The invasion of the Mongol hordes and the domination that followed, stretching for almost two and a half centuries, became a terrible shock for medieval Russia. The Mongol cavalry swept away everything in its path, and if any city tried to resist, its population was ruthlessly massacred, leaving only ashes in place of houses. From 1258 to 1476, Russia was obliged to pay tribute to the Mongol rulers and provide recruits for the Mongol armies. The Russian princes, whom the Mongols eventually entrusted with the direct management of their lands and the collection of tribute, could begin to fulfill their duties only after receiving official permission from the Mongol rulers. Since the 17th century, the phrase “Tatar-Mongol yoke” has been used in Russian to denote this historical period.
The destructiveness of this invasion does not cause the slightest doubt, but the question of how exactly it influenced the historical fate of Russia remains open. On this issue, two extreme opinions are opposed to each other, between which there is a whole range of intermediate positions. The adherents of the first point of view generally deny any significant historical consequences of the Mongol conquest and domination. Among them, for example, Sergei Platonov (1860-1933), who proclaimed the yoke as only a random episode of national history and reduced its influence to a minimum. According to him, "we can consider the life of Russian society in the XIII century, not paying attention to the fact of the Tatar yoke." Followers of a different point of view, in particular, the theorist of Eurasianism Pyotr Savitsky (1895-1968), on the contrary, argued that “without“ Tatar ”there would be no Russia”. Between these extremes, one can find many intermediate positions, the defenders of which ascribed to the Mongols a greater or lesser degree of influence, starting with the thesis of limited influence exclusively on the organization of the army and diplomatic practice, and ending with the recognition of the exceptional importance in determining, among other things, the political structure of the country.
This dispute is of key importance for Russian self-awareness. After all, if the Mongols did not have any influence on Russia at all, or if such an influence was negligible, then today's Russia can be considered as a European power, which, despite all its national characteristics, still belongs to the West. In addition, from this state of affairs, it follows that the Russian attachment to autocracy has developed under the influence of some genetic factors and, as such, is not subject to change. But if Russia was formed directly under Mongol influence, then this state turns out to be a part of Asia or a “Eurasian” power, instinctively rejecting the values of the Western world. As will be shown below, the opposing schools argued not only about the meaning of the Mongol invasion of Russia, but also about the origin of Russian culture.
Thus, the purpose of this work is to study the mentioned extreme positions, as well as to analyze the arguments used by their supporters.
The controversy arose at the beginning of the 19th century, when the first systematized history of Russia was published, written by Nikolai Karamzin (1766–1826). Karamzin, who was the official historian of the Russian autocracy and an ardent conservative, called his work History of the Russian State (1816–1829), thus underlining the political undertones of his work.
For the first time, the Tatar problem was identified by Karamzin in the "Note on Ancient and New Russia" prepared for Emperor Alexander I in 1811. The Russian princes, the historian argued, who received "labels" for ruling from the Mongols, were much more cruel rulers than the princes of the pre-Mongol period, and the people under their rule only cared about the preservation of life and property, but not about the exercise of their civil rights. One of the Mongolian innovations was the application of the death penalty to traitors. Taking advantage of this situation, the Moscow princes gradually adopted an autocratic form of government, and this became a blessing for the nation: “The autocracy founded and revived Russia: with the change of its State Charter, it perished and had to perish ...”.
Karamzin continued his study of the topic in the fourth chapter of the fifth volume of "History ...", the publication of which began in 1816. In his opinion, Russia lagged behind Europe not only because of the Mongols (whom for some reason he called "Mughals"), although they played their negative role here. The historian believed that the lag began during the period of the princely feuds of Kievan Rus, and under the Mongols it continued: “At this time, Russia, tormented by the Mughals, strained its forces solely in order not to disappear: we had no time for enlightenment!” Under Mongol rule, Russians lost their civic virtues; in order to survive, they did not disdain deception, love of money, cruelty: “Perhaps the very present character of the Russians still reveals the stains imposed on him by the barbarism of the Mughals,” wrote Karamzin. If at that time some moral values were preserved in them, then this happened exclusively thanks to Orthodoxy.
Politically, according to Karamzin, the Mongol yoke led to the complete disappearance of free-thinking: "The princes, humbly groveling in the Horde, returned from there as formidable rulers." The boyar aristocracy lost power and influence. "In a word, autocracy was born." All these changes have been a heavy burden on the population, but in the long term, their effect has been positive. They brought an end to the civil strife that destroyed the Kievan state and helped Russia get back on its feet when the Mongol empire fell.
But Russia's gain was not limited to this. Under the Mongols, Orthodoxy and trade flourished. Karamzin was also one of the first to draw attention to how widely the Mongols enriched the Russian language.
Under the clear influence of Karamzin, the young Russian scientist Alexander Richter (1794–1826) published in 1822 the first scientific work devoted exclusively to Mongol influence on Russia - "Studies on the influence of the Mongol-Tatars on Russia." Unfortunately, none of the American libraries have this book, and I had to form an idea of its content based on an article by the same author, which was published in June 1825 in the journal Otechestvennye zapiski.
Richter draws attention to the Russian borrowing of Mongolian diplomatic etiquette, as well as to such evidence of influence as the isolation of women and their clothing, the proliferation of inns and inns, food preferences (tea and bread), methods of warfare, the practice of punishment (whipping), the use of extrajudicial decisions, the introduction of money and systems of measures, methods of processing silver and steel, numerous linguistic innovations.
“Under the rule of the Mongols and Tatars, Russians were almost reborn into Asians, and although they hated their oppressors, they imitated them in everything and entered into kinship with them when they converted to Christianity.”
Richter's book prompted a public debate, which in 1826 prompted the Imperial Academy of Sciences to announce a competition for the best work on “what consequences the Mongol rule in Russia had and exactly what effect it had on the political ties of the state, on the way of government and on the internal government of the country. as well as on enlightenment and education of the people ”. Interestingly, this competition received the only application from a certain German scientist, whose manuscript was ultimately considered unworthy of an award.
The competition was continued in 1832 at the initiative of the Russified German orientalist Christian-Martin von Fren (1782-1851). This time, the topic was expanded in such a way as to cover the entire history of the Golden Horde - in the perspective of the influence that "the Mongol rule had on the decisions and the people's way of life in Russia." Again, only one application was submitted. The famous Austrian orientalist Josef von Hammer-Purgstahl (1774-1856) became its author. The jury, consisting of three members of the Academy, chaired by Fren, refused to accept the work for consideration, calling it "superficial". The author published it on his own initiative in 1840. In this edition, he briefly covers the background of his research and provides feedback from members of the Russian academic jury.
In 1832, Mikhail Gastev published a book in which he accused the Mongols of slowing down the development of Russia. Their influence on the state was proclaimed to be purely negative, and even the formation of autocracy was excluded from the list of their merits. This work was one of the first in a long line of historical works, the authors of which insisted that the Mongol invasion did not do Russia anything good.
In 1851, the first of twenty-nine volumes of Russian history was published, written by Sergei Soloviev (1820–1879), a professor at Moscow University and leader of the so-called “state” historical school. A convinced Westernizer and admirer of Peter I, Soloviev generally refused to use the term “Mongolian period”, replacing it with the term “specific period”. For him, Mongol rule was just a random episode in Russian history, which did not have significant consequences for the further evolution of the country. Soloviev's views had a direct impact on his student Vasily Klyuchevsky (1841-1911), who also denied the significance of the Mongol invasion for Russia.
The legal historian Alexander Gradovsky (1841–1889) made a significant contribution to the development of this discussion in 1868. In his opinion, it was from the Mongol khans that the Moscow princes adopted an attitude towards the state as their personal property. In pre-Mongol Russia, Gradovsky argued, the prince was only a sovereign ruler, but not the owner of the state:
“The private property of the prince existed along with the private property of the boyars and did not in the least hamper the latter. Only in the Mongol period did the concept of a prince appear not only as a sovereign, but also as the owner of the entire land. The grand dukes gradually became to their subjects in the same way as the Mongol khans were in relation to themselves. “According to the principles of Mongolian state law,” says Nevolin, “all the land in general that was within the khan's dominion was his property; the khan's subjects could only be simple landowners ”. In all regions of Russia, except for Novgorod and Western Russia, these principles were to be reflected in the principles of Russian law. The princes, as rulers of their regions, as representatives of the khan, naturally enjoyed the same rights in their domains as he did in his entire state. With the fall of Mongol rule, the princes became the heirs of the khan's power, and, consequently, those rights that were combined with it. "
Gradovsky's remarks became the earliest in the historical literature mention of the merger of political power and property in the Muscovite kingdom. Later, under the influence of Max Weber, this convergence would be called "patrimonialism."
The ideas of Gradovsky were perceived by the Ukrainian historian Nikolai Kostomarov (1817–1885) in his work “The Beginning of Autocracy in Ancient Rus”, published in 1872. Kostomarov was not an adherent of the "state" school, emphasizing the special role of the people in the historical process and opposing people and power. He was born in Ukraine, and in 1859 he moved to St. Petersburg, where for some time he was a professor of Russian history at the university. In his writings, Kostomarov emphasized the difference between the democratic structure of Kievan Rus and the autocracy of Muscovy.
According to this scientist, the ancient Slavs were a freedom-loving people who lived in small communities and did not know autocratic rule. But after the Mongol conquest, the situation changed. Khans were not only absolute rulers, but also the owners of their subjects, whom they treated like slaves. If in the pre-Mongol period the Russian princes distinguished between state power and possession, then under the Mongols, the principalities became fiefdoms, that is, property.
“Now the earth has ceased to be an independent unit; […] It has descended to the value of material belonging. […] The feeling of freedom, honor, consciousness of personal dignity disappeared; subservience to the higher, despotism to the lower became the qualities of the Russian soul. "
These conclusions were not taken into account in the eclectic "Russian history" of St. Petersburg professor Konstantin Bestuzhev-Ryumin (1829-1897), first published in 1872. He was of the opinion that both Karamzin and Soloviev were too harsh in their judgments, and the influence exerted by the Mongols on the organization of the army, the financial system and the corruption of morals cannot be denied. At the same time, however, he did not believe that the Russians adopted corporal punishment from the Mongols, since they were also known in Byzantium, and especially did not agree with the fact that the tsarist power in Russia was a semblance of the power of the Mongol khan.
Perhaps the most harsh position on Mongol influence was taken by Fyodor Leontovich (1833–1911), a law professor at first at Odessa and then Warsaw universities. His specialization was natural law among the Kalmyks, as well as among the Caucasian highlanders. In 1879, he published a study on a prominent Kalmyk legal document, at the end of which he offered his views on the influence of the Mongols on Russia. While recognizing a certain degree of continuity between Kievan Rus and Muscovy, Leontovich nevertheless believed that the Mongols had “broken” the old Rus. In his opinion, the Russians adopted from the Mongols the institution of orders, enslavement of peasants, the practice of parochialism, various military and fiscal orders, as well as criminal law with torture and executions inherent in it. Most importantly, the Mongols predetermined the absolute character of the Moscow monarchy:
“The Mongols introduced into the minds of their tributaries - the Russians - the idea of the rights of their leader (khan) as the supreme owner (patrimony) of all the land they occupied. Arising from here landlessness(in a legal sense) population, the concentration of land rights in a few hands, is inextricably linked with the strengthening of servicemen and burdensome people who retained in their hands the "possession" of the land only under the condition of the proper administration of service and duties. Then, after the overthrow of the yoke [...] the princes could transfer the supreme power of the khan; why all the land began to be considered the property of princes ”.
Orientalist Nikolai Veselovsky (1848-1918) studied in detail the practice of Russian-Mongolian diplomatic relations and came to the following conclusion:
“… The ambassadorial ceremony in the Moscow period of Russian history was in full, one might say, Tatar, or rather, Asian, character; our deviations were insignificant and were mainly caused by religious beliefs ”.
How, in the opinion of supporters of such views, the Mongols ensured their influence, given that they ruled Russia indirectly, entrusting this task to the Russian princes? For this purpose, two means were used. The first was the endless stream of Russian princes and merchants who went to the Mongolian capital Sarai, where some of them had to spend whole years absorbing the Mongol way of life. So, Ivan Kalita (1304-1340), as is commonly believed, made five trips to Sarai and spent almost half of his reign with the Tatars or on the way to Sarai and back. In addition, Russian princes were often forced to send their sons to the Tatars as hostages, thereby proving loyalty to the Mongol rulers.
The second source of influence was the Mongols, who were in the Russian service. This phenomenon appeared in the XIV century, when the Mongols were at the peak of their power, but it acquired a truly massive character after the Mongol Empire at the end of the XV century split into several states. As a result, the Mongols who left their homeland brought with them the knowledge of the Mongol way of life, which they taught the Russians.
So, the arguments of scholars who insisted on the importance of Mongolian influence can be summarized as follows. First of all, the influence of the Mongols is clearly visible in the fact that the Muscovy state, which was formed after the fall of the yoke at the end of the 15th century, was fundamentally different from the old Kievan Rus. The following differences can be distinguished between them:
1. The Moscow tsars, unlike their Kiev predecessors, were absolute rulers, not bound by the decisions of the people's assemblies (veche), and in this respect they resembled the Mongol khans.
2. Like the Mongol khans, they literally owned their kingdom: their subjects disposed of the land only temporarily, on condition of lifelong service to the ruler.
3. The entire population was considered the servants of the king, as in the Horde, where the statute of bound service was the basis of the khan's omnipotence.
In addition, the Mongols significantly influenced the organization of the army, the judicial system (for example, the introduction of the death penalty as a criminal punishment, which in Kievan Rus was applied only to slaves), diplomatic customs and the practice of postal services. According to some scholars, the Russians also adopted the institution of parochialism and a large array of trade customs from the Mongols.
If we turn to scholars and publicists who did not recognize the Mongol influence or minimized its significance, the fact that they never considered it necessary to respond to the arguments of their opponents immediately attracts attention. At least one could expect them to solve two problems: either to demonstrate that their opponents misrepresented the political and social organization of Muscovy, or to prove that the customs and institutions attributed to Mongolian innovations actually existed in Kievan Rus. But neither one nor the other was done. This camp simply ignored the arguments of its opponents, which significantly weakened its position.
This is equally true of the views advocated by the three leading historians of the late empire - Soloviev, Klyuchevsky, and Platonov.
Soloviev, who divided the historical past of Russia into three chronological periods, did not in any way isolate the time period associated with Mongol domination. He did not see "not the slightest trace of the Tatar-Mongol influence on the internal administration of Rus" and did not actually mention the Mongol conquest. Klyuchevsky in his famous "Course of Russian History" also almost ignores the Mongols, not noticing either a separate Mongol period or Mongol influence on Russia. Surprisingly, in the detailed table of contents of the first volume on Russian history in the Middle Ages, there is no mention of the Mongols or the Golden Horde at all. This striking but deliberate gap can be explained by the fact that, for Klyuchevsky, colonization was a central factor in Russian history. For this reason, he considered the massive movement of the Russian population from the southwest to the northeast to be the key event of the 13th – 15th centuries. The Mongols, even having conditioned this migration, seemed to Klyuchevsky an insignificant factor. As for Platonov, he devoted only four pages to the Mongols in his popular course, stating that this subject was not studied so deeply that it was possible to accurately determine its impact on Russia. According to this historian, since the Mongols did not occupy Russia, but ruled it through intermediaries, they could not influence its development at all. Like Klyuchevsky, Platonov considered the division of Russia into southwestern and northeastern parts to be the only significant result of the Mongol invasion.
Three explanations can be offered as to why leading Russian historians were so dismissive of Mongol influence on Russia.
First of all, they were poorly acquainted with the history of the Mongols in particular and oriental studies in general. Although Western scholars of the time had already begun to tackle these issues, their work was not well known in Russia.
As another explanatory circumstance, one can point to unconscious nationalism and even racism, expressed in the unwillingness to admit that the Slavs could learn anything from the Asians.
But, probably, the most weighty explanation is found in the peculiarities of those sources that were then used by historians-medievalists. For the most part, these were the annals compiled by monks and therefore reflected the church point of view. The Mongols, starting with Genghis Khan, pursued a policy of religious tolerance, respecting all religions. They exempted the Orthodox Church from taxes and defended its interests. As a result, monasteries flourished under the Mongols, owning about a third of all arable land, a wealth that, in the early 16th century, when Russia got rid of Mongol rule, sparked a debate about monastic property. With that said, it is easy to see why the Church was quite supportive of Mongol rule. The American historian comes to an astonishing conclusion:
“There are no fragments in the annals containing anti-Mongol attacks that would have appeared between 1252 and 1448. All such records were made either before 1252 or after 1448 ”.
According to the observation of another American, in the Russian annals there is no mention at all that Russia was ruled by the Mongols, their reading forms the following impression:
"[It seems that] the Mongols influenced Russian history and society no more than the earlier steppe peoples, and many historians shared a similar point of view."
The approval of this opinion, of course, was facilitated by the fact that the Mongols ruled Russia indirectly, with the mediation of the Russian princes, and in this regard, their presence within it was not too tangible.
Among the historical works that try to minimize Mongol influence while neglecting specific problems, the work of Horace Dewey of the University of Michigan is a rare exception. This specialist has thoroughly researched the problem of exposure Mongols to the formation of a system of collective responsibility in the Muscovy and then in the Russian Empire, forcing the communities to be responsible for the obligations of their members to the state. A striking example of this practice was the responsibility of the village community for the payment of taxes by the peasants included in it. The term “bail” itself was rarely used in the texts of Kievan Rus, but Dewey nevertheless argued that this institution was already known at that time, and therefore it cannot be attributed to the acquisitions of the Mongol period. At the same time, however, the historian admits that it was most widespread in the period after the Mongol conquest, when other Mongol practices were actively assimilated.
During the first fifteen years of Soviet power, those sections of historical science that did not deal with the revolution and its consequences were relatively free from state control. This was a particularly favorable period for studying the Middle Ages. Mikhail Pokrovsky (1868–1932), the leading Soviet historian of the time, minimized the perniciousness of Mongol influence and downplayed the resistance of the invaders to Russia. In his opinion, the Mongols even contributed to the progress of the conquered territory by introducing key financial institutions in Russia: the Mongolian land registry - "soshnoe letter" - was used in Russia until the middle of the 17th century.
In the 1920s, it was still possible to disagree with the fact that the Mongol masters of Russia acted as bearers of only savagery and barbarism. In 1919-1921, in the harsh conditions of the civil war and the cholera epidemic, archaeologist Franz Bullod conducted large-scale excavations in the Lower Volga region. The findings convinced him that the ideas of Russian scientists about the Horde were in many ways mistaken, and in the book “Volga Pompeii” published in 1923, he wrote:
“[The research shows that] in the Golden Horde of the second half of the XIII-XIV centuries lived not savages at all, but civilized people who were engaged in manufacturing and trade and maintained diplomatic relations with the peoples of the East and West. […] The military successes of the Tatars are explained not only by their inherent fighting spirit and the perfection of the organization of the army, but also by their obviously high level of cultural development ”.
The famous Russian orientalist Vasily Bartold (1896–1930) also emphasized the positive aspects of the Mongol conquest, insisting, contrary to the prevailing belief, that the Mongols contributed to the Westernization of Russia:
“Despite the devastation caused by the Mongol troops, despite all the extortions of the Baskaks, during the period of Mongol rule, the beginning was laid not only for the political revival of Russia, but also for the further successes of the Russian culture... Contrary to often expressed opinion, even the influence of European culture Russia in the Moscow period was exposed to a much greater extent than in the Kiev period ”.
However, the opinion of Ballaud and Barthold, as well as of the orientalist community as a whole, was largely ignored by the Soviet historical establishment. Beginning in the 1930s, Soviet historical literature was finally consolidated in the fact that the Mongols did not bring anything positive to the development of Russia. Equally obligatory were the indications that it was the fierce resistance of the Russians that turned out to be the reason that forced the Mongols not to occupy Russia, but to rule it indirectly and from afar. In reality, the Mongols preferred the indirect management model for the following reasons:
“... Unlike Khazaria, Bulgaria or the Crimean Khanate in Russia, it [the model of direct control] was uneconomical, and not because the resistance offered by the Russians was supposedly stronger than anywhere else. [...] The indirect nature of the government not only did not reduce the forces of the Mongol influence on Russia, but also eliminated the very possibility of the reverse influence of the Russians on the Mongols, who adopted the Chinese orders in China and the Persians in Persia, but at the same time underwent Turkization and Islamization in the Golden Horde itself ” ...
While pre-revolutionary historians for the most part agreed that the Mongols, albeit inadvertently, nevertheless contributed to the unification of Russia, entrusting the management of it to the Moscow princes, Soviet science placed accents differently. The unification, she believed, did not occur as a result of the Mongol conquest, but in spite of it, becoming the result of a nationwide struggle against the invaders. The official communist position on this issue is set out in the article of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia:
“The Mongol-Tatar yoke had negative, deeply regressive consequences for the economic, political and cultural development of the Russian lands, it was a brake on the growth of the productive forces of Rus, which were at a higher socio-economic level in comparison with the productive forces of the Mongol-Tatars. It artificially preserved the purely feudal natural character of the economy for a long time. In political terms, the consequences of the Mongol-Tatar yoke were manifested in the violation of the process of state consolidation of the Russian lands, in the artificial maintenance of feudal fragmentation. The Mongol-Tatar yoke led to the intensification of the feudal exploitation of the Russian people, who found themselves under double oppression - their own and the Mongol-Tatar feudal lords. The Mongol-Tatar yoke, which lasted for 240 years, was one of the main reasons for Rus lagging behind some Western European countries ”.
Interestingly, attributing the collapse of the Mongol empire to purely hypothetical Russian resistance completely ignores the painful blows that Timur (Tamerlane) inflicted on it in the second half of the 14th century.
The position of party scientists was so tough and so unreasonable that it was not easy for serious historians to come to terms with it. An example of this rejection is the monograph on the Golden Horde published in 1937 by two leading Soviet orientalists. One of its authors, Boris Grekov (1882-1953), cites in the book many words used in Russian that have Mongolian origin. Among them: bazaar, shop, attic, palace, altyn, chest, tariff, container, caliber, lute, zenith. However, this list, possibly due to censorship, lacks other important borrowings: for example, money, treasury, yam or tarkhan. It is these words that show what a significant role the Mongols played in the formation of the financial system of Russia, the formation of trade relations and the foundations of the transport system. But, citing this list, Grekov refuses to develop his idea further and declares that the question of the influence of the Mongols on Russia still remains unclear to him.
No one defended the idea of a positive influence of the Mongols on Russia more consistently than the circle of émigré publicists operating in the 1920s who called themselves “Eurasianists”. Their leader was Prince Nikolai Trubetskoy (1890–1938), a descendant of an old noble family, who received a philological education and taught after emigration at the universities of Sofia and Vienna.
History as such was not the first concern of the Eurasianists. Although Trubetskoy gave his main work “The Legacy of Genghis Khan” the subtitle “A Look at Russian History not from the West, but from the East”, he wrote to one of his associates that “the treatment of history in it is deliberately unceremonious and tendentious”. The circle of Eurasians was made up of intellectuals who specialized in various fields, who experienced the strongest shock from what happened in 1917, but did not abandon their attempts to understand the new communist Russia. In their opinion, the explanation should be sought in geographical and cultural determinism, based on the fact that Russia can not be attributed to either the East or the West, since it was a mixture of both, acting as the heir to the empire of Genghis Khan. According to the conviction of the Eurasians, the Mongol conquest not only influenced the evolution of the Muscovy and the Russian Empire in the strongest way, but also laid the very foundations of Russian statehood.
The date of birth of the Eurasian movement is considered August 1921, when the work “Exodus to the East: Premonitions and Accomplishments” was published in Bulgaria, written by Trubetskoy in collaboration with economist and diplomat Peter Savitsky (1895-1968), music theorist Peter Suvchinsky (1892-1985) and theologian Georgy Florovsky (1893-1979). The group established its publishing business with branches in Paris, Berlin, Prague, Belgrade and Harbin, publishing not only books, but also periodicals - “Eurasian Vremennik” in Berlin and “Eurasian Chronicle” in Paris.
Trubetskoy abandoned the traditional view of Muscovy as the heiress of Kievan Rus. The fragmented and warring Kievan principalities could not unite into a single and strong state: “In the existence of pre-Tatar Russia there was an element instability prone to degradation, which could not lead the yoke to nothing else but a foreign one ”. Muscovite Russia, like its successors in the person of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, were the successors of the Mongol empire of Genghis Khan. The territory they occupied has always remained a closed space: Eurasia was a geographical and climatic unity, which doomed it to political integration. Although this territory was inhabited by different nationalities, the smooth ethnic transition from Slavs to Mongols allowed them to be treated as a whole. The bulk of its population belonged to the "Turanian" race, formed by the Finno-Ugric tribes, Samoyeds, Turks, Mongols and Manchus. Trubetskoy spoke about the influence of the Mongols on Russia:
“If in such important branches of state life as the organization of the financial economy, posts and routes of communication, there was an indisputable continuity between the Russian and Mongolian statehood, then it is natural to assume such a connection in other branches, in the details of the structure of the administrative apparatus, in the organization of military affairs, etc. ”.
Russians also adopted Mongolian political habits; having combined them with Orthodoxy and Byzantine ideology, they simply appropriated them to themselves. According to the Eurasians, the most significant thing that the Mongols brought to the development of Russian history concerned not so much the political structure of the country as the spiritual sphere.
“The happiness of Russia is great that at the moment when, due to internal decay, it had to fall, it went to the Tatars and no one else. The Tatars - a “neutral” cultural environment that accepted “all kinds of gods” and tolerated “any cults” - fell to Russia as a punishment from God, but did not muddy the purity of national creativity. If Russia fell to the Turks, who were infected with “Iranian fanaticism and exaltation,” its test would be many times more difficult and the lot worse. If the West took her, he would take the soul out of her. […] The Tatars did not change the spiritual essence of Russia; but in their distinctive quality in this era as creators of states, as a militaristic-organizing force, they undoubtedly influenced Russia ”.
“The important historical moment was not the 'overthrow of the yoke', not the isolation of Russia from the power of the Horde, but the spread of Moscow's power to a significant part of the territory that was once subject to the Horde, in other words, replacement of the Horde Khan by the Russian Tsar with the transfer of the Khan's headquarters to Moscow”.
As noted in 1925 by the historian Alexander Kizevetter (1866–1933), who was teaching in Prague at the time, the Eurasian movement suffered from irreconcilable internal contradictions. He described Eurasianism as “a feeling poured into a system”. The contradictions were most clearly manifested in the attitude of the Eurasians to Bolshevism in particular and to Europe in general. On the one hand, they rejected Bolshevism because of its European roots, but, on the other, they approved of it, since it turned out to be unacceptable for Europeans. They viewed Russian culture as a synthesis of the cultures of Europe and Asia, at the same time criticizing Europe on the grounds that economics lay at the heart of its existence, while a religious and ethical element prevailed in Russian culture.
The Eurasian movement was popular in the 1920s, but by the end of the decade it disintegrated due to the lack of a common position towards the Soviet Union. However, as we will see below, after the collapse of communism, it was to undergo a stormy revival in Russia.
The question of the influence of the Mongols on the history of Russia did not arouse much interest in Europe, but in the United States it was seriously carried away by two scientists. The publication in 1985 by Charles Halperin of the work "Russia and the Golden Horde" opened the discussion. Thirteen years later, Donald Ostrovsky supported the theme in his study Muscovy and the Mongols. In general, they took a single position on the issue under study: Ostrovsky noted that on the main points of Mongol influence on Muscovy, he was completely unanimous with Halperin.
However, even the unprincipled and small disagreements that existed were quite enough to provoke a lively discussion. Both scholars believed that the Mongol influence took place, and it was very tangible. Halperin attributed Moscow military and diplomatic practices, as well as “some” administrative and fiscal procedures, to Mongolian borrowings. But he did not agree that Russia learned politics and government only thanks to the Mongols: "They did not give birth to the Moscow autocracy, but only accelerated its arrival." In his opinion, the Mongol invasion could not predetermine the formation of the Russian autocracy, which had local roots and “drew ideological and symbolic habits rather from Byzantium than from Sarai”. In this respect, Ostrovsky's opinion is at odds with that of his opponent:
“During the first half of the 14th century, the Moscow princes used a model of state power based on the models of the Golden Horde. The civil and military institutions that existed in Muscovy at that time were predominantly Mongolian ”.
Moreover, Ostrovsky ranked among the Mongolian borrowings several more institutions that played a key role in the life of the Muscovite kingdom. Among them were mentioned the Chinese principle according to which all the land in the state belonged to the ruler; localism, which allowed the Russian nobility not to serve those representatives of their class, whose ancestors themselves were once in the service of their ancestors; feeding, which assumed that local officials lived at the expense of the population accountable to them; an estate, or a land allotment, given on the condition of performing conscientious service to the sovereign. Ostrovsky built a relatively coherent theory, which, however, he himself undermined with the statement that Muscovy was not a despotism, but something like a constitutional monarchy:
“Although the Moscow kingdom did not have a written constitution, its internal functioning was in many ways reminiscent of a constitutional monarchy, that is, a system in which decisions are made through consensus between various institutions of the political system. […] Muscovy at that time was a state governed by the rule of law ”.
Allowing himself such statements, Ostrovsky ignored the fact that in the 16th-17th centuries nothing like a constitution existed in any country in the world, that the Moscow tsars, according to the testimony of both their own subjects and foreigners, were absolute rulers, and the political the structure of Moscow did not contain any institutions capable of restraining tsarist power.
In a lengthy debate that unfolded in the pages of the magazine "Kritika", Halperin challenged Ostrovsky's enrollment of the estate and parochialism in the Mongol inheritance. He also challenged Ostrovsky's thesis about the Mongol roots of the boyar duma, which served as an advisory body under the Russian tsar.
Noteworthy are the little-known views of Polish historians and publicists regarding the relationship between Mongols and Russians. The Poles, who remained neighbors of Russia for a millennium and lived under its rule for more than a hundred years, have always shown a keen interest in this country, and their knowledge about it was often much more complete than the haphazard and random information of other peoples. Of course, the judgments of Polish scientists cannot be called absolutely objective, given that the Poles throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries dreamed of restoring the independence of their state. The main obstacle to this was precisely Russia, under whose rule were more than four-fifths of all the lands that made up Polish territory before its partitions.
Polish nationalists were interested in portraying Russia as a non-European country that threatened other states on the continent. One of the first supporters of this view was Franciszek Dushinsky (1817-1893), who emigrated to Western Europe and published a number of works there, the main idea of which was the division of all human races into two main groups - "Aryan" and "Turanian". To the Aryans, he attributed the Romanesque and Germanic peoples, as well as the Slavs. Russians were enrolled in the second group, where they found themselves in kinship with the Mongols, Chinese, Jews, Africans and the like. Unlike the “Aryans”, the “Turanians” had a predisposition to a nomadic lifestyle, did not respect property and legality, and were prone to despotism.
In the twentieth century, this theory was developed by Felix Konechny (1862–1949), a specialist in the comparative study of civilizations. In the book “Polish Logos and Ethos”, he discusses the “Turanian civilization”, the defining features of which, among other things, include the militarization of public life, as well as statehood, which is based on private, not public law. He considered the Russians to be the heirs of the Mongols and therefore "Turanians". By this he also explained the establishment of the communist regime in Russia.
As soon as the communist censorship, which demanded unambiguity on the issue of Mongol influence, ceased to exist, the discussion on this issue resumed. For the most part, its participants rejected the Soviet approach, showing a readiness to recognize the significant nature of the influence of the Mongols on all spheres of Russian life, and especially on the political regime.
The controversy has now lost its scientific character, acquiring an undeniably political connotation. The collapse of the Soviet state left many of its citizens at a loss: they could not figure out which part of the world their new state belongs to - Europe, Asia, both at the same time or neither. This means that by that time most of the Russians agreed that it was largely because of the Mongol yoke that Russia had become a unique civilization, the difference of which from the West is rooted in the distant past.
Let's refer to a few examples. The medieval historian Igor Froyanov emphasized in his works the dramatic changes that took place in the political life of Russia as a result of the Mongol conquest:
“As for the princely power, it receives completely different foundations than before, when the ancient Russian society developed on a social veche basis, characterized by direct democracy, or democracy. If before the arrival of the Tatars, the Rurikovichs occupied princely tables, as a rule, at the invitation of the city veche, dressing up on it about the conditions of their reign and taking an oath secured by kissing the cross, promised to keep the treaty unbreakable, now they sat down on reigns at the discretion of the khan, sealed by the corresponding khan's label ... The princes in a line reached out to the khan's headquarters for labels. So, the khan's will becomes the highest source of princely power in Russia, and the veche national assembly loses the right to dispose of the princely table. This immediately made the prince independent in relation to the veche, creating favorable conditions for the realization of his monarchical potential ”.
Vadim Trepalov also sees the most direct connection between the Mongol yoke and the emergence of autocracy in Russia through belittling the importance of representative institutions like the veche. This point of view is shared by Igor Knyazkiy:
“The Horde yoke also radically changed the political system of Russia. The power of the Moscow tsars, originating dynastically from the Kiev princes, essentially goes to the omnipotence of the Mongol khans of the Golden Horde. And the great Moscow prince becomes tsar following the fallen power of the Golden Horde rulers. It is from them that the formidable sovereigns of Muscovy inherit the unconditional right to execute at their own will any of their subjects, regardless of his actual guilt. Claiming that the Tsars of Moscow “are free” to execute and have mercy, Ivan the Terrible acts not as the heir of Monomakh, but as the successor of Batyev, for here neither wine nor the virtue of the subject is important for him - they are determined by the tsar's will itself. The most important circumstance noted by Klyuchevsky that the subjects of the Tsar of Moscow do not have rights, but only have duties, is a direct legacy of the Horde tradition, which in Muscovy was not essentially changed even by the Zemshchina of the 17th century, because during the time of the Zemsky Councils, Russian people did not have more rights, and their own the councils did not acquire votes ”.
Another manifestation of renewed interest in Mongolian heritage in post-Soviet Russia was the revival of Eurasianism. According to the French expert Marlene Laruelle, “neo-Eurasianism has become one of the most elaborated conservative ideologies that emerged in Russia in the 1990s”. The bibliography of one of her books lists dozens of works published on this topic in Russia since 1989. The most prominent theorists of the revived movement were Lev Gumilev (1912–1992), professor of philosophy at Moscow University Alexander Panarin (1940–2003) and Alexander Dugin (b. 1963).
Post-Soviet Eurasianism has a pronounced political character: it encourages Russians to turn their backs on the West and choose Asia as their home. According to Gumilyov, the Mongol "attack" is nothing more than a myth created by the West to hide Russia's real enemy - the Romano-Germanic world. The movement is characterized by nationalism and imperialism, and sometimes also anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism. Some of its principles were outlined in a speech by President Vladimir Putin in November 2001:
“Russia has always felt like a Eurasian country. We have never forgotten that the bulk of Russian territory is located in Asia. True, I must honestly say that this advantage was not always used. I think the time has come for us, together with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, to move from words to deeds - to build up economic, political and other ties. […] After all, Russia is a kind of integration node linking Asia, Europe and America ”.
This anti-European position is shared by a significant part of Russian society. Answering the question “Do you feel like a European?”, 56% of Russians choose the answer “almost never”.
Contemporary supporters of Eurasianism pay even less attention to history than their predecessors; they are primarily interested in the future and Russia's place in it. But when it comes to reasoning about history, they adhere to the manner characteristic of the first Eurasianists:
“[Panarin] pays almost no attention to Kievan Rus, since he considers it more European than Eurasian education (and therefore doomed to death), focusing on the Mongol period. He writes about the "yoke" as a boon that allowed Russia to become an empire and conquer the steppe. Genuine Russia, he declares, appeared in the Moscow period from the union of Orthodoxy with Mongolian statehood, Russians with Tatars. "
The totality of the facts presented makes it clear that in the dispute about Mongolian influence, those who spoke out in favor of its importance were right. At the center of the discussion, which stretched out over two and a half centuries, was the fundamentally important question of the nature of the Russian political regime and its origin. If the Mongols did not influence Russia in any way, or if this influence did not affect the political sphere, then the Russian adherence to autocratic power, and in the most extreme, patrimonial form, will have to be declared something innate and eternal. In this case, it should be rooted in the Russian soul, religion or some other source that does not lend itself to change. But if Russia, on the contrary, borrowed its political system from foreign invaders, then the chance for internal changes remains, because Mongolian influence may eventually change to Western.
In addition, the question of the role of the Mongols in Russian history is of key importance for Russian geopolitics - this circumstance was overlooked by historians of the 19th century. After all, the perception of Russia as a direct heir to the Mongol empire, or even simply as a country that has survived their strong influence, makes it possible to substantiate the legitimacy of the assertion of Russian power in a vast territory from the Baltic and the Black Sea to the Pacific Ocean and over many peoples inhabiting it. This argument is critically important for today's Russian imperialists.
This conclusion allows us to understand why the issue of Mongolian influence continues to cause such a stormy controversy in Russian historical literature. Apparently, the search for an answer to it will stop very soon.
Among historians studying the Mongol-Tatar invasion, there is no consensus on two main problems: 1) whether there was a Mongol-Tatar yoke; 2) what impact it had on the Russian lands. (See the diagram "The Mongol-Tatar Yoke in Russia: Judgment and Appraisals.")
In general, there are three opposing points of view on these issues:
a) Historian N.M. Karamzin believed that the Mongol-Tatar yoke existed, but assessed positively the influence of the khan's power on the political development of Russia, since internecine wars began to decline, and the supreme power was concentrated in one hand. (See in the anthology article "The meaning of the Mongol-Tatar invasion and the yoke in the history of Russia")
b) L.N. Gumilev believed that there was no Mongol-Tatar yoke in Russia. Batu's invasions were only a military raid, and subsequent events are not directly related to him.
He argued that the Grand Duchy of Vladimir, represented by Alexander Nevsky, had achieved a profitable alliance with the Golden Horde.
As long as a strong Byzantium existed, neither the Catholic nor the Muslim world was afraid of the Russian lands. But in 1204 Byzantium was destroyed by the crusaders. The same fate awaited Russia.
The originality of Russian-Horde relations can be understood only in the mainstream of that historical time when specific Russia was subjected to double aggression - from the East and from the West. At the same time, Western expansion bore more serious consequences for Russia: the goal of the crusaders was territorial seizure and the destruction of Orthodoxy, while the Horde, after the initial blow, retreated back to the steppe, and towards Orthodoxy they showed not only tolerance, but even guaranteed the inviolability of the Orthodox faith, churches and church property. The choice of a foreign policy strategy carried out by A. Nevsky was associated with the defense of "the historical meaning of the originality of Russian culture - Orthodoxy." "The alliance with the Horde - not the yoke of the Horde, but a military alliance with it - predetermined the special path of Russia" - says the historian LI Gumilev.
And in the southern Russian lands, which became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, not even traces of Russian culture remained. Those Russian lands, where they abandoned the alliance with the Mongol-Tatars and chose the Catholic West as their allies, lost everything. (See in the anthology the article "The meaning of the Mongol-Tatar invasion and the yoke in the history of Russia." LN Gumilyov ".)
c) The majority of Russians, both pre-revolutionary (S.M.Soloviev, V.O.Klyuchevsky, and modern historians (in particular B.A.Rybakov, reject the point of view of L.N. Rus was and had the most negative impact on its development. (See in the anthology article "The meaning of the Mongol-Tatar invasion and the yoke in the history of Russia. SM Soloviev, VV Kargalov)" arguments:
A system of dependence of Russia on the Golden Horde was created
1) Russian princes, fell into political - vassal dependence to the Mongol khans, as they had to receive a label - a khan's letter of government. The label gave the right to political and military support from the Horde. The very procedure for obtaining the label was humiliating. Many Russian princes, especially in the first years of dependence, could not accept this and perished in the Horde.
Under such a system, politically, the Russian principalities retained their autonomy and administration. The princes, as before, ruled over the subordinate population, but were forced to pay taxes and obey the representatives of the khan. The Mongol khans exercised strict control over the activities of the Russian princes, not allowing them to consolidate;
2) The economic dependence of the Russian lands was expressed in the fact that every year the Russian people had to pay tribute. Economic coercion was carried out using a clear tax system. In rural areas, a land tax was introduced - kharaj (poluzhnoe - to feed from the plow), in cities - tamga (trade duty), etc. To streamline the collection of taxes, the Mongols conducted three censuses of the solvent population, for which census were sent to the Russian land. The tribute from Russia, sent to the khan, was called the Horde exit.
3) In addition to tribute, the Russian princes had to supply recruits for the khan's army (1 from every 10 households). Russian soldiers were supposed to participate in the military campaigns of the Mongols.
The consequences of the Mongol-Tatar yoke for the Russian lands:
1) The eastern political traditions of the Mongol-Tatars had a significant impact on the form of government of the centralized Russian state. The autocratic power, which was subsequently established in Russia, largely inherited tyrannical, oriental features.
2) The Horde yoke led to a protracted economic decline and, as a result, to the enslavement of the peasants who fled from feudal oppression to the outskirts of the country. As a result, the development of feudalism slowed down.
3) Russia for 250 years was separated from Europe, European culture and trade.
4) Violence lay at the heart of the system of Horde rule in Russia. For this, military detachments, led by the Baskaks, were sent to the Russian lands, who watched over the princes and the gatherings of the exit, and suppressed all attempts of resistance. Therefore, the Horde policy is a policy of terror. The constant military invasions of the Horde troops (in the last quarter of the 13th century - 15 times) were disastrous for the country. Of the 74 Russian cities, 49 were destroyed, in 14 of them life did not resume, 15 became villages.
5) In an effort to strengthen the power of the khan, the Horde constantly quarreled and played off the Russian princes, i.e. civil strife continued. The Mongol conquest preserved political fragmentation.
In general, the Horde yoke had a negative impact on the historical development of Russia.
Excellent definition
Incomplete definition ↓
Study in Russian historiography of the problem of Russian-Mongolian relations of the 13th-15th centuries. has repeatedly become the subject of consideration of many scientists, mainly of the Soviet period, when a sufficient number of opinions and points of view have accumulated both on individual periods and problems, and on the generalizing conclusions of the conceptual plan. Historiographic reviews of various goals and objectives are contained in the works of B.D. Grekov and A.Yu. Yakubovsky, A.N. Nasonova, M.G. Safargalieva, L.V. Cherepnin, V.V. Kargalova, N.S. Borisova, G.A. Fedorova-Davydova, I.B. Grekova, D.Yu. Arapova, A.A. Arslanova, P.P. Tolochko, A.A. Gorsky, V.A. Chukaeva. A distinctive feature of these historiographic excursions is that they are mostly devoted to the historiography of the 19th - early 20th centuries, and speak very sparingly of later works. In addition, recent works are absent in this historiographic series. Thus, the author sees one of his tasks in supplementing the historiography of the “Mongolian question” with an analysis of the latest literature.
At the same time, we do not pursue the goal of listing all the works of the past and present years, in which one or another collision of Russian-Mongolian relations is mentioned and / or an assessment is given to them. Historiographic discrepancies on certain specific issues, if necessary, will be stated in the corresponding chapters. We consider the following as our main task: to trace the most important directions of Russian historical thought in this - one of the most essential and defining problems of Russian history, which, in turn, allows (together with source study observations and analysis) to develop a basis for the author's study of the topic “Russia and the Mongols ".
In Russian historiography, there are a number of rather heavily politicized subjects. Thus, in the field of early Russian history, this is the "Norman problem." This also includes the question of the Mongol-Tatar invasion and yoke. The overwhelming majority of Russian historians considered and consider them mainly from the point of view of political content, for example, the subordination of the institution of princely power to the Mongols, as well as the “fall” of other ancient Russian power structures for the same reason. Such a one-sided approach entails a certain modernization of relations between ethno-state structures of the Middle Ages, interpolation of interstate relations of new and modern times on them, and ultimately, as we see it, a certain inconsistency in understanding the situation as a whole.
The origins of this kind of perception can be seen already in the messages of the chroniclers, who, moreover, added a strong emotional coloring. The latter, of course, is understandable, because the original records were made either by eyewitnesses who survived the tragedy of the invasion, or from their words.
Actually, in Russian historiography, the isolation of the problem of "Tatars and Rus" dates back to the end of the 18th - beginning of the 19th centuries. Its understanding and interpretation must be associated with "the process of self-assertion of the Russian mentality", "an expression of the intensive growth of national self-awareness" and "an unprecedentedly high patriotic upsurge." These socio-psychological foundations of the formation of the Russian national culture of modern times directly influenced the formation of Russian national historiography, its initial "romantic" period. Hence the highly emotional and dramatic, even tragic perception of the events of ancient Russian history, especially such as the Mongol-Tatar invasion and yoke.
The charm of the Russian chronicles, tragically vividly depicting Batu's invasion and its consequences, succumbed to N.M. Karamzin. His perception of the events of distant times is no less emotional than his contemporaries or eyewitnesses of the events themselves. Russia - "a vast corpse after the invasion of Batyev" - so he defines the immediate results of the campaigns of the Mongols. But the state of the country and the people under the yoke: it, "having exhausted the State, absorbing its civil welfare, humiliated humanity itself in our ancestors, and for several hundred centuries left deep, indelible traces, irrigated with the blood and tears of many generations." The stamp of sentimentality is present even when N.M. Karamzin turns to sociological generalizations and conclusions. "The shade of barbarism," he writes, "darkening the horizon of Russia, hid Europe from us ..." The Horde yoke as the reason for Rus lagging behind the "European states" - this is the first main conclusion of N.M. Karamzin. The second conclusion of the historiographer refers to the internal development of Russia in the "Mongol centuries". It does not correspond to what was said before, does not follow from it and, moreover, contradicts, because it turns out that the Mongols brought to Russia not only "blood and tears", but also good: thanks to them, civil strife was eliminated and "autocracy was restored", Moscow itself was "indebted to the khans for its greatness." "Karamzin was the first historian to single out the influence of the Mongol invasion on the development of Russia into a large independent problem of national science."
The views of N.M. Karamzin were widely spread among contemporaries, which will be discussed below. In the meantime, we are interested in their ideological origins. We have already indicated one: this is an elevated socio-psychological and ideological atmosphere in Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. But there was another.
When analyzing the literature used by N.M. Karamzin in the III and IV volumes of the "History of the Russian State", the rather frequent mention of the work of the French orientalist historian of the 18th century is striking. J. De Guigne "General history of the Huns, Turks, Mongols and other Western Tatars in antiquity and from Jesus Christ to the present", published in 4 volumes in 1756-1758. (volume 5 appeared in 1824). J. de Guigne defines the Mongols and their place in world history as follows: “The people who caused a great coup and who then formed an empire, the most extensive of all that we know, was not at all a civilized people, nor striving to spread the wisdom of their laws ... It was a barbarian people who went to the most distant countries only to seize all the riches, turn the peoples into slavery, return them to a barbaric state and make their name terrifying. "
The work of J. de Guignes was the most significant and popular study of Mongol history in Europe in the 18th century. As you can see, N.M. Karamzin, not alien to European enlightenment, fully accepted the latest Western European scientific developments on the ancient history of the East.
But Europe influenced the study of Russian history not only from the outside, but also from within. We mean activities in the first decades of the 19th century. Russian Academy of Sciences. “Historical science in the first quarter of the 19th century. was at the Academy in obvious decline. " Scientists of German origin, who were part of the Department of History, were mainly engaged in auxiliary historical disciplines (numismatics, genealogy, chronology), and their works on Russian history were published in German. Elected in 1817 by academician Kh.D. Fren was also a numismatist, a specialist in oriental (Juchid) coins. But he caught, so to speak, the spirit of the times. The fact is that “it was in the first decades of the 19th century. in France, England, Germany, the first Oriental scientific societies appeared, special Oriental journals began to be published, etc. " H. D. Fren was able to look wider than his predecessors at the problems facing Russian historical science. He became the founder of the Russian school of oriental studies, and his previous studies in Mongolian problems determined the primary priorities of Russian orientalism. "X. Fren was aware of all the oriental literature of his time and, as the greatest historian of the Golden Horde, had firm views on the role of the Mongol conquest in the history of Russia, ”noted A.Yu. Yakubovsky. In 1826, the Academy of Sciences announced a competition on the topic "What consequences did the Mongol domination in Russia have and exactly what effect did it have on the political ties of the state, on the form of government and its internal administration, as well as on the enlightenment and education of the people?" The formulation of the problem was followed by recommendations. “For a proper answer to this question, it is required that it be preceded by a complete description of the external relations and internal situation of Russia before the first invasion of the Mongols, and that it would subsequently be shown exactly what changes were made by the domination of the Mongols in the state of the people, and it would be desirable that, in addition to the scattered testimony contained in the Russian chronicles, a comparison was made of all that can be gleaned from eastern and western sources regarding the then state of the Mongols and their treatment of the conquered peoples. "
There was certainly a tremendous prospect for the researchers. Actually, the very formulation of the task and explanations to it remain relevant to this day, practically unchanged. Their scientific literacy is undeniable. But already in this initial task there was a certain precondition: the attitude towards the "domination" of the Mongols in Russia was determined in advance, although it was precisely the proof or refutation of this that should have become the main task of the stimulated research.
This tendency was more clearly manifested further. The competition of 1826, as you know, did not lead to the desired result and was resumed at the suggestion of H.D. Fren in 1832, the Academy of Sciences again presented the work written by H.D. Frenom "The program of the problem", which is more extensive than in the first case. The introduction was also more lengthy. “The rule of the Mongol dynasty, known in our country under the name of the Golden Horde, among the Mohammedans under the name of Ulus Jochi, or the Chingizov Khanate of Deshkipchak, and among the Mongols themselves under the name of Togmak, which was once for almost two and a half centuries the terror and scourge of Russia, which kept it in bonds of unconditional enslavement and having a capricious crown and life of her Princes, this dominion was supposed to have more or less influence on the fate, structure, decrees, education, customs and language of our fatherland. The history of this dynasty forms a necessary link in Russian history, and it goes without saying that the closest knowledge of the former not only serves to the most accurate comprehension of the latter, in this memorable and unfortunate period, but also contributes a lot to explaining our concepts of the influence that Mongol rule had on decisions and people's way of life in Russia ”.
Comparing the "tasks" of 1826 and 1832, a slight shift in emphasis can be noted. First, much more space is now given to the need to study the history of the Golden Horde itself; secondly, only the previously outlined focus on the "domination" of the Mongols in Russia is now developing into a whole concept. It speaks (in the spirit of the "Norman problem") about the "Mongol dynasty", which forms "a necessary link in Russian history." The "horror and scourge" of Russia - the Mongol khans - kept it "in the chains of unconditional enslavement", and the "crown and life" of the princes they disposed of "capriciously." In addition, attention is drawn to the transition, so to speak, to the Karamzin style of presentation (which is the same "horror and scourge", etc.).
This laid the foundation for the future - not only of the 19th, but also of the 20th century. - research on Russian-Horde issues. The views of N.M. Karamzin, presented by him in the IV and V volumes of the "History of the Russian State", and the academic competitions of 1826 and 1832 gave a strong impetus to the study of the topic "Russia and the Mongols." Already in the 20s and 40s, many works appeared that directly or indirectly develop certain judgments of scientific authorities. In 1822 the first book on this topic was published. Bringing the thought of N.M. Karamzin about the slowing down of the historical development of Russia due to the Mongol yoke, the author writes that the influence of the Mongols affected all levels of social life and contributed to the transformation of Russians into an "Asian people". The same topic becomes relevant on the pages of periodicals (moreover, the most popular magazines), thus establishing itself as socially significant.
However, in a number of works of the same time, a different direction can be seen than in N.M. Karamzin and Kh.D. Frena. Thus, denying any benefit from "Tatar rule", M. Gastev further writes: "The autocracy itself, recognized by many as the fruit of their dominion, is not the fruit of their dominion, if in the 15th century the princes divided their possessions. Rather, it can be called the fruit of the specific system, and most likely - the fruit of the duration of civil life. " Thus, M. Gastev was one of the first to question Karamzin's "concept of slowing down" the natural course of the social development of Russia, caused by the intervention of the Mongols. Objections and his vision of the Mongol period in Russia can be seen in the works of N.A. Polevoy and N.G. Ustryalov.
Considerations of a similar nature were put forward by S.M. Solovyov in the basis of his understanding of the time of the Russian Middle Ages. It is difficult to say how much the historiographic situation influenced him. It is obvious that he proceeded primarily from his own concept of the historical development of Russia. “Since for us the change of the old order of things with a new one, the transition of clan princely relations into state ones, depended on the unity, power of Russia and a change in the internal order, and since the beginning of a new order of things in the north we notice before the Tatars, the Mongolian relations should be important to us to the extent that they helped or hindered the establishment of this new order of things. We notice, - he continued, - that the influence of the Tatars was not the main and decisive here. The Tatars remained to live far away, they only cared about collecting tribute, not interfering in any way in internal relations, leaving everything as it was, therefore, leaving in complete freedom to operate those new relations that began in the north before them. " Even more clearly his position as a scientist on the "Mongolian question" was formulated in the following words: "... the historian has no right from the second half of the XIII century to interrupt the natural thread of events - namely, the gradual transition of clan princely relations into state relations - and insert the Tatar period, to highlight the Tatars, Tatar relations, as a result of which the main phenomena, the main reasons for these phenomena, must be closed. " In his History of Russia since Ancient Times, the great historian concretizes and details these general provisions.
In relation to S.M. Soloviev is attracted to the Russian-Mongolian theme by the balanced and conceptual approach. This was expressed, accordingly, in the absence of emotional assessments, which, as we have seen, filled the previous historiography, and in the attentive attitude to the development of precisely the internal “original” (as his contemporaries-Slavophiles would say) processes. A Look at the Historical Development of Mongolian Rus S.M. Solovyov, thus, was a new scientific concept of this period and became an alternative to the previously prevailing point of view of Karamzin-Fren. Nevertheless, this line did not die either. This is due to the extremely successful development of Russian oriental studies. Moreover, Russia is becoming the only country where Mongolism is developing as an independent scientific discipline. In the middle - second half of the 19th century. it was represented by such names as N.Ya. Bichurin, V.V. Grigoriev, V.P. Vasiliev, I.N. Berezin, P.I. Kafarov, V.G. Tiesenhausen.
V.G. Tiesenhausen in 1884 noted that “the study of the Mongol-Tatar period since then (since the time of academic competitions. - Yu.K.) has managed to advance in many ways ... ". But at the same time, “the absence of a solid, possibly complete and critically processed history of the Golden Horde, or the Jochid ulus ... constitutes one of the most important and sensitive gaps in our everyday life, depriving us of the opportunity not only to get acquainted with the and a kind of semi-steppe power, which for more than 2 centuries controlled the fate of Russia, but also correctly assess the degree of its influence on Russia, having determined with certainty what exactly this Mongol-Tatar domination was reflected in us and how much it actually slowed down the natural development of the Russian people ".
How to comment on the submitted by V.G. Tiesenhausen historiographic situation? Undoubtedly, firstly, despite the "advancement" of the problem, the awareness of the unsatisfactory scientific level of previous research (primarily due to the lack of use of the entire known fund of sources), and, secondly, the author clearly traces "old prejudices", because the "ideological platform "Remains basically the same - at the level of Karamzin and Fren.
Actually "Karamzinskaya" line found the most prominent representative in the person of N.I. Kostomarov. Investigating the "Mongolian problem", he approaches it, as it was inherent in him, on a large scale - against the background of the history of all Slavs. “Wherever the Slavs were left to themselves, there they remained with their primitive qualities and did not develop any lasting social system suitable for internal order and external protection. Only a strong conquest or the influence of foreign elements could lead them to this, ”he wrote in one of his fundamental works. Even A.N. Nasonov called it "fantastic theory." But, proceeding from them, N.I. Kostomarov, inheriting N.M. Karamzin, explained the origin of autocratic power in Russia by the Tatar conquest. The inheritance of N.M. Karamzin is also felt in another passage: under the Mongols, “the feeling of freedom, honor, consciousness of personal dignity disappeared; subservience to the higher, despotism over the lower became the qualities of the Russian soul ”,“ the fall of the free spirit and the dullness of the people ”took place. In general, for N.I. Kostomarov, with the conquest of the Mongols, "the great revolution of Russian history began."
So, from the middle of the XIX century. The "Mongolian question" is becoming one of the most important topics in Oriental and Russian medieval studies. In the second half of the century, two main ways of studying it were formed. The first, dating back to the traditions laid down by N.M. Karamzin and Kh.D. Fren, and represented by a number of major Mongol scholars of that time, proceeds from the significant, and at times defining and all-encompassing role of the Mongols in medieval Russian history. The second is associated with the name, first of all, S.M. Solovyov, as well as his successors, among which the names of V.O. Klyuchevsky, S.F. Platonov, and in the first third of the XX century. M.N. Pokrovsky and A.E. Presnyakov. For these scientists, the main thing remains the natural course of the inner life of medieval Russia, which was not subject, at least in a cardinal way, to changes. So S.F. Platonov considered the Mongol yoke only "an accident in our history"; therefore, he wrote, “we can consider the inner life of Russian society in the 13th century. not paying attention to the fact of the Tatar yoke ”.
In a word, there was no unambiguity in the Mongolian question either in general or in specific subjects. This gave rise to one of the specialists in oriental studies of the early XX century. to summarize: "It is hardly possible to point to any other question in Russian history, which would have been so little developed as the question of the Tatars."
Thus, Soviet historiography found the "Mongolian question" unambiguously unresolved, moreover, being solved in a diametrically opposite way. For some time, the Mongolian period did not attract much attention of Soviet historians, and the works published in the late 1920s and early 1930s were mainly based on the widespread (and not yet debunked) theory of "commercial capital" by M.N. Pokrovsky. The situation begins to change by the end of the 30s, after the most important discussions on a number of problems of the history of Russia took place, the class-harmful bourgeois concepts of Russian history were thrown from the "steamer of modernity", and the consolidation of Marxist doctrine took place. After the concept was approved by B.D. Grekov on the class feudal nature of ancient Russian society, the time has come for the next - medieval - period of the history of Russia. It was then that the first Marxist works, devoted to the period of the XIII and subsequent centuries, appeared. In 1937, a thematic-special, but popular science work by B.D. Grekov and A.Yu. Yakubovsky "Golden Horde", consisting of two parts: "Golden Horde" and "Golden Horde and Russia".
The book was destined to answer the question - how should one understand, study and present the problem of "Russia and the Mongols" in Soviet historical science. In this regard, the authors followed the path that has already become traditional for Marxist historiography. They turned to the classics of Marxist thought, specifically to the statements of K. Marx, as well as I.V. Stalin. “We have a chance to be convinced more than once, - writes B.D. Greeks, - how Marx regarded the influence of the Golden Horde power on the history of the Russian people. In his remarks, we do not see even a hint of the progressive nature of this phenomenon. On the contrary, Marx sharply emphasizes the deeply negative influence of the Golden Horde power on the history of Russia. " There is also a quote from Marx that the yoke “lasted from 1257 to 1462, that is, more than 2 centuries; this yoke not only crushed, it insulted and dried up the very soul of the people who became its victim. " Even more clearly and definitely expressed I.V. Stalin (this was done in connection with the Austro-German invasion of Ukraine in 1918): "The imperialists of Austria and Germany ... bear on their bayonets a new, shameful yoke, which is no better than the old, Tatar ..."
This approach and the assessment by the classics of Marxism-Leninism of medieval Russian-Mongolian relations had a direct impact on the entire subsequent Soviet historiography. But was there anything fundamentally new in the judgments of the ideologists and politicians of the 19th and 20th centuries? on the problem we are considering? Apparently not. Indeed, with the exception of the "Karamzin" thesis about some positive features of the development of Russian statehood, in general, in the perception of the "Mongolian question" by the classics, Karamzin-Kostomarov's positions are repeated. It also talks about the negativity of the influence of the yoke on the social and spiritual life of medieval Russia, and quite emotionally.
So, the already tested way was "offered" to the Soviet historical science. However, unlike the previous historiographic period, there was no alternative to this path. The rigid framework of possible interpretations of Russian-Horde relations should not have allowed any radically different understanding of them.
However, returning to the work of B.D. Grekov and A.Yu. Yakubovsky, it should be said that they themselves are not inclined to exaggerate the influence of the Mongols on either the economic, political or cultural development of Russia. So, A.Yu. Yakubovsky, criticizing Kh.D. Fren for his interpretation of the impact of the Golden Horde period on the course of Russian history, writes the following: “For all the merits that Fren has for science, it must not be overlooked that for his historical consciousness the question was not posed otherwise ... For Fren, the Golden Horde remains only" unfortunate period ", and only from this side is of scientific interest." "No matter how heavy the power of the Golden Horde Mongol khans in feudal Russia," the scientist continues, "now it is impossible to study the history of the Golden Horde only from the point of view of how much it was a" horror and scourge "for the history of Russia." At the same time B.D. Grekov writes: “In the process of the hard struggle of the Russian people against the Golden Horde oppression, the Moscow state was created. It was not the Golden Horde who created it, but it was born against the will of the Tatar Khan, against the interests of his power. " These both theses about the struggle of the Russian people and about the creation of a unified Russian state against the will of the Mongols, in fact, contained a specific program of upcoming scientific research.
A portion of the criticism of the "Mongolian views" of M.N. Pokrovsky was also included in the article by A.N. Nasonov “The Tatar yoke in the coverage of M.N. Pokrovsky "in the well-known collection" Against the anti-Marxist concept of M.N. Pokrovsky ". True, the author mostly used this "tribune" to present his own concept of Russian-Horde relations. This was also emphasized by A.N. Nasonov. “Turning to criticism of the views of M.N. Pokrovsky, - he wrote, - we note that our task will not so much assess the works of Pokrovsky to determine the place he occupies in our historiography, but rather test his views on concrete historical material. "
A little later, the concept of A.N. Nasonova will be framed already in the form of the book "Mongols and Rus". The work of A.N. Nasonov will become a landmark for the Soviet historiography of the "Mongol question".
Anticipating his own formulation of the question, he not only criticizes, but, proceeding from the socio-political conditions of his time, explains the reasons for the "general assessment of the significance of the Tatar yoke in Russia" of his predecessors. “Apparently,” he believes, “in the pre-revolutionary situation, the idea of the active policy of the Russian princes in the Horde was more easily perceived than the idea of the active policy of the Tatars in Russia, even by those historians who attached great importance to the Tatar yoke. Contemporary historians of the XIX - early XX century. Russia was a state with a class of the Great Russian center dominating over other peoples of the East European Plain. To a certain extent, they unwittingly transferred the idea of their contemporary Russia to the old days. They willingly talked about the results of the policy of the Russian princes in the Horde, but they did not study the question of the Tatars in Russia or touched on it in passing. In most cases, they were of the opinion that the passive behavior of the Mongols contributed to the process of the state unification of Rus'.
His reasoning about the influence of social conditions on the formation of "pre-revolutionary" concepts of Russian-Horde relations can be fully applied to the ideological origin of his own concept. First, despite the fact that "the problem of studying the history of Tatar politics in Russia is posed by him" for the first time "," the formulation of such a problem follows from the indications of the "traditional policy of the Tatars" "given by K. Marx in the book" The Secret History of Diplomacy XVIII century ". This is the first impulse for subsequent constructions. Secondly, the ideological essence of A.N. Nasonov is explained by the social conditions of the time, of which he was a contemporary. “We prove,” he says, “that the Mongols pursued an active policy and the main line of this policy was not expressed in the desire to create a single state out of a politically fragmented society, but in the desire in every possible way to prevent consolidation, to maintain mutual discord between individual political groups and principalities. This conclusion suggests that a single "Great Russian" state, as we see it in the 17th century, was formed in the process of the struggle against the Tatars, that is, in the 15th-16th centuries, partly in the second half of the 16th century, when the struggle was possible according to the state of the Golden Horde itself. " Consequently, “the formation of a centralized state appeared, therefore, not at all as a result of the peaceful activities of the Mongol conquerors, but as a result of the struggle against the Mongols, when the struggle became possible, when the Golden Horde began to weaken and decay, and a popular movement arose in the Russian North-East. for the unification of Russia and for the overthrow of the Tatar domination ”.
After analyzing a large number of Russian (mainly chronicles) and oriental (in translations) sources, A.N. Nasonov came to the following specific conclusions: 1) the internal political life of Russia in the second half of the 13th - early 15th centuries. in a decisive way depended on the state of affairs in the Horde; the changes taking place in the Horde certainly entailed a new situation in Russia; 2) the Mongol khans constantly manipulated the Russian princes; 3) popular protests took place against the Mongols, but they were suppressed.
The book by A.N. Nasonova became the first monograph in Russian historiography entirely devoted to the topic "Russia and the Mongols", and most of her conclusions were the basis for the subsequent development of the problem. Moreover, we can say that it remains in this “role” to this day: many (if not most) of its provisions are accepted in modern historiography as axioms. Therefore, thanks to the work of B.D. Grekov and A.Yu. Yakubovsky and monographs by A.N. Nasonov, first of all, "Soviet historiography of the 30s - early 40s developed ... a unified scientifically grounded view of the consequences of the Mongol-Tatar invasion as a terrible disaster for the Russian people, which delayed the economic, political and cultural development of Russia for a long time." ; this was also due to the fact that for many decades a regime of "systematic terror" was established in Russia, - wrote A.A. Zimin, fully accepting the scheme of A.N. Nasonova. Thus, as A.A. Zimin, "the study of the struggle of the Russian people against the Tatar-Mongol enslavers is one of the important tasks of Soviet historical science."
An example of solving this problem is the fundamental work of L.V. Tcherepnin "Formation of the Russian centralized state". In the chapters on the socio-political history of medieval Russia, its history is closely intertwined with the Horde theme. Peru L.V. Tcherepnin also wrote an article about the initial period (XIII century) of Mongol dependence in Russia.
"Having suppressed the courageous and stubborn resistance of the peoples, the Mongol-Tatar invaders established their rule over the Russian land, which had a detrimental effect on its further destinies." In general, the researcher formulates the question of this "perniciousness" as follows: "The Mongol invasion of Russia is not an isolated fact, but a continuous long process that led the country to exhaustion, which caused it to lag behind a number of other European countries that developed in more favorable conditions." Already in the XIII century. reveals the "Russian" policy of the Mongol khans, "aimed at inciting inter-princely strife, strife, internal wars." Although the Horde did not break (“could not break”) the “political order” that existed in Russia, but it tried to put them “at its service, using in its own interests the Russian princes who seemed to them reliable, exterminating the unreliable and constantly pushing the princes against each other. to prevent anyone from strengthening and keeping everyone at bay. "
However, “the Horde khans acted not only by intimidation. They tried to rely on certain social forces; with gifts, benefits, privileges to attract part of the princes, boyars, clergy. " This, according to L.V. Cherepnin, played a certain role: “some representatives of the ruling class went into the service of the conquerors, helping to strengthen their dominion. But not everyone did this. And among the feudal elite - princes, boyars, clergy - there were enough people who resisted the foreign yoke. " But it was not they who determined the "mode" of fighting the enemy. “The popular masses were an active force in the struggle against the Mongol-Tatar oppression. Throughout the XIII century. there was a national liberation movement, anti-Tatar uprisings broke out, "which, it is true, were not" organized armed resistance "(which will happen only by the end of the 14th century), but" separate spontaneous scattered actions. "
This is how the authoritative researcher sees the XIII century. How much has changed in the XIV century? The events of the century in relation to Russian-Mongolian relations are presented (and rightly so!) By L.V. Cherepnin is ambiguous. Before us is a detailed picture of that complex and dramatic era.
However, the first decades of the XIV century. differ little from the last XIII century. The scientist writes: “In the first quarter of the XIV century. The Tatar-Mongol yoke was very perceptible over Russia. Fighting for political supremacy in Russia, individual Russian princes did not oppose the Golden Horde, but acted as executors of the khan's will. As soon as they stopped doing this, the Horde dealt with them. The fight against the Horde was fought by the people themselves in the form of spontaneous uprisings, which arose mainly in cities. The princes have not yet tried to lead the liberation movement of the townspeople. For this they did not yet have the necessary material prerequisites and forces. But the support of the cities largely determined the success of these or those princes in the political struggle with each other. "
The same processes remained dominant during the time of Ivan Kalita. So, the uprising in Tver in 1327 was raised "by the people themselves, contrary to the instructions of the Tver prince ...". In general, "under Kalita, Russian feudal lords not only made no attempt to overthrow the Tatar-Mongol yoke (the time had not yet come for this), but this prince brutally suppressed those spontaneous popular movements that undermined the foundations of the Horde's rule over Russia."
Some changes have been observed in the following decades. In the 40-50s, still recognizing the supreme power and regularly paying the "exit", the princes seek "the non-interference of the Horde Khan in the internal affairs of their possessions." Thanks to this, these years become the time of "a certain strengthening of the independence of a number of Russian lands." This, as well as the internal struggle in the Golden Horde itself leads to the fact that in the 60-70s of the XIV century. there is a "gradual weakening of the power of the Golden Horde over Russia." At the same time, from the turn of the 60-70s of the XIV century. In connection with the intensified Tatar raids, "the resistance of the Russian people to the Horde invaders" also intensified, and the "Nizhny Novgorod principality" becomes the "center of the people's liberation struggle". Ultimately, this "rise" led to a "decisive battle" on the Kulikovo field. Evaluating the reign of Dmitry Donskoy L.V. Cherepnin writes about "a significant intensification of the foreign policy of Russia": if earlier the Russian princes ensured the security of their possessions by paying tribute to the khans, then "now they are already organizing a military rebuff to the Horde force." Dmitry Donskoy "tried to achieve" silence "for Russia not only with the people's ruble, but also with the sword." “Raising” this prince in this way, L.V. Cherepnin is in a hurry to make a reservation: “However, before Dm. Donskoy raised this sword, the Russian people have already risen to fight the Tatar yoke ”. And yet "Prince Dmitry more consistently than his predecessors supported the alliance with the townspeople", which was due to the growth of their importance primarily in socio-economic development. Dmitry Donskoy "objectively" thus contributed to the rise of the national liberation movement.
In the research of L.V. Tcherepnin, dedicated to the period of Horde dependence, a number of thoughts are clearly visible that develop the views of his predecessors. The first is the princely-khan's relations, which mainly depend on the khan's will and, in general, on the events taking place in the Horde. The second is to emphasize in relation to the Mongols a deep class gap between the princes (and other feudal lords) and the people. At the same time, certain successes in the inter-princes' struggle depended on the latter, mainly on the townspeople. Of course, specific situations in one way or another changed the arrangement of the marked sides, but always, according to L.V. Cherepnin, their initial opposition remained: the prince - the khans, the feudal lords - the people (townspeople) and, of course, Russia - the Horde. At the same time, it is necessary to note the well-known research flexibility, which allows a scientist in his conceptual scheme of events to take into account data that at first glance contradict the main research trend (which, however, remains unchanged).
This distinguishes the works of L.V. Tcherepnin from several straightforward conclusions of other Russian historians, whose works were contemporary to him or were published in subsequent years. So, I.U. Budovnits wrote the following very emotionally: “... In the most terrible decades of the Tatar yoke, which came after the bloody pogrom of Batyev, the preaching of servility, servility and groveling before the carriers of foreign oppression emanating from the clergy and the ruling feudal class, the people were able to oppose their militant ideology, based on irreconcilability towards the invaders, on contempt for death, on the readiness to sacrifice their lives in order to free the country from the foreign yoke. "
Having considered the historiographic situation in the "Mongolian question" that had developed by the mid-60s, V.V. Kargalov came to the conclusion that it was necessary to create a "special study" about the period of the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Russia. These are the chapters of his more general work thematically and chronologically.
The main goal of V.V. Kargalov's goal is to maximize the “field” of the problem within the 13th century: chronologically, territorially, and finally, socially. As for the first task, “the consequences of the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Russia are considered not only as a result of Batu's campaign, but as a consequence of a whole series of Tatar invasions that lasted for several decades (starting with the Batu pogrom)”. In general, it seems that it is true and justified: Mongolian troops appear in Russia more than once. But V.V. Kargalov is a priori interested in only one aspect: "This formulation of the question makes it possible to more fully imagine the destructive consequences of the Mongol-Tatar conquest."
Expanding the "territorial field", V.V. Kargalov also contributes. If “the question of the consequences of the invasion for the Russian city”, he believes, “was well developed by Soviet historians,” then “the situation with the study of the consequences of the invasion for the rural areas of feudal Russia is somewhat worse. Having studied the written and archaeological data, V.V. Kargalov came to the conclusion that both the cities and the "productive forces of the Russian feudal village" were dealt a terrible blow by the Mongol invasion.
How did the population of the Russian lands react to these disasters: the nobility and the people? V.V. Kargalov continues the practice of their "bifurcation" outlined in previous works. The "policy of agreement" between the Tatars and the "local feudal lords", "cooperation of the Tatar feudal lords", their "alliance" among themselves, at best a "certain compromise" - this is how the researcher sees the picture of Russian-Mongolian relations in the second half of the 13th century. at the level of "feudalism" of two ethnic groups.
But unlike his predecessors V.V. Kargalov proposes to consider this "compromising policy" of Russian princes not locally (both in relation to individual princes and other "feudal lords" of certain Russian lands), but extends such conclusions to "Russian spiritual and secular feudal lords" as a whole. "The Russian feudal lords," he concludes, "quickly came to terms with the Horde khans and, recognizing the supreme power of the khan, retained their" tables "and power over the oppressed classes."
The attitude to the Horde people of the people was different. “The masses opposed the policy of cooperation with the Mongol-Tatar conquerors, which was pursued by a significant part of the Russian feudal lords, with an irreconcilable attitude towards the rapists. Despite the terrible consequences of the "Batu pogrom" and the policy of their own feudal lords, who conspired with the Horde khans, the Russian people continued to fight against the foreign yoke. "
This alignment of social forces led to at least two consequences. The first was that "anti-Tatar and anti-feudal motives were closely intertwined in the actions of the lower classes." The second is that it is precisely “to the struggle of the Russian people against the foreign yoke ... Northeastern Russia owes its special position in relation to the Horde Khan. Not the "wise policy" of the Russian princes, but the struggle of the masses against the Mongol conquerors led to the elimination of "non-fertility" and "Basque", to the expulsion of numerous "tsarist ambassadors" from Russian cities, to the fact that Russia did not turn into a simple "ulus" Golden Hordes. Under the burdensome foreign yoke, the Russian people managed to preserve the conditions of their independent national development. " This is one main conclusion of the work of V.V. Kargalov. Another sums up the invasion. “The study of the history of Russia after the Mongol-Tatar invasion inevitably leads to the conclusion about the negative, deeply regressive influence of foreign conquest on the economic, political and cultural development of the country. The consequences of the Mongol-Tatar yoke were felt for several centuries. It was precisely this that was the main reason for the lag of Russia behind the developed European countries, for the elimination of which it took titanic efforts of the hardworking and talented Russian people. "
The work of V.V. Kargalov - a new milestone in the development of the national historiography of the "Mongolian question". She very clearly indicated the main plots of Russian-Horde relations in the 13th century. and their perspective. A tough armed confrontation took place between Russia and the Horde, between the princes (and other "feudal lords") and the people - irreconcilable class contradictions. At the same time, another aspect of the problem is the preservation of a certain (within the framework of feudal development) political independence of the Russian lands.
We see the development of such research trends in the monograph by V.L. Egorova. Its main task is to study the historical geography of the Golden Horde in the XIII-XIV centuries. - is closely linked, in particular, with the military-political relations between Russia and the Horde. Along with the confirmation of a number of provisions already established in domestic historiography, for example, about "the undivided power of the Mongols and the absence of active resistance of the Russian princes" in the period before 1312 or that the period 1359-1380. "Characterized by a steady increase in the military and economic power of the Russian lands", the author poses some questions in a new way or more emphasizes the known ones.
First, we see a clear division of the "main stages of Mongolian policy in Russia." Secondly, it seems to us important to state that this policy "was not associated with the seizure and seizure of new land territories." Thus, according to the well-founded opinion of the researcher, the Russian lands were not actually included in the territory of the Golden Horde. And in this connection stands the concept of "buffer zones", which he introduced into scientific circulation, "which limited the Russian borders from the south." Finally, thirdly, emphasizing that the main goal of the Horde's policy "was to receive the greatest possible tribute," and the Russian lands were "in the position of semi-dependent, taxable territories." At the same time, such a status not only did not interfere, but, on the contrary, stimulated the military dictatorship of the Mongol khans over Russia. Therefore, "throughout the entire existence of the Golden Horde, the Russian principalities were forcibly drawn into the orbit of the political and economic interests of the Mongols."
The results of the consideration in the latest Russian historiography of the "Mongol question" were summed up in the article by A.L. Khoroshkevich and A.I. Pliguzov, preceding the book by J. Fennel about Russia 1200-1304. “The question of the impact of the Mongol invasion on the development of Russian society is one of the most difficult in the history of Russia. The extreme lack of sources complicates the answer to it, therefore, it becomes quite possible for the appearance of such works in which any impact of the invasion on the development of Russia is denied. Most historians, however, are of the opinion that the foreign yoke delayed the economic, social and political development of Russia, the completion of the formation of feudalism, reviving archaic forms of exploitation. "
Along with such a conclusion, which, however, does not contain any innovations, the authors propose the formulation of some of the problems that seem to them urgent. Without a doubt, they are such and are both for solving private and general issues of Russian-Horde relations. But at the same time, let us note that the “Mongol issue” as a whole is far from being resolved in principle. Concepts, which previously, having criticized, could, simply speaking, be dismissed, are by no means frivolous and unscientific, referring to their scientific inconsistency. In our historiography, the concept of L.N. Gumilyov.
The relationship between Russia and the Mongols is considered by L.N. Gumilyov against a broad background of foreign policy, in many respects proceeding from ethnic and confessional relations of that time. For the scientist, the invasion of Batu's troops is not a turning point in the history of Rus. It was a "Mongol raid", or "a big raid, and not a planned conquest, for which the entire Mongol Empire would not have enough people"; he "in the scale of the destruction carried out is comparable to the internecine war, usual for that turbulent time." "The Grand Duchy of Vladimir, which let the Tatar army through its lands, retained its military potential," and "the destruction caused by the war" is "exaggerated."
Subsequently, "in Great Russia they agreed that the Russian land became the land of" Kanovi and Batyev ", that is, they recognized the suzerainty of the Mongol Khan." This situation suited both the Mongols and the Russians, since "it was justified by the foreign policy situation." What was “suzerainty” for Russia? “... The Mongols neither in Russia, nor in Poland, nor in Hungary left garrisons, did not impose a permanent tax on the population, and did not conclude unequal treaties with the princes. Therefore, the expression "conquered but not conquered country" is completely wrong. The conquest did not take place, because it was not planned "; "Russia was neither subdued by the Mongols, nor subjugated", and "the Russian land became part of the Dzhuchiev ulus, without losing its autonomy ...". “This system of Russian-Tatar relations, which existed before 1312, should be called symbiosis. And then everything changed ... ". The changes took place as a result of the adoption of Islam by the Golden Horde, that L.N. Gumilev calls "the victory of the neighboring Muslim superethnos, which seized the Volga and Black Sea regions in 1312." "Great Russia, in order not to die, was forced to become a military camp, and the former symbiosis with the Tatars turned into a military alliance with the Horde, which lasted more than half a century - from Uzbek to Mamai." Its political essence consisted in the fact that the Russian princes “demanded and received military assistance against the West (Lithuania and the Germans. - Yu.K.) and had a strong barrier that protected them from impending attacks from the East. "
The subsequent confluence of circumstances (internal and external) made it possible to lay the "foundation for the future greatness of Russia."
The concept of "Ancient Russia and the Great Steppe" by L.N. Gumilyov in many ways goes back to the idea of "Eurasianism" and its concrete historical development, primarily in the works of G.V. Vernadsky. (LN Gumilev, as you know, called himself “the last Eurasian”.) “Eurasianism” now, unlike the past decades, is actively present in Russian social and scientific thought. He is "opposed" by the concept of Russian-Mongolian relations, formed by our historical science in the late 30s - 60s and 70s. How significant are the differences between these concepts? If you pay attention to the details, then, it is true, there will be a lot of inconsistencies and disagreements. And if you look more broadly and voluminously?
Both concepts recognize, to one degree or another, the dependence of Russia on the Mongols, which is obvious. But the "Eurasian" view presupposes the status of the Russian lands as a "Russian ulus", that is, their entry into the main territory of the Golden Horde. However, this did not result in any "stagnation" in the internal life of Russia. Moreover, it has been enriched by many acquisitions in various spheres of social, political, cultural and even ethnic life.
The majority of Russian historians believed and still believe that Russia, as a territory and a society, did not become the territory of the "Dzhuchiev ulus". As V.L. Egorov, between the "native" lands of North-Eastern Russia and the Golden Horde there were so-called "buffer zones", in fact, delimiting the Russian and Mongolian areas. But at the same time, this did not ease the position of Russia. Russia found itself under the heavy Horde "yoke" that existed for almost two and a half centuries. "Igo" threw the country, which was in the mainstream of European development, for several centuries, causing its backwardness and specificity in the future. These are the positions of the currently opposing historiographic sides in the "Mongol question".
It seems to us that, despite the external antagonism, there are no insurmountable obstacles between them. But for this it is necessary to somewhat soften their provisions concerning the internal state and development of Russia "under the yoke". There is no doubt that assessments of the relationship as "friendly" or "benevolent" did not correspond to reality. There was a confrontation between two ethno-social systems (although, perhaps, they were basically close), and the confrontation was tough. On the other hand, we believe that the view of Russian-Horde relations as a "total" subordination of Russia to the Horde, expressed in the form of constant "terror" in relation to the population and the princess, is at least somewhat exaggerated.
This is not about defending the Mongol-Tatar policy in Russia, we are not striving for any apologetics for the Mongol-Tatars. (It seems that the history of any ethnos does not need protection and patronage, because in the history of all peoples there is positive and negative, “black” and “white”, if the question can be raised at all.) - Horde relations, complete and balanced, without ideological and other distortions in one direction or another. We are also talking about an attempt to explain some (all, apparently, will not succeed) elements of relations (their origins, reasons), which do not always fit into the rationalistic schemes that are familiar to us. Religious ideas, customary law, everyday life, ritualism - all this (of course, along with "classical" economic, political relations) must be taken into account when studying Russian-Horde relations.
Not only economic, social and political systems came into contact, not only nomadic and sedentary worlds, but also worldview systems: ideological and mental. Without taking into account the latter, our perception of events and phenomena of that time becomes impoverished and becomes inadequate to medieval realities.
Raids, assaults, violence clearly simplify Russian-Horde relations, just as they simplify in general the internal development of Russia itself, in many respects reducing it only to the imposed influence of the Mongol-Tatar order.
The sketches offered below are aimed at showing the common and the different, that united or separated two large social systems of the Eurasian Middle Ages. Ultimately - an attempt to move from the interpretation of Russian-Horde relations as a continuous struggle to an interpretation that presupposes multilateral and multilevel interaction.
. Grekov B.D., Yakubovsky A.Yu. 1) Golden Horde (Essay on the history of Ulus Ju-chi during the period of addition and prosperity in the XIII-XIV centuries). L., 1937.S. 3-10, 193-202; 2) The Golden Horde and its fall. M .; L., 1950.S. 5-12; A.N. Nasonov The Tatar yoke illuminated by M.N. Pokrovsky // Against the anti-Marxist concept of M.N. Pokrovsky. Part 2.M .; L., 1940; Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols in Russia // Essays on the history of Russian oriental studies. M., 1953.S. 31-95; Safargaliev M.G. The collapse of the Golden Horde. Saransk, 1960.S. 3-18; L.V. Cherepnin Formation of the Russian centralized state in the XIV-XV centuries. Essays on the socio-economic and political history of Russia. M., 1960 (Chapter 1. Historiography of the question of the formation of the Russian centralized state); Kargalov V.V. Foreign policy factors in the development of feudal Russia: Feudal Russia and nomads. M., 1967.S. 218-255; Fedorov-Davydov G.A. The social system of the Golden Horde. M., 1973.S. 18-25; Borisov N.S. Domestic historiography about the influence of the Tatar-Mongol invasion on Russian culture // Problems of the history of the USSR. Issue V. M., 1976. S. 129-148; Grekov I.B. The place of the Battle of Kulikovo in the political life of Eastern Europe at the end of the XIV century. // Battle of Kulikovo. M., 1980.S. 113-118; Arapov D.Yu. Russian oriental studies and the study of the history of the Golden Horde // Battle of Kulikovo in the history and culture of our Motherland. M., 1983.S. 70-77; Arslanova A.A. From the history of the study of the Golden Horde according to Persian sources of the 13th - first half of the 15th centuries. in Russian historiography // Problems of socio-economic development of the Middle Volga village in the period of feudalism. Kazan, 1986.S. 11-130; Tolochko P.P. Ancient Russia. Essays on socio-political history. Kiev, 1987.S. 165-167; A.A. Gorsky Russian lands in the XIII-XV centuries. Ways of political development. M., 1996.S. 56-57, 107-108; Chukaea V.A. Russian principalities and the Golden Horde. 1243-1350 Dnepropetrovsk, 1998.S. 4-19.
Cm.: Borisov N.S. Domestic historiography ... S. 140-143; Kargalov V.V. Foreign policy factors ... pp. 253-255.
Cm.: Rudakov V.N. Perception of the Mongol-Tatars in the chronicle stories about the invasion of Batu // Hermeneutics of Old Russian Literature. Sat. 10. M., 2000, etc. Of course, it is necessary to take into account the late editorial processing of the "scribes" ( Prokhorov G.M. 1) Codicological analysis of the Laurentian Chronicle // VID. L., 1972; 2) The Tale of the Batu invasion in the Laurentian Chronicle // TODRL. T. 28.1974).
. Stennik Yu.V. On the origins of Slavophilism in Russian literature of the 18th century // Slavophilism and modernity. SPb., 1994.S. 17, 19, 20; Poznansky V.V. Essay on the formation of Russian national culture: the first half of the 19th century. M., 1975.S. 8, etc.
. Karamzin N.M. History of the Russian State in 12 volumes.Vol. V. M., 1992. S. 205.
In the same place. T. II-III. M., 1991.S. 462.
In the same place. T. V. S. 201, 202, 208.See also: Borisov N.S. Domestic historiography ... S. 130-132.
In the same place. P. 132.
. Karamzin N.M. History of the Russian State in 12 volumes. Vol. II-III. P. 751; T. IV. M., 1992.S. 423.
Cit. on: Golman M.I. Study of the history of Mongolia in the West (XIII - mid XX centuries). M., 1988.S. 40.
In the same place. - It was followed by another prominent French orientalist of the early 19th century. D "Osson, who published in 1824 in 4 volumes" The History of the Mongols from Genghis Khan to Timur-Bek. " devastating consequences for the peoples of Asia and Eastern Europe "; as a work of de Guignes for the 18th century, the work of D" Osson was "the most significant in Western European historiography on the history of Mongolia in the 19th century. and has not lost its scientific significance in the XX century. " (Ibid. Pp. 42-43). “A look at the Mongols of the XIII century. as the conquerors, who caused tremendous destruction in the countries they conquered, was accepted by bourgeois science when this science was on the rise ”( Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols ... p. 33). Wed: "After D" Osson, historians, so to speak, vulgarized a negative attitude towards the Mongols and Chingizids "( Kozmin N.N. Preface // D "Osson K. History of the Mongols. T. 1. Genghis Khan. Irkutsk, 1937. C.XXVII-XXVIII).
History of the USSR Academy of Sciences. T. 2.1803-1917. M .; L., 1964.S. 189.
About Kh.D. Frene see: Saveliev P. About the life and scientific works of Fren. SPb., 1855.
. Golman M.I. Study of the history of Mongolia ... p. 143, approx. 57. - About the “noticeable influence on Russian oriental studies” of a number of ideas “dominated in Western European Orientalism”, wrote D.Yu. Arapov ( Arapov D.Yu. Russian oriental studies and the study of the history of the Golden Horde. P. 70). See also: Gumilev L.N. Ancient Russia and the Great Steppe. M., 1989.S. 602-604; V.V. Kozhinov Mysterious pages of the history of the XX century. M., 1995.S. 229, 231-232.
. Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols ... p. 39.
Collection of acts of the ceremonial meeting of the Academy of Sciences, which was on the occasion of its 100th anniversary on December 29, 1826 St. Petersburg, 1827, pp. 52-53. - For the background of the problem setting and the results of the competition, see: Tizengauzen V.G. Collection of materials related to the history of the Golden Horde. SPb., 1884. T. 1.C. V-VI; Safargaliev M.G. The collapse of the Golden Horde. S. 3-6.
. Tizengauzen V.G. Collection of materials related to the history of the Golden Horde. T. 1.S. 555-563.
In the same place. S. 555.
In the same place. S. 556-557.
... "The views of H. Fren were then dominant in historical science" ( Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols ... p. 39). - It is hardly appropriate to say that in the “Program” compiled by Kh.D. Fren, “the problem of classes and class struggle was not taken into account, the study of the socio-economic foundations of the Golden Horde state was not given priority attention” ( Arapov D.Yu. Russian Oriental Studies ... p. 72).
. Richter A. Something about the influence of the Mongols and Tatars on Russia. SPb., 1822. See also: Naumov P. On the relations of the Russian princes to the Mongol and Tatar khans from 1224 to 1480. SPb., 1823; Berngoff A. Russia under the yoke of the Tatars. Riga, 1830; A. On the significance of the Mongol period in Russian history. Odessa, 1847.
. A.R. Studies on the influence of the Mongol-Tatars on Russia // Otechestvennye zapiski. 1825, June; Prandunas G. The reasons for the fall of Russia under the yoke of the Tatars and the gradual restoration of autocracy in this // Bulletin of Europe. 1827. Part 155. No. 14; [N. W.] On the state of Russia before the Mongol invasion (excerpt) // Son of the Fatherland. 1831. T. 22, No. 33-34; [M.P.] Discourse on the reasons that slowed down civil education in the Russian state before Peter the Great, the work of M. Gastev. M., 1832 // Telescope. 1832. No. 12; Fisher A. Speech delivered at the solemn meeting of St. Petersburg University by the ordinary professor of philosophy A. Fisher, September 20, 1834 // ZhMNP. 1835.4.5. No. 1.
. Gastev M. Reasoning about the reasons that slowed down civil education in the Russian state. M., 1832.S. 131.
. Polevoy N.A. History of the Russian people. SPb., 1833. T. 4. S. 9; T. 5.S. 22-23 and others; Ustryalov N.G. Russian history. Part 1.SPb., 1855.S. 185, 187-193.
Although it is possible to assume that his view was "a reaction to the exaggeration of the role of the Tatar yoke in Russian history" (Russian history in essays and articles / Ed. By MV Dovnar-Zapolsky. T. I. B. m., 6. P. 589).
. Soloviev S.M. Op. in 18 kn. Book. I. History of Russia since ancient times. T. 1-2.M., 1988. S. 53.
In the same place. P. 54.
The concept of the "Mongolian question" S.М. Solovyov was not accepted by Soviet historical science and was sharply criticized. So, N.S. Borisov wrote that in his works "the significance of the Tatar invasion is extremely underestimated, even the very term" Mongol period "is discarded. In his multivolume History of Russia, Batu's invasion takes only four pages, and about the same is a description of the customs of the Tatars ”( Borisov N.S. Domestic historiography ... p. 135).
. Kononov A.N. Some questions of studying the history of Russian oriental studies. M., 1960.S. 3; Golman M.I. Study of the history of Mongolia ... P. 54. - For the subsequent development of Mongolian studies in Russia, see p. 108-118.
. Tizengauzen V.G. Collection of materials related to the history of the Golden Horde. T. 1.C. IX.
In the same place. S. V. Cf .: “The merits of that generation of Orientalists, to which Berezin belongs, are determined not so much by the fulfillment as by the setting of scientific tasks, and in this respect, the scientist who understood that“ it is the responsibility of Russian Orientalists to explain ”the Mongolian period of Russian history, and not only in word, but also in deed, who has proved the consciousness of this duty ... has every right to the gratitude of posterity ”( Bartold V.V. Op. T. IX. M., 1977.S. 756).
. Kostomarov N.I. The beginning of autocracy in ancient Russia // Kostomarov N.I. Sobr. Op. Historical monographs and research. Book. 5.T. XII-XIV. SPb., 1905.S. 5.
. A.N. Nasonov The Tatar yoke illuminated by M.N. Pokrovsky. P. 61.
. Kostomarov N.I. The beginning of autocracy in ancient Russia. P. 47.
In the same place. P. 43.
. Platonov S.F. Op. in 2 volumes.Vol. 1.SPb., 1993.S. 135-139. - A brief description of other points of view of Russian historiography of the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. see: Russian history in essays and articles. S. 589-590. - Reassessment of the "Mongolian heritage" at the end of the 19th century. took place in Western historiography. “At this time, bourgeois historical science began to revise its views on the past, including the question of the role of the Mongol conquest. Voices began to be heard more and more that previous historians had misjudged the role of the Mongols and the Mongol conquest in the history of mankind, that it was high time to reassess previous views in this area, that the Mongols were not at all such destroyers as they had previously thought, and that, on the contrary , they brought a lot of positive things into the life of the conquered peoples and countries. This change of progressive views in the field of evaluating the Mongol conquests as reactionary ones captured even the most serious representatives of bourgeois historiography of the late 19th and 20th centuries, ”he described from the standpoint of the early 1950s. a revolution in views on the "Mongolian problem" A.Yu. Yakubovsky ( Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols ... p. 64. See also: Golman M.I. Study of the history of Mongolia ... pp. 44, 52).
Assessing the consequences of the Tatar-Mongol yoke and its influence on the subsequent development of the Russian state, one should recognize its ambiguous nature. Therefore, it makes sense to consider each area of public life separately.
Economy.
Destruction of cities - 49 cities are destroyed. 15 of them became villages, 14 were never restored.
Slowdown in the development of crafts - many artisans, like city dwellers, died during the storming of the city or were taken prisoner to the Horde; some technologies were lost forever (cloisonné enamel, stone carving); artisans did not work for the market, but for the khans and the princely court.
The payment of the tribute fell a heavy burden on the state. There was a leakage of silver - the main monetary metal of Russia, which hindered the development of commodity-money relations.
Politics.
Appointment of princes with the help of special letters - labels (But! They only confirmed or rejected the candidacy of the prince, without affecting the selection procedure, while the right of inheritance was preserved).
They did not create their own ruling dynasty.
They created the institution of governors - Baskaks - leaders of military detachments who followed the activities of the princes and collected tribute. The denunciation of the Baskak led either to the summons of the prince to the Horde, or to a punitive campaign. (But! In the end of the 13th century, the collection of tribute was transferred to the hands of the Russian princes)
The withering away of veche traditions and the formation of a political course for the establishment of unlimited power of the ruler according to the Eastern model.
The Mongols artificially supported territorial and political fragmentation, which became the basis for subsequent centralization from above.
Social structure.
· Almost complete destruction of the old Varangian nobility.
· Formation of a new nobility with a strong Tatar element - Sheremetevs, Derzhavins, Tolstoy, Akhmatovs.
Religion
The Horde did not destroy the Orthodox faith and imposed its own religion.
· The destruction and plundering of churches took place only for profit, and not for ideological reasons.
· The church was exempted from taxation, its holdings were declared inviolable.
· During the yoke, the number of monasteries increased, their land tenure expanded significantly.
· Strengthening the position of the church more as a political institution than as a spiritual one.
· Protection of the Orthodox Church from the influence of the West.
Public consciousness.
· Changing the consciousness of the rulers - the princes were forced to demonstrate servility. The disobedient were humiliatingly punished or destroyed.
· Approval of the eastern model of government - cruel and despotic, with unlimited power of the sovereign.
There are three main points of view on this problem in Russian historiography.
1.S.M.Soloviev, V.O. Klyuchevsky and most historians - the Yoke for Russia was a great disaster
Ygo is a system of relations between conquerors (Mongols) and vanquished (Russians), which manifested itself in:
The political dependence of the Russian princes on the khans of the Golden Horde, who issued labels (letters) for the right to rule in the Russian lands;
Dannic dependence of Russia on the Horde. Russia paid tribute to the Golden Horde (food, handicrafts, money, slaves);
Military dependence - the supply of Russian soldiers to the Mongol troops.
2. NM Karamzin noted that the Mongol-Tatar domination in Russia had one important positive consequence - it accelerated the unification of the Russian principalities and the revival of the united Russian state. This gave rise to some later historians to talk about the positive influence of the Mongols.
3. A. Fomenko, V. Nosovsky believe that there was no Mongol-Tatar yoke at all. The interaction of the Russian principalities with the Golden Horde was more reminiscent of allied relations: Russia paid tribute (and its size was not so great), and the Horde, in return, ensured the security of the borders of the weakened and scattered Russian principalities.
5. Contemporary Russian discussions about Prince Alexander Nevsky
Recently, the political talents of the prince have been more and more insistently emphasized, since, it turns out, "Alexander Nevsky performed his main feat not on the battlefield as a military leader, but in the political arena as a statesman." At the same time, "our great ancestor ... selflessly defended Russia from external enemies and understood the decisive role of the people in this defense."
Their opponents are not inclined to exaggerate Alexander's services to the Fatherland. They accuse the prince of collaboration, of what exactly from “surrendered” to the Mongol hordes Veliky Novgorod and Pskov, which did not reach the hordes of Batu in 1237-1238, it was he who, drowning in blood the first attempts to resist the Horde of the urban “lower classes”, ensured the power of the Horde khans for almost a quarter of a century and thereby consolidated the despotic system of government in Russia, imposing it on his homeland and thereby slowing down its development for several centuries ahead. “The shame of Russian historical consciousness, Russian historical memory is that Alexander Nevsky became an indisputable concept of national pride, became a fetish, became the banner not of a sect or a party, but of the very people whose historical fate he cruelly distorted. ... Alexander Nevsky, no doubt, was a national traitor. "
Speaking about Alexander Nevsky, a professional historian is obliged to distinguish between at least five characters in our history and culture. First of all, this is the Grand Duke Alexander Yaroslavich, who lived in the middle of the 13th century. Secondly, the holy noble prince Alexander Yaroslavich, the defender of Orthodoxy, canonized already forty years after the death of his prototype. Thirdly, somewhat modernized in the 18th century. the image of St. Alexander Nevsky - a fighter for access to the Baltic Sea (after all, he defeated the Swedes at almost the very place that Peter I chose to build the capital of the Russian Empire). And finally, fourthly, the image of the great defender of the entire Russian land from German aggression, Alexander Nevsky, created in the late 1930s thanks to the joint efforts of Sergei Eisenstein, Nikolai Cherkasov and Sergei Prokofiev. In recent years, the fifth Alexander has been added to them, for whom, apparently, the majority of TV viewers of the Rossiya TV channel voted: a just strong ruler, a defender of the “lower classes” from the boyars-“oligarchs”. the main qualities - justice, strength, the ability to resist moneybags, talent, political sagacity - all this is not yet available, but the need of society for this is - and the most acute.
1. The battles for which Prince Alexander became famous were so insignificant that they are not even mentioned in Western chronicles.
This idea was born out of sheer ignorance. The battle on Lake Peipsi is reflected in German sources, in particular, in the "Elder Livonian Rhymed Chronicle". Based on it, some historians talk about the insignificant scale of the battle, because the Chronicle reports the death of only twenty knights. But here it is important to understand that we are talking specifically about the "knight brothers" who performed the role of the highest commanders. Nothing is said about the death of their warriors and the representatives of the Baltic tribes recruited into the army, who formed the backbone of the army.
As for the Battle of the Neva, it did not find any reflection in the Swedish chronicles. But, according to Igor Shaskolsky, a prominent Russian specialist in the history of the Baltic region in the Middle Ages, “... this should not be surprising. In medieval Sweden, until the beginning of the XIV century, there were no major narrative works on the history of the country, such as Russian chronicles and large Western European chronicles ”. In other words, the Swedes have no place to look for traces of the Battle of the Neva.
2. The West did not pose a threat to Russia at that time, unlike the Horde, which Prince Alexander used exclusively to strengthen his personal power.
Wrong again! It is unlikely that in the 13th century one can speak of a “united West”. Perhaps it would be more correct to talk about the world of Catholicism, but as a whole it was very motley, heterogeneous and fragmented. It was not the "West" that really threatened Russia, but the Teutonic and Livonian orders, as well as the Swedish conquerors. And for some reason they smashed them on Russian territory, and not at home in Germany or Sweden, and, therefore, the threat posed by them was quite real.
As for the Horde, there is a source (Ustyug Chronicle), which makes it possible to assume the organizing role of Prince Alexander Yaroslavich in the anti-Horde uprising.
3. Prince Alexander did not defend Russia and the Orthodox faith, he simply fought for power and used the Horde to physically eliminate his own brother.
This is just speculation. Prince Alexander Yaroslavich primarily defended what he inherited from his father and grandfather. In other words, with great skill he performed the task of a guardian, a keeper. As for the death of his brother, it is necessary, before such verdicts, to study the question of how he, in recklessness and youth, put the Russian armies useless and in what way he generally acquired power. This will show: not so much Prince Alexander Yaroslavich was his destroyer, as he himself claimed the role of an early destroyer of Russia ...
4. Turning to the east, not to the west, Prince Alexander laid the foundations for the future revelry of despotism in the country. His contacts with the Mongols made Russia an Asian power.
This is already completely groundless journalism. All Russian princes were then in contact with the Horde. After 1240, they had a choice: to die on their own and subject Russia to another ruin, or to survive and prepare the country for new battles and, ultimately, for liberation. Someone rushed headlong into battle, but 90 percent of our princes of the second half of the XIII century chose a different path. And here Alexander Nevsky is no different from our other sovereigns of that period.
As for the "Asian power", different points of view are really being voiced here today. But as a historian, I believe that Russia has never become it. It was not and is not part of Europe or Asia or something like a mixture, where European and Asian take on different proportions depending on the circumstances. Russia is a cultural and political essence that is sharply different from both Europe and Asia. In the same way, Orthodoxy is neither Catholicism, nor Islam, nor Buddhism, nor any other confession.
It only remains to say that Alexander Nevsky is not a villain or a hero. He is the son of his difficult time, which was not at all guided by the "universal values" of the XX-XXI centuries. He did not make any fateful choice - he was chosen by the Horde khans, and he only fulfilled their will and used their strength to solve his momentary problems. He did not fight against the crusading aggression, but fought with the Dorpat Bishop for spheres of influence in the Eastern Baltic and negotiated with the Pope. Nor was he a traitor to national interests, if only because these very interests, like the nation, had not yet existed and could not have been. Collaboration is a concept that did not exist in the 13th century. All these assessments, all "choices", all concepts are from the 20th century. And in the XIII century they have no place - if, of course, we are talking about the actual scientific discussion.
Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation
North-Eastern State University
"Discussions about the influence of the Tatar-Mongol yoke on Russian history."
Completed by a student
philological faculty
group I-11
Vechtomova Tatiana
Checked by Associate Professor of the Department of ViIR
G.A. Pustovoit
Magadan 2011
In the XIII century. the peoples of our country had to endure a hard struggle against foreign invaders. Hordes of Mongol-Tatar conquerors fell from the east to Russia, to the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus. From the west, the Russian lands and the lands of the peoples of the Eastern Baltic were subjected to aggression by German, Swedish and Danish knights-crusaders, as well as Hungarian and Polish feudal lords.
The period of Mongol-Tatar rule in Russia lasted for about two and a half centuries, from 1238 to 1480. In this era, Ancient Russia finally disintegrated and the formation of the Moscow state began.
Before the invasion of the Tatar-Mongol hordes on the Russian lands, the Russian state consisted of several large principalities that constantly competed with each other, but did not have one large army capable of resisting the armada of nomads.
The problem of the influence of the Tatar-Mongol yoke on the formation of Russian statehood in Russian historiography is expressed by two extreme positions:
1. The Mongol-Tatar yoke brought ruin, death of people, delayed development, but did not significantly affect the life and life of Russians and their statehood. This position was defended by S. Soloviev, V. Klyuchevsky, S. Platonov, M. Pokrovsky. It has also been traditional for Soviet historiography for 75 years. The main idea was that Russia developed during the period of the Mongol-Tatar invasion along the European path, but began to lag behind due to large-scale destruction and human losses, the need to pay tribute.
2. The Mongol-Tatars had a great influence on the social and social organization of the Russians, on the formation and development of the Moscow state. For the first time this idea was expressed by L.N. Gumilev, N.M. Karamzin, and then it was developed by N.I. Kostomarov, N.P. Zagoskin and others. In the 20th century, these ideas were developed by the Eurasians, who considered the Moscow state a part of the Great Mongolian state. There are authors who argued that serfdom was borrowed by Russia from the Mongols
The position of L.N. Gumlev.
A feature of the concept of Lev Nikolaevich Gumilyov is the assertion that Russia and the Golden Horde before the XIII century. not only were they not enemies, but even were in some allied relations. In his opinion, the preconditions for such a union were the overly active expansionist actions of the Livonian Order in the Baltic States. Moreover, the alliance was for the most part military rather than political. This alliance was expressed in the form of protection of Russian cities by Mongolian detachments for a certain fee: “... Alexander was interested in the prospect of receiving military assistance from the Mongols to resist the onslaught of the West and internal opposition. It was for this help that Alexander Yaroslavovich was ready to pay, and pay dearly ”(LN Gumilev From Russia to Russia. - M .: Progress. P. 132). So, according to Gumilyov, with the help of the Mongols such cities as Novgorod, Pskov in 1268, and also Smolensk in 1274 escaped capture: “But here in Novgorod, according to the agreement with the Horde, a Tatar detachment of 500 horsemen appeared ... Novgorod and Pskov survived ”(Gumilev L.N. From Russia to Russia. - M .: Progress. p. 134). In addition, the Russian princes themselves helped the Tatars: “The Russians were the first to provide military assistance to the Tatars, taking part in the campaign against the Alans” (Gumilev L.N. From Russia to Russia. - M .: Progress. P. 133). Lev Nikolaevich saw only positive sides in such an alliance: “Thus, for the tax that Alexander Nevsky undertook to pay to Sarai, Russia received a reliable strong army that defended not only Novgorod and Pskov ... Moreover, the Russian principalities, which accepted an alliance with the Horde, completely preserved their ideological independence and political independence ... This alone shows that Russia was not a province of the Mongol ulus, but a country allied to the great khan, paying some tax on the upkeep of the army, which she herself needed "(Gumilyov L.N. From Russia to Russia - M .: Progress. P. 134). He also believed that this union brought about an improvement in the internal situation of the country: “The union with the Tatars turned out to be a blessing for Russia from the point of view of establishing internal order” (Gumilev L.N. From Russia to Russia. - M .: Progress. P. 133).
LN Gumilev cites the following facts to substantiate his idea. Firstly, Tatar-Mongol detachments were not constantly in Russia: “The Mongols did not leave the garrisons, they did not think to establish their permanent power” (Gumilev L.N. From Russia to Russia. - M .: Progress. P. 122). Secondly, it is known from many sources that Prince Alexander Nevsky often went to see Khan Bat. Gumilyov connects this fact with the organization of the union: “In 1251, Alexander came to the Batu Horde, made friends, and then fraternized with his son Sartak, as a result of which he became the adopted son of the khan. The union of the Horde and Russia has come true ... ”(Gumilev LN From Russia to Russia. - M .: Progress. P. 127). Thirdly, as mentioned above, Gumilev cites the fact of the protection of Novgorod by the Mongols in 1268. Fourth, in his books, Gumilev mentions the opening of an Orthodox bishopric in the Golden Horde, which in his opinion would be hardly possible in the event of enmity between these countries: “In 1261, through the efforts of Alexander Nevsky, as well as the Mongol khans Berke and Mengu-Timur a courtyard of an Orthodox bishop was opened. He was not subjected to any persecution; it was believed that the Bishop of Sarsk was the representative of the interests of Russia and all Russian people at the court of the great khan ”(Gumilyov L.N. From Russia to Russia. - M .: Progress. p. 133). Fifth, after Berke came to power in the Horde, who established Islam as a state religion, religious persecution of the Orthodox Church did not begin in Russia: “... After the victory of the Muslim party in the Horde in the person of Berke, no one demanded that Russians convert to Islam” ( Gumilev L.N. From Russia to Russia. - M .: Progress. P. 134). It seems to me that it is on the basis of these, and maybe even some other, facts that he makes a conclusion about the existence of allied relations between Russia and the Horde.
Other approaches to the problem.
In addition to the concept of L.N. Gumilev, there is one more “original” concept of Nosovskiy G.V. and Fomenko A.T., which does not coincide at all with traditional history. Its essence lies in the fact that, in their opinion, the Horde and Russia are practically the same state. They believed that the Horde was not a foreign entity that seized Russia, but simply an eastern Russian regular army that was an integral part of the ancient Russian state. The “Tatar-Mongol yoke” from the point of view of this concept is simply the period of military rule of the state, when the commander-khan was the supreme ruler, and civil princes sat in the cities, who were obliged to collect tribute in favor of this army, for its maintenance: “Thus the ancient Russian state is represented by a single empire, within which there was an estate of professional military men (Horde) and a civilian unit that did not have their own regular troops, since such troops were already part of the Horde ”(Nosovskiy G.V., Fomenko A.T. New chronology and concept Ancient Russia, England and Rome. M .: Publishing Department of the UC DO MGU, 1996. p.25). In the light of this concept, the frequent Tatar-Mongol raids were nothing more than a forcible collection of tribute from those regions that did not want to pay: “The so-called“ Tatar raids ”, in our opinion, were simply punitive expeditions to those Russian regions, which they refused to pay tribute to considerations "(Nosovskiy G.V., Fomenko A.T. New chronology and concept of ancient Russia, England and Rome. M .: Publishing. Department of the UC DO MSU, 1996. p.26). Nosovsky and Fomenko argue their version of events as follows. First, they share the opinion of some historians that Cossacks lived on the borders of Russia back in the 13th century. However, there is no mention of clashes between the Mongols and the Cossacks. From this they conclude that the Cossacks and the Horde are Russian troops: “The Horde, wherever it comes from, ... would inevitably have to come into conflict with the Cossack states. However, this was not noted. The only hypothesis: the Horde did not fight the Cossacks because the Cossacks were an integral part of the Horde. This is the version: the Cossack troops were not just part of the Horde, they were also regular troops of the Russian state. In other words, the Horde was Russian from the very beginning "(Nosovsky G.V., Fomenko A.T. New chronology and concept of ancient Russia, England and Rome. ). Secondly, they point to the absurdity of the use of Russian troops by the Mongols in their campaigns; after all, they could rebel and go over to the side of the Mongol enemies: “Let us stop for a moment and imagine the whole absurdity of the situation: the victorious Mongols for some reason hand over their weapons to the“ Russian slaves ”they have conquered, and they calmly serve in the troops of the conquerors, constituting there“ the main mass ”! .. Even in traditional history, Ancient Rome never armed the newly conquered slaves "(Nosovsky G.V., Fomenko A.T. New chronology and concept of ancient Russia, England and Rome. M .: Publishing. Department of the UC DO MSU, 1996 . p. 122). Karamzin wrote in his writings that most of the current churches were built precisely during the yoke. This fact also confirms the basis of the concept of Nosovsky and Fomenko: “Almost all Russian monasteries were founded under the“ Tatar-Mongols ”. And it's clear why. Many of the Cossacks, leaving military service in the Horde, went to monatyrs "(Nosovsky G.V., Fomenko A.T. New chronology and concept of ancient Russia, England and Rome. M .: Publishing. Department of the UC DO MSU, 1996. pp. .127-128). Thus, they write, “The Mongol conquerors turn into some kind of invisible, which for some reason no one sees” (Nosovskiy G.V., Fomenko A.T. New chronology and concept of ancient Russia, England and Rome. M .: Publishing Department of the UC DO MSU, 1996. p.124).
Almost all other well-known historians believe that the relationship of the Golden Horde to Russia cannot be called allied. In their opinion, the reasons for the establishment of the yoke are:
1. Conquest campaigns of the Tatar-Mongols,
2. The superiority of the Mongols in the art of war, the presence of an experienced and large army;
3. Feudal fragmentation and strife between princes.
The Tatar-Mongol invasion is precisely an "invasion", and not a "walk" in Russia, as L. Gumilyov claims and the establishment of the most severe yoke, that is, the domination of the Tatar-Mongols with all the hardships of the dependent existence of Russia.
The consequences of the Tatar-Mongol invasion are as follows: as a result of more than 2.5 centuries of yoke, Russia was thrown back in its development for 500 years, and this is the reason for Russia's lagging behind Western civilizations at the present time. As a result of the Tatar-Mongol invasion, Russian lands and cities were devastated, entire principalities were destroyed, colossal damage was caused to the development of the economy and culture, but the struggle against the Tatar-Mongol yoke helped to unite the Russian people, the formation of a centralized state.
Therefore, the Horde still had power over Russia, and the word “yoke” characterizes this power most accurately. The great khans treated Russia as a vassal state, the helplessness of which was supported by great tribute and recruiting. They argue their position with the following facts. First, for the great khans, Russian princes were like a cross between vassals and slaves. So, every time after the change of the khan, they went to bow to him and ask for a label to reign: “Back in 1242, the Grand Duke of Vladimir Yaroslav I went to the headquarters of Batu, where he was approved in office. His son Konstantin was sent to Mongolia to assure the regent of his and his paternal commitment ”(Vernadsky V.G. History of Russia: Mongols and Rus. - M .: Tver: Agraf: Lean, 2000. p. 149). This is also confirmed by the facts of the execution of Russian princes by the Mongol khans, for example, the execution of Mikhail of Chernigov: “... He was executed together with one of his loyal boyars, who accompanied him to the khan's duck ...” (Vernadsky V.G. History of Russia: Mongols and Russia. - M .: Tver: Agraf: Lean, 2000. p. 151). Secondly, history knows that during the entire period of power, the Golden Horde sent a lot of punitive detachments to Russia, who fought against non-payment of tribute, as well as uprisings of princes or common people. The clearest example of this is the "Nevryuev army", sent against the Grand Duke Andrei Yaroslavich, and which, according to the testimony of many historians, did Russia more harm than Batu's campaign: Tatar tumens under the command of the commander Nevryuya. The regiments of Andrei Yaroslavich and his brother Yaroslav were defeated in a fierce battle near Pereyaslavl-Zalessky, and the Grand Duke himself fled to Sweden, from where he returned only a few years later ”(Encyclopedia for Children. Vol.5. History of Russia and its closest neighbors. - M .: Avanta +, 1998.S. 229). Also, one cannot but take into account the frequent censuses of the population of Rus carried out by the khans. Their results were used to collect taxes, as well as to recruit warriors. This version of events is also supported by the fact that there was a decline in culture in Russia: some crafts were lost, many books were burned.
Conclusion.
It is very difficult to draw an unambiguous conclusion on this problem. None of the above versions of the presentation of events can be true.
List of used literature
