat to the newly acquired American possessions in the Pacific Ocean. In the 1890s, the Russian fleet laid down a series of three high-speed ocean-going battleships of the Peresvet series, which were larger and faster than all existing American ships.
As a result, the project was redesigned again. The 203-mm "intermediate" caliber was excluded from the project, and the new 50-caliber 152-mm cannons formed the basis of the rapid-fire artillery. The armor was made composite, the main belt was recruited from garve armor, and a number of other elements were made from Krupp's armor. At the same time, increased speed requirements were set - the new ships had to have a course of at least 18 knots.
In "Maine" the features of the Russian, English and American shipbuilding schools were intertwined, which is why it very weakly resembled its "official" prototype - Iowa. But it was very similar to the battleship "Prince Potemkin-Tavrichesky", the drawings of which were transferred to Kramp for the design of the "Retvizan". They had a forecastle with a high bow turret of the main caliber and a relatively low poop. Central space occupied the casemate of auxiliary artillery, which supported the superstructure with two bridges - at the bow and stern. For the first time in American practice, the battleship had three pipes. Some layout solutions clearly repeated the "Retvizan". And the only drawback was also inherited from the "Retvizan", it was the use of the same 24 boilers of Nikloss.
The total displacement of the ships was 12,846 tons. They had a length of 120.1 meters, a width of 22 meters and a draft of 7.42 meters.
The ships were armed with new 305-mm 40-caliber long-barreled guns that fired smokeless powder. Much more powerful than the anachronistic 330-mm cannons of previous projects, these new guns could launch a 394-kg projectile at a distance of up to 17370 meters with an initial speed of 732 m / s (originally supposed to be 810 m / s, but American engineers were unable to fulfill this requirement ). At a distance of 11,000 meters, such a projectile pierced a 239 mm harveed plate. The rate of fire of the guns was originally 1 shot per 1.3 minutes, but by 1906 it was brought to two rounds per minute.
The guns were installed in armored towers, in pairs, at the bow and at the stern. The original design of the towers had a noticeable defect - the ammunition feed elevator passed through the entire tower and the barbette through and through, without any dampers, and the fire in the tower could easily spread into the cellars. In April 1904, a turret incident on BB-11 Missouri killed 34 people. After that, the elevators were equipped with dampers.
The auxiliary artillery consisted of sixteen 152mm 50-caliber guns, the first truly rapid-firing American guns of this caliber. The guns fired up to 6 rounds per minute at the range, and fired a 48-kg high-explosive projectile at a distance of up to 14,590 meters. Five guns from each side stood in a casemated battery on the main deck, under the superstructure, four more guns (two per side) were in the casemates on the deck above, and two more guns were located in individual casemates in the bow.
Anti-mine weapons, in accordance with the growth in size, speed, and range of torpedoes of destroyers, now consisted of six 75-mm cannons, eight 3-pounder cannons, six Nordenfeld's one-pound guns and three 7.62-mm Maxim machine guns. Torpedo armament (for the first time in American practice) was located under the waterline and consisted of two 457-mm rod torpedo tubes.
Maine-class squadron battleships were the first American ships to replace harveled armor with more advanced Krupp-cemented armor. Although initially the new armor raised a number of doubts (the main of which was its enormous cost and complexity of manufacturing), in the end, the ability to reduce the thickness of the armor protection while maintaining the same strength played a role in favor of the Krupp armor.
The main armor belt had a maximum thickness of 280 millimeters. It went along the entire length of the ship, to the extremities (outside the citadel), thinning to 102 mm. In the bow, the belt kept a constant height, while in the aft, its upper edge gradually lowered, repeating the bend of the armored deck. Despite the fact that the belt was thinner than that of the previous classes, best quality armor provided adequate protection with less weight.
Above the main belt was the upper one, covering the space in the center of the hull from the upper edge of the main belt to the base of the casemates of the rapid-fire artillery. Its thickness was significantly increased in order to provide effective protection against the 203-254-mm "intermediate" caliber guns that began to appear at that time, which had higher armor penetration than 152-mm rapid-fire guns.
The main caliber turrets were protected by 305 mm armor. The protection covered the upper part of the barbets of the same thickness: the lower one (additionally covered by the upper belt) had a thickness of 203 millimeters. The battery of rapid-fire artillery was very heavily protected - each gun was in a casemate, which had protection from all sides of armor plates 152 mm thick.
Horizontal protection was provided by an armored deck, which had a thickness of 64 mm. The central part of the deck (in the citadel) was located at the level of the upper edge of the main belt. At the extremities and at the edges, the deck went below the waterline to the lower edge of the armor belt. Thus, the main belt was additionally reinforced by bevels located at an advantageous angle.
The power plant was two-shaft, with a total capacity of 15,600 liters. with. Maine carried twenty-four Nicloss boilers, and Ohio and Missouri twelve more efficient Thorninkroft boilers. The maximum speed of the ships was 18 knots. The subsequent operation of the ships of the same type clearly showed the inconsistency of the advertising of the Nikloss brothers: the Maine turned out to be the most uneconomical ship in the American fleet and was nicknamed the "coal eater". However, this shortcoming was subsequently corrected: during the modernization in 1910, its boilers were replaced by 12 new ones from Babcock and Wilcox.
The Maine-class battleships were the first fully successful series of American battleships. Having accumulated significant negative experience in the previous series, American engineers figured out what was not worth doing, and taking successful analogs as a model, they managed to create small but perfectly balanced and powerful ships.
Maine-class battleships possessed high speed and good seaworthiness, powerful weapons and reliable armor protection. The new 305mm 40-caliber guns, replacing the anachronistic 330mm, were finally at the level of European standards. The rapid-fire 152mm guns were some of the best in the world.
Armor protection has been radically increased. Replacing the harveted slabs with cemented ones, which had much higher strength, allowed American shipbuilders to reduce the thickness of the armor of the main belt (without losing strength) and increase the thickness of the upper protection. The Maine-class battleships had a well-thought-out protection scheme that reliably protected guns and mechanisms from heavy shells, and the freeboard and extremities from rapid-fire shells. In general, in terms of the effectiveness of armor protection, small American battleships were in one of the first places in the world.
| "Formidebl" |
Maine |
|---|
USS Maine
Historical data
Total information
EH
real
doc
Reservation
Armament
Main artillery
Medium caliber artillery
Mine artillery
Additional weapons
Torpedo armament
Comparison of South American battleships and US Navy ships built in response to their construction
| Ship | Country | Commissioning | Waterism. T | Speed knots | Artillery (caliber over 57 mm) | Torpedo armament | Reservation mm |
| Riachuelo Aquibadan | 1883 1886 | 5750 | 15,5 | 4x234 mm 4x140 mm | 5x356 mm | Belt - 178-280 Deck - 50-76 Towers - 254 Cabin - 254 |
|
| Capitan pratt | | 1891 | 4200 | 18,3 | 4x240 mm 8x120 mm | 4x450 mm | Belt - 100-300 Deck - 14-50 Towers - 50 Cabin - 260 |
| USS Maine | USA | 1895 | 6789 | 16,5 | 4x256 mm 6x152 mm | 4x457 mm | Belt - 178-305 Deck - 51-102 Towers - 203 Cabin - 254 |
| USS Texas | USA | 1895 | 6417 | 17,8 | 2x305 mm 6x152 mm | 4x356 mm | Belt - 152-305 Deck - 51 Towers - 305 Deck - 305 |
Final version of the project USS Maine
To select an armored cruiser project USS Maine The US Department of the Navy decided to organize a competition, the winner of which was a project by the Bureau of Construction and Repair ( Bureau Construction and Repair) - the structure of the fleet responsible for the development, calculations and evaluation of ship designs. Drawings of the ship that received the designation ACR-1, were developed in 1886 and approved on November 1, 1887. In accordance with the initial project, the cruiser was supposed to have a displacement of 6744 tons, a length of 94.5 m, a width of 17.7 m, a draft of 6.7 m. The main caliber guns were supposed to be installed in barbets, covered only with shields.
The order for the construction of the ship was received by the state shipyard New york navy yard in Brooklyn. The cost of the ship was originally estimated at $ 2.5 million, excluding the cost of weapons. Preparations for construction began in June 1888, and the ship was officially laid down on October 17, 1888. At this point USS Maine was the largest ship laid down in American shipyards.
USS Maine immediately after launching
The construction of the ship was delayed for seven years. Among the reasons for the delays was a fire in the shipyard, which destroyed a working set of ship drawings. The supply of armor plates was delayed for three whole years - the American industry at that moment was not ready for the construction of large ships. The cruiser was launched on November 18, 1890. US Navy Secretary Benjamin Tracy took part in the launching ceremony, his granddaughter was the godmother of the ship.
It was planned that USS Maine will be commissioned in mid-1892, but completion was delayed until 1895. The ship was accepted by the customer only on September 17, 1895.
USS Maine had a length of 98.9 m, a width of 17.4 m and a draft of 6.9 m. The hull was divided into 214 watertight compartments and had a double bottom with a length of about 60 m. The hull of the ship was rather long and narrow, more characteristic of fast cruisers, however poor weight distribution slowed him down.
The main armor belt of the ship, made of nickel-plated steel, had a maximum thickness of 305 mm at the top, gradually thinning down to 178 mm. The length of the armored belt was only 54.9 meters - it covered the engine rooms and cellars of the main caliber, the height was 2.1 m (of which 0.9 m was above the waterline). Further to the ends of the armored belts, it went with an inclination towards the depth of the ship, having a thickness of 203 mm and connecting with armored 152-mm traverses.
The armored deck had a thickness of 51 mm in the horizontal part and 76 mm on the slopes and covered the space from bow to stern, going under the waterline closer to the stern in order to cover the propeller shafts and steering.
The round turrets had 203 mm armor, the barbets were 305 mm thick, the conning tower was protected by 254 mm armor.
The booking is considered to have USS Maine there were two main drawbacks - the lack of any reservation against small-caliber artillery in the upper part of the ship, and the use of nickel-plated armor, which had a lower efficiency compared to the Harvey and Krupp armor, which by that time had already begun to appear on warships, including American ...
Boilers USS Maine
On USS Maine two vertical triple expansion steam engines manufactured by the company were installed N.F. Palmer Jr. & Company’s Quintard Iron Works of New York separated by a watertight bulkhead. Steam was supplied to them by eight single-sided fire-tube "Scottish" boilers. The stock of coal for the boilers was 910 tons, which was too little for such a large ship and limited the cruising range.
During tests, the ship was able to show a speed of 16.45 knots, never reaching the design speed of 17 knots.
Summary table of the main characteristics of artillery USS Maine
| 10 ″ / 30 Mark 2 | 6 ″ / 30 Mark 3 | 57 mm Driggs-Schroeder | 37 mm cannon |
|
| Caliber, mm | 254 | 152 | 57 | 37 |
| Number of barrels, pcs | 4 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| Barrel length, calibers | 30 | 30 | 45 | 40 |
| Projectile weight, kg | 236 | 48 | 2,7 | 0,45 |
| The initial velocity of the projectile, m / s | 610 | 594 | 570 | 550 |
| Firing range, m | 18200 | 9000 | 8000 | 3200 |
| Practical rate of fire, rounds / min | 0,6 | 1,5 | 20 | 25 |
| Armor penetration of a vertical steel plate at a distance of 5000 m, mm | 175 | n.d. | n.d | - |
| Armor penetration of a vertical steel plate at a distance of 8000 m, mm | 147 | - | - | - |
Battleship's main caliber USS Maine was represented by four 254-mm guns Mark 2 with a barrel length of 30 calibers. They fired shells weighing 236 kg at a distance of 18 km. The vertical guidance range varied from −3 ° to 15 °.
It was originally planned to install these guns in open barbets, covering them with shields, but during construction it became clear that the main caliber artillery crews had to be reliably protected from small-caliber artillery fire, and the project was changed to accommodate the guns in the towers. Due to the additional weight associated with them, the towers had to be placed one deck lower than the original design, and this made them difficult to use in high seas.
The towers were placed diagonally, and in practice it turned out that this caused a number of problems. Firstly, they were not balanced, and the turret rotation caused the ship to roll, which made it difficult to aim and limited the angles of fire. Secondly, shooting on the "foreign" side led to damage to the superstructures by muzzle gases. USS Maine and USS Texas became the last ships of the US Navy, which used the diagonal placement of artillery towers of the main caliber.
Auxiliary artillery USS Maine included six 152-mm guns, mounted in casemates and oriented two to the bow and stern, and one to the sides. They fired 48-kg shells at a distance of up to 9 km.
Torpedo tube USS Maine
Small-caliber armament consisted of seven 57-mm cannons Driggs-Schroeder mounted on superstructures, and eight 37-mm cannons - on superstructures, in the stern and on the battle tops.
On USS Maine four 457-mm surface torpedo tubes were installed, located on the sides. It was also assumed that the ship would carry two 15-tonne destroyers armed with a 356-mm torpedo tube and a 37-mm gun, but only one such boat was actually built. On tests, it turned out that its maximum speed does not exceed 12 knots, and in the future it was used only as a training ship.
USS Maine in 1895
USS Maine entered service on September 17, 1895, the first captain was Captain Arent Crowninshield. After loading the ship with ammunition in early November 1895, he was included in the North Atlantic squadron. Most of his short career USS Maine spent in this squadron, participating in campaigns and exercises off the east coast of the United States and in the Caribbean. In 1896 USS Maine was reclassified as a Class II battleship ( 2nd class battleship). On April 10, 1897, Captain Charles Dwight Sixby succeeded Crowningshield as the ship's commanding officer.
USS Maine enters the harbor of Havana three weeks before death
In 1895, an active armed struggle against Spanish colonial rule began in Cuba. From the very beginning, the United States supported the revolutionaries, some American media campaigned for the US intervention in Cuba. Under pressure from internal and external factors at the end of 1897, Spain, going to meet the rebels, changed the Cuban administration.
Scuttled battleship USS Maine in Havana
In January 1898, a rebellion broke out in Havana, raised by the Cubans who supported Spain. The US Ambassador requested assistance from Washington to protect American citizens who were in the city, and on January 25, the battleship anchored in the port of Havana. USS Maine called from Florida. The presence of a large American ship in the harbor calmed the situation, and for three weeks the city lived a relatively calm life. However, on the evening of February 15, at about 21:40, a powerful explosion occurred on the battleship in the area of the bow artillery cellars, which destroyed the bow of the ship. The battleship sank quickly. Most of the crew at this time was on the ship in their cabins, and 260 people died before they could get out of the sinking battleship. 89 people were saved, including the captain and a significant part of the officer corps.
Immediately after the explosion, two commissions were organized to investigate the causes and circumstances of the explosion - an American and a Spanish. Having studied the available facts and evidence, the commissions, as often happens in such politically difficult situations, came to conflicting conclusions.
The Spanish commission insisted that the source of the explosion was inside the ship. The main assumption was the spontaneous combustion of coal in one of the coal pits located near the bow artillery cellars. The evidence supporting this version, according to the Spaniards, was:
The American commission concluded that the hypothesis of spontaneous combustion of coal and the subsequent explosion of cellars does not look convincing. The basis of the version of the Americans was the statements of the witnesses of the explosion that they heard two successive explosions and that, in the opinion of the divers who examined the remains of the ship, parts of the keel were wrapped inside the ship. The final conclusion of the commission contained a statement that the cause of the explosion USS Maine was the explosion of an underwater mine, which caused the detonation of two or more bow artillery cellars.
As soon as the news of the death of the battleship reached the United States, many American media launched an active campaign to unwind the scandal. So, New York Journal within a week after the explosion, he devoted materials to the deceased battleship with an average volume of about eight pages. Very quickly, public opinion, already supporting the fighters for Cuban independence, was set to sharply aggravate relations with Spain.
Doom USS Maine did not directly lead to the start of the war, but created an atmosphere in which forces that wanted a conflict found it enough to simply bring the situation to the point they needed. In April 1898, the United States and Spain declared war on each other, known as the Spanish-American War, and one of the most popular slogans in the United States was: “Remember the Maine! To Hell with Spain "(" Remember Maine! To hell with Spain! ")
The ship's hull, lying in the harbor of the Cuban capital, interfered with the use of the port, and the Cuban government has repeatedly asked the United States to clear the harbor. In addition, the Americans wanted to raise and bury the remains of 70 sailors who remained buried in the premises of the sunken battleship. In 1910, the US Congress authorized the allocation of funds to raise and sink the shipwreck elsewhere, and work soon began.
USS Maine- June 11, 1911
Army engineers built a caisson of interconnected steel cylinders about 15 meters wide, covered with earth, around the remains of the battleship, and pumped water out of it. By June 30, the deck of the ship emerged from the water. The superstructures and decks were dismantled, the ship was divided into two parts, and the relatively intact stern at the cut was closed with a specially constructed watertight bulkhead. The remains of the sailors were removed from the premises of the ship for subsequent burial.
On February 13, 1912, water was again launched into the caisson, and the stern part surfaced. On March 16, 1912, the aft part of the battleship was towed into the open sea four miles off the coast of Cuba, where it was solemnly flooded with fireworks from two US Navy warships. The remains of the sailors were buried at Arlington Memorial Cemetery.
The reasons for the death of the battleship continued to arouse interest after the end of the war, and over the years several investigations were carried out, which did not fully clarify the reasons for the death of the ship.
In 1911, as part of the removal of the remains USS Maine from the harbor of Havana, the ship's hull, freed from the water, was carefully examined. The new American commission made the same conclusions as the previous one - the explosion of a mine became the cause of the explosion of the cellars, although in its opinion the external explosion took place in a different place.
In 1974, US Admiral Hyman Rikover organized a private investigation into the death of the battleship. The materials used were materials from previous investigations and documents from the archives of the US Navy. The admiral came to the conclusion that the cause of the explosion was the spontaneous combustion of coal, and not the explosion of a mine.
In 1998 the magazine National Geographic conducted his investigation using archival materials and computer simulations. No definite conclusions were made: both versions - about the spontaneous combustion of coal and about the explosion of a mine - were recognized as having the right to exist.
In 2002, the TV channel "The History Channel" made a documentary about the explosion on USS Maine, in which the filmmakers concluded that the explosion was caused by spontaneous combustion of coal and defects in the watertight bulkhead between the coal pit and the cellars.
In addition to the results of investigations, there is a theory that the explosion was organized by the Americans themselves in order to create the basis for unleashing a war with Spain. This version, in particular, is adhered to by the official historians of Cuba. So, on the monument in Havana, dedicated to the death of the battleship, in 1961 was inscribed the inscription "Dedicated to those killed on the Maine, who were sacrificed to the greed of the imperialists and their desire to take control of the island of Cuba."
